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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I examine the ways in which social media in Nigeria functions 
through online signifying practices as a strategy of demarginalization and subaltern resistance. I 
engage with this perspective by framing Web 2.0 platforms as enablers of citizens’ right to public 
and performative speech. Interested in the ways in which netizens imagine the nation and perform 
political selves and identities through viral and popular images on social media, my dissertation 
underpins a reading of social media that is grounded in an expanded conception of speech, visual 
and/or verbal. This approach enables me to take cognizance of the voices and perspectives 
secured by the decentralized capacity of digital media for everyday citizens with access to the 
Internet. Engaging with how social media re-centers alternative perspectives to prevailing 
orthodoxies, I explore the ways in which marginal groups, mostly relegated to the periphery of 
governmental power, emerge in performative spaces of public discourses through digital cultural 
signifiers such as the selfie, viral Internet memes, and humorous political cartoons posted online. 
I show that despite the limitations of cyberspace and the uneven access to internet technologies in 
some parts of Nigeria, social media is a discursive, if not contested, space of cultural production 
from which postcolonial subjects ‘author’ media narratives that revise, resist, and challenge 
exclusion and marginality.  
By analyzing the significations of user-generated cultural forms, mostly fictional images 
(Internet memes) and actual performative representations (the selfie) produced as vectors of 
digital activism and resistance, the dissertation highlights the varied ways in which social media 
functions as a rearticulating mechanism for a more inclusive appearance of young people and 
women in Nigeria’s public sphere. I analyze the production and circulation of these images 
within a framework that positions them as supplemental performative strategies to digital 
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activism. Extrapolating the economy of meanings inherent in these images begins, for me, by 
unsettling the postmodern assumption that mediatized culture is futile for resistance. The 
refutation of such arguments is necessary to consolidate the claim that the capacity for agency 
and representation, which social media affords excluded or oppressed populations is more 
pertinent than the positivist and teleological expectations some scholars have of digital 
articulations of dissent. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: THE LIBERTY OF APPEARING 
Social media in Nigeria functions through online popular images as a strategy of 
demarginalization and subaltern resistance, enabling a field of cultural production, as Pierre 
Bourdieu might frame it, that is defined by tensions and negotiations. My dissertation addresses 
this idea by framing Web 2.0 platforms as enablers of citizens’ right to public and performative 
speech. I am interested in the question: what are the effects of imagining the nation and performing 
political selves and identities through signifying practices such as viral hashtags, Internet memes 
and the selfie on social media? My response to this query is grounded in an expanded conception 
of speech, visual and/or verbal, that takes cognizance of the voices and perspectives secured by 
the decentralized capacity of digital media for everyday citizens with access to the Internet. Its 
apparent democratic outlook notwithstanding, the Nigerian state practises a politics of exclusion 
that largely affects the masses, especially youths and women, who are largely unrepresented in 
both actual governance and the public sphere.  
For most of its post-colonial history, Nigeria has witnessed more military governments 
than democratically elected administrations. The brutish and oppressive exercise of power during 
this period of military rule can be likened to what Giorgio Agamben locates in the sovereign sphere 
of totalitarian regimes, including the ban on human life through the circulation and mechanisms 
of absolute power (53). Typical of many autocratic countries, the militarization of society extended 
at the period to the regulation of thought, free speech, and culture, with a large section of working-
class people massively underrepresented in governance or in official political discourses. The 
military era saw a complete ban on political activities, with the Abacha government of the 1990s 
continuing the dictatorial politics of previous military regimes and jailing social activists and 
journalists without trial (Babatope 2000). Despite the return to democracy in 1999, there is still an 
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enormous concentration of power in the hands of a few in the political class who attempt to 
maintain the old military culture of political corruption and exclusion of large section of citizens 
from the public sphere. I hope to show how digital technologies remedy this situation by framing 
social media users as legitimate “authors” of subaltern meanings and alternative sites of cultural 
and political knowledge in contemporary Nigeria.  
The subaltern, initially from Antonio Gramsci’s conception of it in terms of class 
consciousness, non-hegemonic groups, and economic relations, is a keyword in postcolonial 
studies that I am using to designate this population of disempowered citizens who, before social 
media, found themselves in the margins of Nigerian sociocultural conversations and political 
history. While this work is also alert to the status of the subaltern in the framework of the ideas of 
Ranajit Guha and his cohorts in the Subaltern Studies Collective, the central focus of the term is 
its manifestation in digital contexts. In this dissertation, I describe the digital subaltern as an online 
subject that gains visibility and speech by coopting user-based media to write self and agency into 
the history of political and cultural processes. Gayatri Spivak’s essay on the female subaltern in 
the historiographical framework of South-East Asian colonialist politics adds to the concept of 
both Gramsci and Guha. Like Spivak’s idea that the female subaltern cannot speak and articulate 
any knowledge or agency because of a culturally designed lack of access to hegemonic spaces, the 
voice and perspectives of many Nigerian young people and women before social media was 
inadmissible in the public sphere. 
Although much of the content I am studying are the cultural productions of people between 
age 18 and 35, I also draw relevant examples from the creative social media posts of other everyday 
Nigerians being followed in network communities by these young individuals. According to 
statistics from the CIA World Factbook, of the estimated 180 million population of Nigeria, 62.4 
percent are in the age range of 0–24 years, 30 percent are in the range of 25–55 years, and 3 percent 
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are 65 years and older.1 These figures are significant because only three percent of the population 
have been most dominant as the country’s political elite, with a gerontocratic hold on power that, 
until recently, excludes many others from governance. I engage with how social media re-centers 
alternative perspectives to these prevailing orthodoxies, exploring the ways in which marginal 
groups, mostly relegated to the peripheries of governmental power, emerge in performative spaces 
of public discourses through digital cultural signifiers such as the selfie, viral Internet memes, and 
humorous political cartoons posted online. In a discussion of the margin as a space in which people 
inhabit “the fringes of the system of power” (48), Nelly Richard writes of it as “a concept-metaphor 
for rendering productive the social discarding of marginalization and marginality” (48). Richard 
stresses the importance of converting the sanctioning of the margin “into an enunciative posture 
and into the aesthetic citation of a critical neo-experimentality on the borders of identity and 
meaning” (48). In the framework of online media, this enunciative capacity of the margin can be 
rendered evident through the visual metaphors of symbolic forms on social media. Also, it enables 
me to argue that regular citizens on the peripheries of power can now rehabilitate their positionality 
and reclaim new political meanings through socially mediated forms of performative speech 
online. This dissertation, thus, generates important insights on the ways social media offers cultural 
capital to Nigerian citizens on the margins of power. 
I hope to show that despite the limitations of cyberspace and the uneven access to internet 
technologies in some parts of Nigeria, social media is a discursive, if not contested, space of 
cultural production. It functions in countries in the global south to rehabilitate exclusion in political 
and cultural discourses. By examining the significations of user-generated cultural practices, 
mostly fictional images (Internet memes and humorous images) and actual performative 
                                                          
1  “The World FactBook: Nigeria,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ni.html. Accessed 19 Jan, 2018. 
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representations (the selfie) produced as vectors of digital activism and resistance, my dissertation 
pinpoints the varied ways in which social media functions as a rearticulating mechanism for a 
more inclusive appearance of young people and women in Nigeria’s public sphere. These popular 
images, as the Nigerian social media terrain signals, serve as the visual metaphors of subaltern 
opposition to political domination and hegemonic culture.  
With user-generated media, the people in this group of Nigerians, constituting the largest 
demographic in the country, have become more assertive and involved participants in the political 
terrain, with social media enabling the visibility of previously silenced and silent perspectives. 
These subaltern populations, though, are not an undifferentiated mass, impervious to the polarizing 
effects of ethnicity, political party loyalty, and religion. Indeed, there are inexplicable voices from 
the disenfranchised class that mimic, if not endorse, the operations of hegemonic structures. In a 
2016 Facebook post, Ikhide Ikheloa identifies the ways the present government in Nigeria promotes 
counter-arguments to destabilize the interventions of young people on social media. I am invoking 
Ikheloa because he is one of the prominent voices commenting on culture and politics in the 
Nigerian social media arena. He writes of the existence of a Buhari Media Center (BMC) that has 
“been paying young writers/bloggers/social media ‘overlords’ and other assorted scumbags to 
appear to be objective public commentators (Ikhide Ikheloa 2016). This equally youthful group, 
working in a very slightly similar fashion to the Hitler youth organization in Nazi Germany, 
produces narratives to the “national discourse at least on social media, in the favor of their 
paymasters” and doing “many awful things to dissenting voices” in the process (Ikhide Ikheloa 
2016). This propaganda machinery proves that the Nigerian state is alert to some of the ways in 
which social media, as a contested space, offers new tactics of political engagements for non-
dominant groups. Despite the presence of these paid trolls, some of whom also double as the 
background actors of some politicians’ engagement with citizens on social media, the ways a 
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relatively new medium emphasizes the functioning of expressive power among Nigerian young 
people remains unprecedented. The existence of these ‘trolls’ also serves as an important reminder 
of the dispersed agency of the subaltern, and the necessary caution against valorizing it. 
The repoliticization of subaltern speech, as well as the new regime of agency and self-
enfranchisement digital citizens now apply to themselves on social media, have altered the nature 
of political involvement in the country. I consider agency to be the capacity individuals exercise as 
a means of participating in society and of performing unhindered social actions in various ways 
determined by them. This perspective would be most accurate if informed by Margaret Archer’s 
social theory of critical realism and agency. Archer writes that “our emergence as ‘social selves’ is 
inextricably related to the emergent properties of the social structures and cultures in which we 
find ourselves, and which we both reproduce and transform” (258). In other words, the 
performative competence and self-worth of social actors play out from within particular social and 
cultural structures that constitute the foundation of individual self-action and personal identity.  
Based on this theoretical viewpoint, I use ‘Performative agency’ to gesture toward the 
performance of identities organized around the capacity of individuals to produce and circulate 
cultural meanings as subjectively defined practices of transforming and reproducing social 
structures. In a 2015 report by Cordelia Hebblethwaite on @BBCTrending, Blossom Nnodim, 
founder of #AdoptaTweep, told the BBC that many Nigerian youths online feel a sense of political 
responsibility in the expression of agency. Those who do have “access [to the Internet] have taken 
it upon ourselves to be the voice for the ones who don’t. To be the voice of the voiceless” (“BBC”). 
The various inflections and employment of this subaltern voice—particularly its images, rhetoric, 
and contradictions—are the cornerstones of this study. There is a politics of class to be recognized 
here, though, considering that netizens who position themselves to speak for others without access 
to the Net unwittingly perpetuate other kinds of hierarchies. As Linda Alcoff famously argues, the 
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practice of speaking for others leads, even if not always, to an erasure and is often “born of a desire 
for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about 
another’s situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise” 
(22). In other words, the practice of privileged persons, whether on social media or in another 
discursive location, speaking for or on behalf of marginal or less privileged persons or groups, 
indeed, has the potential to increase or reinforce the oppression of the group spoken for. I highlight 
this idea to caution against the transformation of user-based performances online into hierarchical 
forms of speech and thinking. 
Suffice to say that Nigerian young people and women now have a voice that resonates in 
the corridors of power. This digitally enabled repossession of a visible space in the political 
landscape unsettles the idea that young people are generally not interested in political 
conversations. David Buckingham explains that: “By and large, young people are not defined by 
society as political subjects, let alone as political agents. Even in the areas of social life that affect 
and concern them to a much greater extent than adults – most notably education – political debate 
is conducted almost entirely ‘over their heads’” (219). This dissertation addresses how young 
people challenge such perceptions, and political exclusions, investigating, although secondarily, 
the discourse of social media as an enabler of the organization and coordination of social protest 
in Nigeria. As the central objective of the dissertation is the exploration of online popular culture 
as discursive forms of resistance, I examine the ways young people express themselves politically 
online without implying that they are victims of any postcolonial entanglements. The enhanced 
visibility and voice offered by the medium envision a new regime of empowerment and new 
articulations of political consciousness for creative young people. I consider this newly amplified 
voice by analyzing the discursive spaces presented by digital media for the agency of young people, 
who, as Buckingham asserts, are often sidelined in conversations that affect them. 
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The assumption in much of the research on social media is the teleological imperative that 
the deployment of network environments for social actions must convoke some praxis. This view 
also assumes that the mobilization of social media as an apparatus for organizing protest must 
always initiate offline results for it to be considered an effective technology for social change. 
Implicit in this hypothesis is the fact that social media, like modernity’s narratives of progress, 
must materialize measurable social change lest it is construed as another mediatized space in which 
resistance is futile. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s view that the culture industry restates 
bourgeois domination partly informs much of this pessimistic scholarship on technology and 
modern cultural productions. Adorno and Horkheimer famously write that “the deception is not 
that the culture industry serves up amusement but that it spoils the fun by its business-minded 
attachment to the ideological clichés of the culture which is liquidating itself” (114). Their sense 
of the culture industry as a legitimation of capitalist hegemony constructs culture as a sphere that 
offers a freedom to choose what is always the same. Despite Adorno and Horkheimer’s cultural 
pessimism on the idea of the transformative power of political action by the working class and on 
social movements, there are others in the Marxist tradition that do not share their skeptical 
approach. A major figure in this later tradition, for instance, is Ernst Bloch, who asserts belief in 
the principle of hope, that utopian vision of a future not founded on naïve wishful thinking but one 
“pervaded by daydreams; dreams of a better life than that which has so far been given” (5) to 
individuals. As I intend to show in this dissertation, despite Nigeria’s enduring crises of governance 
marked by a defective democracy and widespread human rights abuses and economic 
mismanagement, everyday life is yet infused with a principle of hope that is articulated in various 
ways that include the symbolic cultural practices of netizens. These individuals are animated 
neither by the sociopolitical gloom nor economic austerity that surrounds them, but by a sense of 
optimism, informed by a perpetual longing for a better future. This hope, together with other 
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factors, informs the production of satirical cartoons, playful and protests selfies, humorous Internet 
memes, as well as other media signifiers of sanguinity that are circulated in Nigerian social media 
as visual metaphors of politicized speech. 
Aside from Adorno and Horkheimer, the other informing perspective is Jean Baudrillard’s 
argument about the media as a site of simulations and unreality, one in which postmodern culture 
is constituted by copies and representations, an idea I hope to challenge in a subsequent section. 
Some scholars and public commentators extend these perspectives in various ways, including 
Malcolm Gladwell (2010), Evgeny Morozov (2011), as well as the occupy activist Astra Taylor 
(2014). Taylor, for instance, reasons that the “values of programmers and the corporate officers 
who employ them shape the online worlds we inhabit” (76). Morozov, for his part, asserts that the 
enlistment of social media for digital activism is a slacktivist process “that makes activists feel 
useful and important while having preciously little political impact” (190). While these are 
legitimate concerns, it is not always the case that resistance is meaningless or that real-world 
political consequences are absent when people deploy social media as a mechanism of dissent and 
resistance. I use Nigerian social media culture to assess the varied modes of expressing the 
amelioration of social inequities which the Internet also supports, including the performative 
expression of resistance through popular images. There is no doubt slacktivism may be a genuine 
possibility, yet it harbours a cynicism that forecloses the various ways the mere capacity for 
representation and speech as well as the public expression of politicized speech by subaltern 
populations in online network communities are significant expressions of self-enfranchisement. 
This empowerment needs to be appreciated for its own sake. The new regime of agency facilitated 
by Web 2.0 constructs new media users as productive subjects imbued with authorial power, 
making their capacity to represent themselves a critical milestone in countries with notoriety for 
the devaluation of free speech and the exclusion of certain individuals in politics.  
 9 
 
Working within a digital feminist context, Carrie Smith-Prei and Maria Stehle (2016) invite 
critics to evaluate the politics inherent in the awkwardness and messiness of past digital activism 
such as those of Pussy Riot and the Occupy movements. They view the politics and expression of 
some of these digital moments as often fraught with a misdirected motion that is “in constant 
movement, circulating and slipping from view” (146). This state of flux and becoming is informed 
by an awkwardness that makes online articulations of resistance messy, unruly, yet acquiring a 
form that can upset social norms. Rather than focus on actual offline social changes that many 
critics of social media protests have come to expect, Smith-Prei and Stehle suggest that the 
“awkward politics” of digital activism embeds an agency that makes the online expression of 
dissent fascinating. While I agree with these feminist scholars on the efficacy of the medium, I 
insist that a politics of oppression in a context such as those obtainable in many autocratic or 
pseudo-democratic societies demands that one engage with social media for its sheer ability to 
render subaltern narratives and expressions of resistance visible. Focusing on whether these online 
protests are ineffective, messy or awkward sometimes elides the important fact that more regular 
citizens and subaltern populations in many countries can now indeed speak back to power, 
appearing through user-focused technologies to create, author, and circulate their own cultural 
formations and narratives of resistance.  
I am framing resistance in terms of the wide-ranging and undisciplined ways young people 
seek to articulate dissent as a cultural and playful practice on social media. I examine resistance as 
the ways in which Nigerian netizens “encounter the state, and how they engage, deconstruct and 
wrestle with it” (Obadare and Willems ixxx) as a practice of an everyday life that is entangled with 
social media. Since I am interested in the articulation of this resistance through popular culture, my 
work highlights some of the various ways online images are produced and circulated in Nigerian 
social media as signifying practices that destabilize a normative sociocultural order perceived to 
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be unjust and unequal by many citizens. My work hopes to demonstrate the reterritorialization of 
the politics of counter-hegemony online and the reconstitution of the everyday resistance practices 
of citizens in social media posts and narratives. Although I will be returning to Stuart Hall’s 
discussion of the workings of popular culture as the site in which “hegemony is secured” (239) in 
chapter two, I rely here on John Fiske’s equally broad explanation of the culture of everyday life 
to chart my understanding of what Nigerian netizens are doing with popular images and visual texts 
on social media:  
Everyday life is constituted by the practices of popular culture, and is 
characterized by the creativity of the weak in using the resources provided by a 
disempowering system while refusing to submit to that power. The culture of 
everyday life is best described through metaphors of struggle or antagonism: 
strategies opposed by tactics, the bourgeoisie by the proletariat; hegemony met 
by resistance, ideology countered or evaded top-down; power opposed by 
bottom-up power, social discipline faced with disorder. (47) 
This focus on the tactics of disempowered groups, which Fiske underlines as the “creativity of the 
weak” is expressed in the context of Nigerian social media through political images and 
performative forms functioning to affirm the daydreams and hopeful longings of everyday people. 
The emphasis on the culture of ordinary people online enables me to explore how online everyday 
life in contemporary Nigeria overlaps with ideas of power and resistance. Fiske’s reference to the 
“creativity of the weak” reiterates James Scott’s idea of the “weapons of the weak” (1). Scott uses 
his expression to refer to the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups, notably the hidden 
transcript of the covert everyday resistance of peasants (29). However, with social media rendering 
subaltern strategies of dissent visible, these creative forms of resistance can be found in public and 
collective defiance of state authority. This is because social media, by nature, is a performative 
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space for the staging of public spectacle, with the practices of resistance conditioned by overt 
performances, rather than concealment.  Social media inaugurates a practice that was almost 
inconceivable previously in a world of monopolistic and regulated media culture in Nigeria in 
which the consumer of cultural meanings was not actively invested in the process of resisting 
hegemony. The use of social media to subvert and undermine postcolonial excess in countries such 
as Nigeria may be imagined as a predictable response, typical of the dialectic of power and 
resistance, since, as Michel Foucault asserts, “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or 
rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (95). 
Since power and resistance are mutually constituted, my interest is to examine the online 
articulation of this tension, this interplay of rule and resistance by locating contemporary modes of 
activist behaviour in Nigeria within social media. Therefore, as agency and resistance operate 
within the mechanism of power in various ways that engage, transform, undermine, and subvert 
state power (Obadare and Willems 7), I highlight how the incessancy of dissent to hegemonic 
culture is expressed through the images of popular culture. Also, I argue that much of the social 
media culture in Nigeria indicates the production and sharing of media for participating in politics. 
That user-generated media makes possible conditions in which netizens, as producers of culture, 
respond to hegemony restates the argument that these netizens are not invested in the struggle 
against the dominant culture from a position of victimhood. They are ‘authors’ of political change, 
not victims trapped in any static political formation.  
While my work examines different modalities of political interactions and engagements in 
the Nigerian social media landscape, what it stresses most are the visual cultural forms that enhance 
the expression of resistance by a section of young Nigerians on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. 
What I am calling resistance also includes the expression of outrage articulated through the 
contestations of visible practices of political corruption, economic domination, and systemic abuses 
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of power. Although I problematize and complicate the meanings of resistance and concepts, such 
as agency and performance, my mobilization of the term is in the context of social media. 
Particularly, my focus is how Web 2.0 technologies rearticulate hitherto passive consumers of 
culture as legitimate producers of meaning and involved members of a new public sphere. While I 
invoke the Habermasian public sphere, I am deploying a framework for resistance organized 
around the production of visual culture by netizens. This deliberate production of images may be 
considered a manifestation of what Deborah Willis (2003) calls “subversive resistance” (55). Willis 
uses this expression to describe the calculated production of photographic images by African 
American communities as a repertoire of visual tactics that recover a positive identity and resist an 
“other” view of the black subject (55). Subversive resistance can be redeployed within a Nigerian 
social media context to refer to the ways in which online citizens intentionally or unintentionally 
produce and distribute subversive political images to resist, revise, and critique corrupt and abusive 
power. As well, these images also function as conduits of the subjectivity and agency of netizens 
who employ visual culture to repossess a space for themselves in online public conversations. 
Outrage, as Manuel Castells notes, is often a product of the realization that so-called democratic 
institutions do not “represent the interests of citizens” (42) because the ruling elite have, as in the 
case of the Nigerian government, become “a self-reproducing cast catering mostly to their interests, 
and to the preservation of their monopoly over the state” (42). Interested in the ways social media 
users challenge such systems of rule and domination, I show that forms and signifiers of online 
popular culture such as the selfie, political cartoons, online humour, and viral Internet memes are 
being used as performative strategies through which Nigerian netizens perform everyday resistance 
to disempowering postcolonial conditions. The idea that the spaces facilitated by social media 
inherently harbour the possibility of performance is a suggestion that users orient their public 
identities and activities in specific ways, carefully presenting well-fashioned versions of 
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themselves as they would want to be perceived or imagined by an audience. Social media, then, is 
the ultimate locale of self-fashioning.  
The repertoire of visual tactics identified above is important for the scholarship on social 
media and social movements because of the deeply embedded cultural perspective it lends to much 
of the quantitative and positivistic research on digital activism that emerged after the Arab Spring 
and the Occupy Movements. While mindful of the overly sociopolitical orientation of social 
movements as a new media response to abusive or autocratic power, I am suggesting that the 
signifiers of online popular culture deployed as performative strategies of resistance by regular 
social media users point to the existence of alternative cultural practices that can animate research 
in online activism. While the debate on ways social media enables the collecting, organizing, and 
coordinating of dissident voices across the world is important, this dissertation explores the other 
means by which social media facilitates the expression of resistance, namely various symbolic and 
performative articulations of political dissent. During Occupy Nigeria, for instance, there were 
humour and musical performances presented as expressions of solidarity by artists who had joined 
the 2012 mass protest for the removal of oil subsidy by the Nigerian government. In a similar way 
to how the discursive representations in these sites of performances serve as symbolic 
accoutrements of street protests, online popular forms of representations and visual culture also 
legitimize spaces in which agency and politicized speech against hegemonic culture are possible.  
My conception of the Nigerian public sphere as a realm constituted by visual culture 
circulated by young people on social media coheres with Thomas Paine’s famous assertion about 
“the liberty of appearing” (154) as a precondition for the dissemination of truth in a nation. The 
liberty to appear and be seen/or heard, which social media facilitates is a mode of resisting a 
normative order that fosters silence, and, sometimes, discursive erasure.  Thus, the rehabilitation 
of cultural and political invisibility is itself a form of resistance. This claim can be appreciated 
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more through Hannah Arendt’s description of the public realm as an intersubjective and 
deprivatized space in which speech and visibility are major expressive modalities. As Arendt puts 
it: 
everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the 
widest possible publicity. For us, appearance – something that is being seen and 
heard by others as well as by ourselves – constitutes reality. Compared with the 
reality which comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of intimate 
life – the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses 
– lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are 
transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them 
for public appearance…The presence of others who see what we see and hear what 
we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves. (50) 
It needs to be emphasized that the liberty of appearance often leads to the appearance of liberty, 
something Arendt clearly opines in this passage. Her ideas sponsor the notion of silence as an 
ineffectual mode of engaging in the public arena, privileging speech as a productive and essential 
mode of appearing in the public sphere. This appearance, as Jürgen Habermas reckons, is 
predicated upon a certain “kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of 
status, disregard[s] status altogether” (36). This disregard of status is something user-based media 
affords all netizens, especially minority groups such as women and youths. Unlike the exclusion 
of particular sets of people that constitute the discourse of the Habermasian public, the digitally 
enabled public sphere in Nigerian social media includes anyone with access to the Internet, as 
citizens now seek to engage in critical-rational communication with willing members of the 
political class. To return to Arendt, the constitution of the politics in this public realm can be seen, 
for instance, in the ways social media enables networks and communities of individuals who, “in 
 15 
 
the presence of others,” share reality at a differential, interactive, and multiperspectival level. Even 
if their contributions in this public space are deindividualized, the interventions of social media 
users are individuated because of the ways in which user-generated media serves to articulate the 
authority and agency of the individual on social media.  
To critique this Arendtian framework of social media as a space of appearance, as do Nick 
Couldry and Jannis Kallinikos in a recent discussion of the sociology of social media’s ontology, 
is to restate a popular skepticism about social media that elides the agency of users. In their 
italicized claim, Couldry and Kallinikos are of the view that there is on social media platforms “no 
appearance-in-itself but only ever appearance that is derivative of prior processes of [economic] 
calculation” (234) that challenge the basis of understanding the social. Their views convoke 
narratives of what may be called ‘algorithmic interpellation’—the subjectivization of digital actors 
through computer protocols for economic gains. The recent privacy scandal involving Facebook 
and Cambridge Analytica is a pertinent illustration of how the agency and subjectivities of netizens 
can sometimes serve insidious ideological and capitalist ends. As I will show through a Marxist 
analysis in the next chapter, this perspective harbours a pessimistic approach to social media that 
occludes the meaningful social connections and political engagements that also take place on the 
platforms. 
Because of social media, subjects whose representation in a nation’s public sphere is limited 
can now indeed appear in both the public arena and in the consciousness of the state or its actors. 
The Nigerian netizens who appear in such digital public spheres indeed exercise speech as a 
“performative power to lay claim to the public” (Butler s75) in a way that is not always sanctioned 
by the established cultural and political hierarchy in the country. Yet, as I will show shortly, this 
performativity sometimes transcends online speech to include “the demands of bodily action, 
gesture, movement, congregation, persistence, and exposure to possible violence” (Butler 75). This 
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ensemble of performative behaviour is evident in different ways in some of the examples in 
subsequent chapters, with the exposure to violence, in particular, examined within the framework 
of some selfie protests of #BringBackOurGirls campaign discussed in chapter three. In this third 
chapter, I stress how a certain disposability of protest bodies by the state and its repressive 
apparatuses faces some ridicule and resistance through visual culture.  
A recent debate demonstrating this expanded voice of young people in the Nigerian public 
sphere involves Africa’s first Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka. On the heels of the American 2016 
presidential elections, Soyinka had expressed his determination to destroy his American residency 
card if Donald Trump emerged victorious in the election. Following Trump’s victory, a horde of 
young people on social media called out to Soyinka to fulfill his promise. Soyinka read their online 
commentaries as a mob-like invasion of his privacy, calling his interlocutors “illiterates who feel 
they want to make themselves heard” (Ibekwe 2016). Although a number of Soyinka’s critics were 
misguided, the plurality of haranguing commentaries on the subject indicates a new order in the 
nature and constitution of the Nigerian public sphere. Soyinka’s language regarding social media 
users that wish to “make themselves heard” aptly frames the impact of the new regime of agency 
available to young people in Nigeria.  One Facebook user, in a statement that reflects the collective 
disposition of this now visible group, presents the following thoughts as part of his response to the 
Soyinka debate:   
[S]ocial media is turning out to be the 'older generation’s nightmare. The older 
generation of politicians, intellectuals, columnists are used to having opinions and 
making them public without contradiction. They are used to writing in newspapers 
and declaring their opinions as final without contradiction because [for] some of 
these young ones, it will take them a year to ever get their opinions published in 
those newspapers. What social media has offered the youths is the opportunity to 
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challenge every word spoken, the opportunity to talk back, the opportunity to 
examine every word written and spoken and sieve out the bullshit from the real 
message. This is very uncomfortable for certain persons. (James Ogunjimi 2016)  
My idea of agency in this dissertation is also this power to be heard and seen by others which 
Patrick Chabal (2009) frames as “directed, meaningful, intentional, and self-reflective social action 
(7). It is the individual capacity of everyday citizens to contribute to social processes with limited 
institutional restrictions. Ogunjimi’s post summarizes the anxieties of Nigeria’s young netizens 
about the evolving nature of the public arena in Nigeria. The post informs my view that everyday 
life in Nigeria is now entangled with social media and young people are the beneficiaries of the 
medium’s politics of re/membering and visibility. I use “remembering” in a dual sense that signifies 
how social media restages the consciousness of young people in cultural and political 
conversations, re/membering them as informed actors of a digitally enabled public sphere onto a 
body politic that has always excluded them. From a culture in which an “older generation of 
politicians, intellectuals, columnists are used to having opinions and making them public without 
contradiction” to one that promotes “opportunity to talk back” and “challenge every word,” there 
is the apparent understanding that previously silenced perspectives can gain traction and have 
evident representation in national debates. There is the possibility of reading the “talk back” of 
these young people as the jangling sounds of a mob as Wole Soyinka imagines it. However, such 
a view would be a foreclosure of the idea that social media unsettles an earlier cultural order that 
proscribes speech and silences certain populations in the constitution of a vibrant public sphere.  
 
1.1 Web 2.0, and Postmodern Performativity  
Tim O’Reilly and Dale Dougherty coined the expression “Web 2.0” in 2004 to explain the 
transition of the Internet from static web pages to more dynamic web platforms that rely on user-
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generated content” (O’Reilly 17). Wikis and social media are examples of such platforms that 
enable a more active participation of previously passive and depoliticized media users in the 
production of knowledge and new cultural meanings, which are organized around connectivity and 
sharing of user-generated content. Thus, social media technologies, as Jean Burgess, Alice 
Marwick and Thomas Poell explain, include “those digital platforms, services, and apps built 
around the convergence of content sharing, public communication, and interpersonal connection” 
(1). My conception of social media as a digital arena of convergence and sociality enabling 
participatory politics also stems from the idea of the agora in Classical Greece, since social media 
similarly exhibits an assembly of disparate and performative voices appearing in a shared and 
networked space to discuss issues of public concern. The digital agora, though, envisions the 
possibility of a cultural and political space that stages privatized narratives and individual 
subjectivity as a mode of public self-presentations. With Web 2.0, social activism and the 
questioning of traditional structures of power and nation-states take on a global intensification, 
manifest in the online reconstitution of the politics of dissent and resistance around the world. 
Platforms such as social media became the organising mechanisms for coordinating and mobilizing 
protests activities of such notable social movements as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street. 
In Nigeria, Occupy Nigeria became a local version of similar transnational movements around the 
world.  
Although Nigerian netizens also coordinated and planned protest events on Facebook and 
Twitter, many others maximized the platforms’ creative affordances to reconstitute some of the 
symbolic signs that typically accompany street protests, within social media. I should note that 
while the activism in Nigerian social media in 2012 was simply a demand for basic living 
conditions, it has since transformed into a protest culture against bodily violence and state silence 
on domestic terrorism. Satirical cartoons, humorous videos, as well as other images that ridiculed 
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the Nigerian government’s economic policies were deployed by ordinary Nigerians as cultural and 
performative practices during Occupy Nigeria. Artists and other cultural icons converged with civil 
rights activists on concrete spaces in Lagos and other major cities for protests. Cultural forms such 
as humour and music were strategic in rousing of the huge crowd of people that had been out to 
protest. With digital forms of resistance, however, these performances were retransmitted online 
through visual images produced to achieve similar ends. What is assured by these new 
developments is not only a reconstitution of the fields of social movements and politics but also of 
popular culture. Within the framework of the #BringBackOurGirls campaign and other forms of 
digital protests in Nigeria, these symbolic forms constitute a radical mode for the performative 
expressions of political thought. Besides arguing that users of social media are not just depoliticized 
and passive consumers of media that can read preferred, negotiated and/or oppositional meanings 
(Hall 117), I also suggest that social media offers an appreciation of their behaviour as audience-
contributor in mediatized space in terms of performance. The performance of political selves on 
social media by users, especially young people who still occupy the margins of the political class, 
is now being articulated through the phatic and performative rituals of sharing, tweeting and liking 
content such as texts, music, and popular images. These young people can now, through economies 
of representation on social media, scrutinize the hegemonic spaces of the Nigerian state as well as 
its varied mechanisms of abusive power. A cultural theory of social media and its deployment as 
an instrument of resisting marginality not only, therefore, facilitates an awareness of digital media’s 
enabling of agency but also divulges the ways popular and visual culture on social media can 
supplement resistance to dominant groups and postcolonial oppression.  
In understanding the rhizomatic pathways of protest online, one can liken the forms of 
popular culture examined in this study to what Nduka Otiono conceives as “street stories” (2) in 
his dissertation. This perspective enables an understanding of the ways in which subaltern 
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narratives in new sociocultural contexts such as social media in postcolonial states disrupt 
structures of power through citizens’ sharing of popular culture. Otiono explains street stories in 
“the postcolonial Nigerian urban context” as “asymptomatic of ordinary citizens’ attempt to 
comprehend their socio-political circumstance through narratives, and to promote popular uprising 
against an oppressive state” (2).  He focuses on how these narratives are framed through the 
communicative model of rumour in an array of media forms, including the traditional press in 
Nigeria, Internet sites, the video-film culture, Nollywood, as well as Nigerian music. However, he 
does not fully explicate the varied and specific ways social media particularly functions through 
digital visual culture and popular images to articulate subaltern dissent and archive the 
contemporary sociocultural and political history of Nigeria. In other words, my work builds on 
Otiono’s, to elaborate on the reimagination of everyday life and political culture in Nigeria, by 
focusing on the digital activities of citizens who perform political selves and identities by posting 
subversive images on social media. Political images and the rhetoric they embed have always been 
central to cultural formations in Nigerian oral performances that employ aural and visual idioms 
as strategies of articulation. The iconic album covers of Nigerian revolutionary musician Fela 
Anukulapo-Kuti, for example, stage aesthetic performances of the politics of protest for which the 
legendary Nigerian music icon was globally acclaimed. According to Sola Olorunyomi, the visual 
narrative of the musician’s album jackets offers “a social realism” (1) of Fela’s Afrobeat song-
texts that makes visible the agonies of life in early post-independent Nigeria. Designed by the artist 
Lemi Ghariokwu, the images on the albums highlight the intersection of art and politics—which 
more contemporary artists such as Mike Asukwo are using social media to circulate.  
Beyond the global fascination with social media as an apparatus for new forms of social 
movements, therefore, is an appropriation of network platforms as cultural fields in which everyday 
citizens express political identities. My work undertakes a critical analysis of the visual metaphors 
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of virtual network communities, with a view to showing how the critiques of power by Nigerian 
social media users is an affirmation of some of the ways citizens can visually narrate the nation 
(Bhabha 1990). I examine viral memes and satirical images, and political self-presentations that 
function as markers of postmodern performativity in Nigerian social media to illustrate that the 
sharing of popular culture forms on social media extend the boundaries of online activism and can 
be conceptualized as counter-hegemonic visual signifiers in Nigerian spaces of power. By spaces 
of power, I am referring to traditional structures and apparatuses of nation-states and their 
geographies of political authority. For example, the Nigerian Parliament has recently proposed a 
bill, titled “Act to Prohibit Frivolous Petitions and other Matters Connected Therewith,” to regulate 
and control social media activities (“Premium Times”). In response to the prohibitions of the 
proposed legislation, social media was used by concerned Nigerians as a tactic of opposition. Many 
social media users published and distributed commentaries in their networks to disparage the bill, 
while civil and cultural organizations, such as the worldwide association of writers (PEN), 
networking with similar international groups, signed an online petition urging the Nigerian 
Parliament to reconsider the implications of the bill on freedom of expression.  
Aside from the cliché that a picture conveys a thousand words, my sense of these varied 
interventions is that they receive a more critical purchase when accompanied by satirical and 
humorous images some netizens prefer to circulate instead. For instance, the works of the Nigerian 
political cartoonist Mike Asukwo who distributes his cartoons on both Facebook and Twitter are 
examples of such images. These visual texts are shared by the cartoonist and his many fans to 
disseminate political positions while resisting and subverting the juridical pretentions of the 
Nigerian parliament. Mike Asukwo is the most prolific political cartoonist in contemporary Nigeria 
and his many viral images inform critical discussions online. His cartoons are disseminated both 
in digital and print avenues across Nigeria. Digital media have become an important location for 
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the distribution of his works, as social media bring Asukwo and his audience into a shared space 
in which they converge to read, reproduce and circulate the political rhetoric of his cartoons. This 
work suggests that social media is central to the increasing role of Asukwo's political cartoons in 
expressing and conditioning a civic agency among Nigerians. His cartoons and the other images 
discussed in this work can lead to the conclusion that everyday media practices such as the reading 
of popular culture texts challenge hegemonic structures, leading to the production of a public 
sphere that is inclusive and assertive. 
 
 
        Fig. 1.1. Mike Asukwo. “Damning the Bridge.” Facebook  
Metaphorically, the title “Damning the bridge,” in this cartoon illustrates the state’s disruption of 
the democratizing affordances of social media. It gestures towards the ways in which social media 
in Nigeria has been a connective technology for ordinary citizens to reach politicians, who 
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previously were inaccessible to their constituencies. That the lawmakers threaten a juridical 
procedure that abrogates a new cultural form of engagement between the ruling elite and the masses 
indicates how corrupt and abusive power in Nigeria resists scrutiny and citizen-driven demand for 
accountability. The fact that a Nigerian structure of power initiates this criminalization of social 
media is itself a critical pointer that social media is changing the face of governance in a way in 
which earlier forms of media and cultural representations have not done in Nigeria. Also, the image 
pertinently illustrates the destabilization of the traditional authority of the state which social media 
spaces of representation such as Mike Asukwo’s Facebook timeline provokes. The deployment of 
this image on Facebook, and not in a traditional medium such as print, is one of the reasons for its 
effectiveness as a text that widely circulates resistance among netizens. The immediacy of social 
media and the participatory nature—evident in the dialogic exchanges of readers on the thread—
empower users to quickly disseminate the critiques of the text, to the extent that the Nigerian 
national assembly, eventually reconsidered passing the proposed bill into law. The reach and 
distribution of the rhetoric of the image on social media make it more effective than any circulation 
of a similar message in pre-digital traditional media. Although the mainstream media and digital 
media continue to feed into each other in Nigeria, the fact that the latter enable ordinary consumers 
of media narratives to assert and represent themselves more directly makes social media an 
innovative space for resisting totalities in Nigeria. A new cultural template in which the user is the 
focus of textual formations, whether as writer and reader in the poststructuralist sense, invites the 
production of new forms of subjectivities, uncommon in the Nigerian sociocultural and political 
contexts. From the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter campaign of 2014 to the recent 2016 
#SacktheSenate or #OccupyNASS movements therefore, what is evident in the Nigerian political 
sphere is a new sociopolitical order constituted by a virtual public that counters the hegemonic 
 24 
 
designs of the state by mounting resistance through popular satirical texts and humorous images 
on social media.  
My focus on the images of popular culture and the dialogic narratives they embed motivate 
my de-emphasis of verbal and oral modes of argumentation natural in the Nigerian public sphere. 
Instead, I rely on what Manuel Castells identifies as “the flows of information and images” (417) 
in digital media to understand the imagining and narrating of nationhood and citizenship through 
the construction of meaning organized around political images—visual self-representations used 
in political discourses, in addition to written self-representations such as status updates.  My 
intention is to evaluate social media as a cultural and symbolic field in which citizens imagine and 
reimagine their nation through the playful and performative modes of self-presentations digital 
media occasions. My conception of citizenship in this work thus fits Heather Zwicker’s analytical 
framework, which promotes citizenship as one of the ways subjects negotiate with the nation-state. 
According to Zwicker, this understanding of citizenship never imagines the public sphere as being 
limited to the state alone. There is a sense in which identifying with a state involves the 
performance of citizenship in both private and public spaces (250). Social media is arguably the 
commonest example of a field in which this public-private performance can be realized through 
popular culture. In her definition of citizenship—as a mode of shaping the public sphere, Nadine 
Dolby (2006) asserts that citizenship is “an active process that involves the core of people’s daily 
existence, including the ways in which they interact with and use popular culture” (32). This 
centrality of popular culture to thinking about the expression of citizenship is an idea I emphasize 
as performative citizenship, as I imagine an intersection between popular culture as a domain for 
identity performance and social media as an avenue that fosters new expressions of political 
subjectivities. The expressions of citizenship and identity in contemporary Africa can best be fully 
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appreciated through the economies of symbolic meanings netizens produce and circulate on social 
media.  
As I am critical of any conception of social media that essentializes it, I approach the 
increasingly pervasive influence of social media in contemporary Nigeria, and indeed around the 
world from a perspective that forbids essentializing or fetishizing the media. Social media might 
have been effective within the context of the Arab Spring and indeed Occupy Nigeria, yet the 
inflections and particularities of its workings in different regions of the world need to be 
highlighted. As Paolo Gerbaudo frames the argument, the problem of a techno-optimistic narrative 
on social media becomes “a ‘fetish’ of collective action” (Gerbaudo 8) to the extent that social 
media becomes endowed with mystical qualities that only obscure the actors using the media. 
Within the Nigerian context, social media exerts a palpable influence on society, as much as 
society also shapes the kind of contents and genres that are evident on the platforms. Commenting 
on this point, Daniel Miller explicates the essential nature of social media in relation to its working 
in society by noting that it is not “that the world has made social media completely different, or 
that social media has changed the world. It’s obviously always going to be dialectical. But in this 
case, it provides a new space for genres to occupy, which are not themselves particularly changed” 
(Borgerson and Miller 523). In other words, and this is particularly true of the social media culture 
in Nigeria, there exists a reciprocal influence between society and social media, to the extent that 
the latter exhibits a continuum of the cultural practices and media behaviours of users. For instance, 
before the era of social media, one of the manifestations of a public sphere in which everyday 
citizens participated in as an informal way of articulating their voice was the “newsstand street 
parliament” (Otiono 290), as in Figure 1.2 below: 
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Fig. 1.2. A group of men at a street newspaper stand in Nigeria. Source: Gettyimages 
The mode of conversations and debates in public spaces such as the one in the image is one of the 
major elements of social life reconstituted in many public engagements with politics and culture 
in Nigeria. While narratives from street parliaments, serving as one of the traditional ways of 
assessing popular opinions in Nigeria, continue to be important for citizens without access to the 
Internet, social media provides a more complex and nuanced stage for the dissemination of the 
alternative perspectives of everyday people. 
The gendered space of this example is telling, as the normative culture of patriarchy 
sometime abjures women from appearing and participating in public conversations on politics. 
Since women have not always been silent or muted figures in the Nigerian cultural imaginary, 
however, I will be showing later how women speak back to power through online popular culture 
strategies such as satirical fictional images and actual performative texts such as protest selfies. I 
consider the implications of women putting themselves “out there” as virtual images unsettling the 
gaze of oppressive masculinist politics.  Re-articulations of the body as a symbolic site for resisting 
and altering patriarchal dominance have a long history in Nigeria and in other parts of the world. 
Historically, for example, the Aba Women's Riot of 1929 and the 1940 Abeokuta Women's Riot 
in colonial Nigeria offer pertinent illustrations of Nigerian women's disruption of patriarchal 
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spaces through the performative politics of the body. There have been more recent instances of 
such nude protests in states such as Benin and Ekiti. In these instances, women did not only employ 
the traditional politics of public nudity for resisting the British colonial apparatus, but they also 
forced the public sphere to reckon with them as political subjects materially affected by oppressive 
colonial policies. They were able to do this by mobilizing the traditional belief that deliberate 
nudity by women of certain ages goes against all forms of indecency and oppression, which was 
the way the British tax on women without representation was interpreted by all during this time. 
With social media, such public performances of protest through the body acquire new 
configurations that enable a better understanding of the intersection of corporeality and power. 
This study engages with this aspect of women’s resistance and will include how women are 
unsettling patriarchal formations of governmental power through the production of subversive 
online content. Socially mediated texts such as the selfie provide cultural avenues to appreciate an 
African feminist discourse in Nigerian social media culture. With Boko Haram materializing a 
pernicious masculine ideology both online and offline in recent years, this aspect of my research 
enables an understanding of African women’s response to violence in both digital and non-virtual 
environments. In my third and fourth chapters, therefore, I will use the selfies of some 
#BringBackOurGirls activists as well as the fictional works of the female Facebook user “Correct 
Bae” to show how a strong feminist presence on social media can undermine such patriarchal 
configurations of the political space.  
Unlike older media such as film, literature, or older Nigerian Internet communities such as 
“Naijanet” or “Nairaland,” that mostly allow the normative sender-receiver model of 
communication, social media offers more dialogic and interactive opportunities for participatory 
politics. Nairaland is an indigenous online community in which people post comments and have 
sociocultural and political conversations. On the other hand, Naijanet, “one of the Net’s most 
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robust and enduring Afrocentric virtual communities” (Anna Everett 37), was created in the mid-
late 1990s, as a space on which Nigerians in the diaspora converged to discuss topics about the 
homeland. The platform can be regarded as one of the various digital media employed by Nigerian 
diaspora activists to circumvent the limitations of the traditional media in the affirmation of a 
strong nationalist voice from exile. Social media thus animates the public speech of Nigerians in 
a digitally transformed public sphere, earlier assured by both Nairaland and Naijanet. Misty 
Bastian notes that Naijanet was a diaspora-based and activist online community for expressing 
“the true spirit of "Naija," the virtual nationalist space [Naijanetters] were struggling to create” 
(qtd. in Everett 37) in their attempt to resist the then military junta in Nigeria. The diaspora 
performance of resistance online is a process of, to borrow Koleade Odutola’s useful term, 
“cyberframing” the nation (Odutola 17). The term locates in the digital moment possibilities for 
Nigerian émigrés to speak back to power from exile. By making the user, whether at home or in 
exilic locations, the locus of content creation, social media promotes a postmodernist character 
that inspires individual mini-narratives that decenter the hegemonic truths of the state and its media 
in Nigeria. Nigerian digital actors who utilize the democratic potentials of Web 2.0 platforms to 
subvert the Nigerian state’s mechanism of oppression underscore that user-generated media, rather 
than the restrictively authorizing spaces of television or cinema, are the new locations of subaltern 
agency.  
 One of the theoretical modes of engaging with the politics of visual culture and resistance 
in this dissertation is this postmodern perspective on cultural forms that elicit a re-articulation of 
the everyday subject from the margins of culture to its centre. Although theories on postmodernism 
appear to have peaked in the early 90s, I find it relevant to reflect on the way social media’s 
democratization of the media is a postmodern condition that unsettles absolute truths and grand 
political narratives. This postmodernist dimension rejects and deconstructs the metanarratives of 
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traditional media such as television, alerting netizens to the circulation of state-sponsored 
narratives online. The once passive consumers of the TV can now create and disseminate multiple 
media truths and identities, entering the realm of authorship as producers of meanings. Within the 
context of Nigerian political communication, social media enables a preponderance of individual 
narratives that challenge the hegemony of a highly-regulated media environment. Social media 
users in Nigeria who protested online against the government’s explanation of the austere crude 
oil policy in 2012 were able, for instance, to produce their own counter narratives and alternative 
meaning about the ‘true’ state of the energy sector.  They were invested in this process not only 
through text-based status updates and tweets, but also through visual self-representations such as 
cartoons and memes to offer alternative meanings to the dominant narratives of government. 
Writing in the context of post-coup Chile, Nelly Richard asserts that the production of contrary 
perspectives ought to generate a radical questioning and overturn of official systems of thoughts 
and power. Richard writes: 
To have formulated meanings that were merely contrary to the dominant point of 
view, without taking aim at the larger order of its signifying structures, would have 
meant remaining inscribed within the same linear duality of a Manichaean 
construction of meaning. It would have meant inverting the symmetry of what was 
represented, without questioning the topology of the representation. (4) 
The personal tweets and Facebook posts of netizens, whether as visual or written forms, are not 
mere expressions of counter perspectives in the Nigerian context. They likewise function to 
question and resist asymmetrical power relations and their hegemonic narratives. Cultural forms 
such as online cartoons and humorous images together with the political commentaries that emerge 
from them challenge what Richard refers to as “the fraudulent language spoken by the official 
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power” (5). Produced and circulated online as dissident signifiers invested in the displacement of 
official knowledge systems, the visual texts deployed as examples in this study rupture and counter 
the semantic force of such fraudulent narratives. I intend these illustrations to prove that signifying 
practices are always already modes of interrogating authority and resisting both state strictures and 
attempted monopolies on meaning. The focus on visual images is thus in line with Nicholas 
Mirzoeff’s argument that “the disjunctured and fragmented culture that we call postmodernism is 
best imagined and understood visually” (3). A postmodernist performative dimension to this 
dissertation is thus grounded in the way Nigerian social media enact and present selves through 
the staging of visual cultural forms articulating an irreversible shattering of the normative power 
of the state. Although it may appear that the corrupt elite in Nigeria pays little attention to these 
sites of resistance, yet a closer appreciation of the overarching picture reveals, as in the case of the 
Buhari Media Centre, an unsettled governmental presence online bent on coopting and disrupting 
dissident voices. 
 As far as postmodern media go, the Nigerian netizens who use images to present political 
selves and identities on social media are invested in the mobilization of these images as cultural 
appendages of their oppositional politics. By showing how the social media space can be 
productive for subaltern agency, they challenge the negative vision of Baudrillard’s concept of the 
simulacrum, a representation of copies that have no correspondence to the real. Examples from 
Nigerian social media can demonstrate that, while it is possible for the image to reframe and 
articulate conflicting versions of reality, particularly within the (new) media space, a strategic 
reconfiguration of the simulacrum can yield further insights into some of the ways popular culture 
on the Internet serve as performative markers of identities subverting dominant power structures 
in corrupt and abusive regimes such as Nigeria’s. These images do not seek to represent an any 
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authentic political reality in Nigeria, but instead assert themselves, as autonomous versions of 
Nigerian politics, that intervene to question austere and disempowering conditions.  
 Performative behaviour in this dissertation is based on the view that discourse produces 
that which it represents. To this end, I reframe Judith Butler’s description of gender as a 
performative identity to explicate the performance of identities in social media platforms. Butler 
reformulates the theses of J.L. Austin’s remarks on performative utterances, and on Michel 
Foucault’s exposition of discourse as systematic practices that bring into being what they name. 
She argues for an “understanding of performativity not as the act by which a subject brings into 
being what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains (Butler 2). For Butler, the performative force of gender 
is not a natural category that defines what one is; rather, it is a contested term that describes what 
one does.  Therefore, a person’s “identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” 
that are said to be its results” (25).  Gender, in this sense, is a performance in which one’s identity 
is not universal but constituted by one’s social roles. In a similar way, I show that acts of vlogging, 
as well as practices such as posting, liking, trolling, sharing, tweeting, and retweeting, all of which 
I am calling “social media rituals,” also produce specific performative identities, since they 
constitute the person who perform these rituals. Social media is, therefore, a performative space 
that enables users to frame identities through the digital performances enacted by its rituals.  
Social media as digital networks of social relations illustrate new postmodernist 
performative dimensions of the self, expressed through visual culture. In other words, this present 
work demarcates the contours of social media intervention in politics differently from scholars 
such as Manuel Castells. Whereas Castells, together with many other alternative media scholars, 
frame the discourse in terms of the way social media are used by netizens to do and organize 
politics, this study locates its arguments in a postmodernist context in which social media users do 
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things with images as cultural texts that embody power relations. While studies such as those of 
Castells’ analyze the ways social media function to undergird and support social movements, I am 
much more, as mentioned earlier, concerned with how online popular images as signifiers of 
postmodernist performance are expressions of resistance to totalities and hegemonies.  For 
instance, in the image below, the Facebook post of Nigerian political cartoonist Mike Asukwo is 
presented as a creative intervention in a Nigerian structure of power in a way that is different from 
the way online activists use social media to mobilize and coordinate mass protests. 
 
 Fig. 1.3. Mike Asukwo. “Tongue-Propelled Bullets.” Facebook  
This image speaks to how the rhetoric of the ruling elite in Nigeria serves to stoke the embers of 
warfare. The two major political parties, the All People’s Congress (APC) and the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) are represented in a satirical cartoon that critiques the reckless exchange 
of political rhetoric that sometimes generate conflict in the polity. Publishing this image on 
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Facebook is not just a remediation of a print-sourced political cartoon on social media; it is an 
expression of the ways network environments are being deployed by both regular citizens and 
artists to perform an increasingly changing relationship to power and authority. Social media here 
gives the user Asukwo a space to ridicule the state and to express a counter-hegemonic perspective 
through the visual and textual rhetoric of an image whose medium potentially subjects to a vast 
possibility of digital dispersals. Asukwo suggests that the political elite is the real terror the 
Nigerian public must contend with. Posting this image is a social media ritual of performing 
political identities. As I am discussing the enactments of identities through acts of tweeting and 
posting information onto social media as performative practices, I will be returning to this in a 
later chapter. This example constitutes a specific online identity to the degree that the image 
reproduces Asukwo as a content producer whose self-presentation on social media gestures 
towards the performance of a political self. In contrast to other communities such as Nairaland, 
social media accommodates the distribution of content in a manner that decentralizes and disperses 
the original message, with the cartoonist’s performance operating at a rhizomatic level that reaches 
a multiplicity of people in his networks and branches into the networks of his friends and followers.  
The forms of popular culture examined in this dissertation allow me to determine how 
people’s performances of self and identities overlap with resistance. It is this innovative use of 
images, expressed through the performance self and agency in Nigerian politics that inspires the 
Deleuzian inclination to relocate the simulacrum from a negative context to a signifying 
framework that is more optimistic and positive. I will show through a close reading of popular 
images that the cultural sites of representations that new media technologies enable legitimize a 
new regime of the image, which privileges the imagination as an act of resistance in network 
spaces. I also show how these new cultural spaces are being deployed by social media users in 
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Nigeria as individuated acts of political subversion and resistance, a new phenomenon that was 
first inspired by the inroads of global mobile telephony into the country in the early 2000s. 
The explosion of internet-enabled mobile cell phones in many African countries is central 
to this discussion since mobile phones support new media behaviour that encourages creative 
Nigerian youths to appropriate global technology applications to forge an identity for themselves, 
and for an array of aesthetic purposes achieved through creative digital images. These netizens, 
relying on the instrumentality of web-based phones, challenge social conventions and confront the 
hegemonic strategies of the Nigerian state through popular aesthetics disseminated on spaces such 
as the BlackBerry Messenger, and recently, WhatsApp. In other words, a marginal category 
amongst Nigerian youth populations deploys new media to reinvent a new vision of self and 
society, and write their agency into the centre of national politics. Paul Ugor, speaking in regard 
to Nigerian video films, has written about the way this contemporary youth culture of digital media 
engagement leads to an emergence of ‘a new social space’ in which Nigerian youths narrate “their 
social struggles in everyday life for both local and international audiences” (1). The implication of 
the many digital media-propelled narratives is the renegotiation of the webs of powers in Nigeria 
and a redefinition of political apathy—as many more youths now use the many textual possibilities 
in Internet environments in a counter-hegemonic way that maps and remaps the contours of 
Nigerian politics. Partly because of the global acknowledgement of Nigerian cinema, Nollywood 
as a successful video-film and home-grown medium of (visual) storytelling, a number of new 
media scholars in Nigeria, including Ugor, locate their analyses of contemporary youth culture 
within the framework of a cinematic representation of the Nigerian marginal class. In the next 
chapter, I trace the emergence of Nollywood in Nigeria and contend that social media is a more 
fascinating media form that facilitates the demarginalization and repoliticization of many young 
people.  
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1.2 Nigeria’s Facebook President 
Although immigrant Nigerians’ access to the Internet positioned them to “cyberframe” 
political discourse from metropolitan Euro-American centres as from the 1990s, it was less 
imagined at the height of the country’s military junta in 1995 that the Internet’s eventual 
appearance would be used actively from home to shape political life in the decade that followed. 
According to the site Internet Live stats, 3.5% of Nigeria’s population were active online in 2006, 
a figure that rose to 25.5% in 2011, following the keen interest among Nigerian social media users 
in the events of the Occupy movements and the Arab Spring in 2011. As of 2018, that figure was 
46.1% of the population, with a share of world internet users at 2.5 per cent2. 2011 also marked 
the symbolic entry of a Nigerian president into cyberspace, facilitating a new political practice in 
the country’s democracy. The president joined Facebook on June 28th, 2010, posting a message, 
which signalled government’s desire to engage with social media as a potential policy platform:  
Today, in fulfillment of the promise I made at the 26th convocation of the University 
of Port Harcourt on Saturday, 15 May 2010, I have created a [F]acebook fan page to 
interact with Nigerians. As I said on that day, there is an unchallengeable power of 
good in the Nigerian nation and her youth and through this medium I want Nigerians 
to give me the privilege of relating with them without the trappings of office. 
(GEJonathan 2010) 
While the medium for the Nigerian leader subsequently became a platform for citizen engagement, 
it also pointed to a recognition by the Jonathan administration of the desire among many Nigerians 
for a dialogic environment in which government might be held accountable. Facebook gave a face 
                                                          
2 “Nigerian Internet Users” Internet Live Stats, Live. http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/nigeria/. Web 
10 June 2017. 
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to a political elite often faceless and unresponsive to the electorate. The number of “comments” 
and “likes” generated by his initial post, Figure 1.4 below, illuminate an intensification of 
democratic sensibilities among Nigerian youths.  
 
Fig. 1.4. Goodluck Jonathan. Facebook. 
The large number of people sharing, liking and commenting on this post marked the first time in 
the country when many ordinary Nigerians, especially young people, could engage directly with 
the apparatus of government, and instantly assess and critique its policies and programmes, 
because of the growing level of online participatory culture in Nigeria. The difference between 
this medium and previously existing media is the opportunity for instant, even if sometimes hasty, 
expression of approval or disapproval. In a multi-ethnic and diverse country, such as Nigeria, the 
circulation of bigotry and hate speech among partisan followers of the president was also born 
alongside the presence of government in a digital medium of sociality and solidarity. Since 
Goodluck Jonathan’s emergence coincided with the advent of the social media culture in Nigeria, 
he became the first president who used the medium to interact with Nigerians online. The president 
later published some of his social interactions, and the reactions and suggestions of netizens on 
governance in the volume, My Friends and I: Conversations on Policy and Governance via 
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Facebook. The 2010 publication was the major highlight of a series of digital activities carried out 
by Goodluck Jonathan to reach the country’s citizens.  In the introduction to the book, Goodluck 
Jonathan asserts that “a major problem of democracy today is the absence of a sense of belonging 
by the citizenry. Many citizens believe they are only of importance to politicians at election times” 
(“Sahara Reporters”). Knowing the irresponsible character of governance in Nigeria, one can mock 
the book for its language and populist pretensions, as well as its questionable engagement with 
Nigerian citizens, most of whom deserted the president because of his response to Boko Haram 
and the economy. My interest in the book is to amplify President Jonathan’s recognition of 
citizens’ belief that, aside from their power during electoral seasons, they are mostly irrelevant to 
governance. In a 2017 article on the Jonathan administration’ uses of Facebook, Omolade Adumbi 
writes that Jonathan’s online presence demonstrated that interactions between the state and its 
citizens on social media “legitimized his attempts to promote cultural and national modes of 
understanding and to cultivate citizens to support state policies” (233). Adumbi refers to this 
performance of citizenship on Facebook as “a social mediation of politics (1), something that I 
have more appropriately identified as “digital social mediation.” Supposedly coined from “social 
media,” “social mediation” has a purchase on other fields, including conflict and peace studies, 
that makes it ambiguous in the context of digital media. Whereas social media itself was helpful 
in the initial days of Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency, it also eventually became his nemesis, as I 
will show in chapter five through close readings of some Internet photo-based memes created 
during the 2015 elections in which he was ousted from office. 
Also, two major events that took place during the latter part of the Jonathan Administration 
can be used to underscore the increasingly important role of social media in the Nigerian political 
terrain. In April 2013, a notable Nigerian online news portal reported that the former Nigerian 
president had awarded a $40-million contract to Israeli arms manufacturer Elbit Systems to enable 
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the Nigerian government to spy on citizens’ computers and Internet communications, under the 
guise of intelligence gathering and national security (“Premium Times”). The need for government 
surveillance of Nigerian netizens’ activities was so much a concern for a government unmindful 
of public accountability that the presidency described the many young people who take to social 
media to critique the government as “idle and twittering, collective, children of anger” whose goal 
was to vote out the president from office. As will be discussed in chapter five, the 2015 national 
election in Nigeria provided an occasion for users of social media in Nigeria to reach to network 
platforms to articulate an alternative vision of politics and democracy. In the end, social media, 
which was central to citizens’ participation in the electoral processes, resulted in a political change 
in Abuja. Also, consequent on this was the violence-free transition from one democratic 
administration to another in Nigeria, the first time that would happen in the country. It is because 
of this mobilization of social media to advance a democratic consciousness that I am engaging 
with network culture.  
In subsequent chapters, I illuminate the ways in which the cultural forms produced by 
Nigeria’s marginalized young people on social media unsettle the political status quo and promote 
a more egalitarian space for democratic participation in the country.  In the meantime, to anticipate 
some of the kinds of visual texts the dissertation generally explores, I now offer two online political 
images used by netizens as an accoutrement of online protest. The first example is one of many 
viral images produced during Occupy Nigeria in 2012. Following the austerity of the government’s 
increase of petroleum pump price in 2012, an army of Nigerian youths, inspired by similar events 
from Wall Street, began an online occupy movement to protest the government’s decision and its 
potential for precarity. Figure 1.5, an example of one of the many ways dissent was performed on 
social media, casts the former Nigerian president in the mode of Hitler to emphasize the neo-fascist 
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appropriation of power by the Nigerian regime. The parallel to Hitler suggests oppression and 
nihilism in the policies and programmes of the Nigerian presidency.  
 
Fig. 1.5. Occupy Nigeria. Facebook. 
The image is overlaid with former American president, Lyndon Johnson’s quotation—"The future 
holds little hope for any government where the present holds no hope for the people.” American 
democracy is, thus, set against the backdrop of the totalitarian reign of Nazi Germany, is used to 
indict President Jonathan as an incompetent leader who leaves no hope for the electorate. The 
quotations allude to a prophetic termination of corrupt governments, implying that the former 
Nigerian president would eventually be voted out of office in future elections. Fortunately for the 
Nigerian online activist movement, Goodluck Jonathan was indeed voted out of office in March 
2015, a reality that points to how social media and the various sites of online popular culture can 
resonate in some ways, even if limited, in the corridors of power. Social media posts might not 
have directly provoked any measurable change, but they certainly promote an alternative political 
consciousness imbued with electoral capital among Nigerians with access to digital media.  The 
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screenshot of this image was taken quite early when it had only a single “like.” The number of 
“likes” garnered may be a result of the Nigerian culture of silence that is extended onto a digital 
environment. What the #OccupyNigeria, and later #BringBackOurGirls activists did accomplish 
is the attainment of a more censorious voice deployed through visually articulated narratives to 
critique all forms of hegemonic culture and the political landscape in particular, as in Figure 1.6:  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6. A Facebook Collage of Political Memes from Nigeria. 
These are photographic images deployed to ridicule the operations of abusive power in Nigeria. 
Without much familiarity with the socio-cultural contexts represented, one can almost follow the 
decentred plotting of the narrative of this post, as actual images overlaid with words have been 
creatively combined to communicate a critique of the president. The image is a mix of four 
different photos, which together with the texts pls judge for yourself; 24 Hours after the [Nyanya], 
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Abuja Bomb Blast invites the reader to appreciate how the former president of Nigeria is insensitive 
to the pain of the underclass. He is represented as a party-loving leader impervious to the suffering 
of the masses, while the British High Commissioner responds to calls for donation of blood for 
victims of a Boko Haram terror attack. The juxtaposition of these images uncovers and mocks the 
postcolonial condition in which reckless African leaders are not as politically responsible as 
leaders in the West. While showing how social media empowers Internet users to critique a culture 
of political abuse in Nigeria, I will also be focusing on the dialogic conversations produced 
alongside the images. Of all the many uses to which Nigerian netizens put social media, it is 
through this interrogation of the political that the self is most expressed performatively. Unlike the 
past, Nigerian youths now find digital avenues such as Facebook and Twitter as appropriate media 
for their own radical expression of political agency and the questioning of normative hegemony. 
This practice is unprecedented in the history of subaltern participation in the political arena in 
Nigeria.  
In the next chapter “Social Media and the Re/Turn to Agency in Nigeria,” I expand on the 
idea of agency, demonstrating how Nigerian popular culture has experienced a major shift from a 
widely celebrated video-film industry Nollywood to social media spaces that motivate individual 
subjectivities. By using the political cartoons of Mike Asukwo on Facebook and Twitter, as well 
as the puppetry videos published by Buni TV on YouTube, the chapter examines some of the ways 
in which satirical cartoons and animations facilitate the emergence of a shared community of 
network users critiquing the political culture. These netizens are committed to the production and 
reproduction of alternative narratives and publics that provoke counter-hegemonic models of civic 
engagement. In chapter three, “Performative Citizenship and Political Identities in Nigerian Social 
Media,” I propose the idea of “self-spectatoriality,” the performative presentation of 
spectacularized speech and citizenship in a context of power relations and the performance of 
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identity. My deployment of the term is aimed at foregrounding the ways the structure of social 
media urges users to produce and circulate their own perspectives. I will discuss this notion in 
relation to the ways cultural forms such as the selfie constitute performative expressions of 
resistance. The chapter will also examine selfies and other playful forms of self-presentation 
deployed by ordinary Nigerians during the #BringBackOurGirls social media campaign to 
dismantle the mythology that young people’s involvement in social media forms of protest is 
entirely ineffective. In further developing the argument of play and performance, I stress humour 
as a tactic of subverting power in chapter four, titled: “Carnivalesque and the Cultural Politics of 
Humour in Nigerian Social Media.” I will argue here that humour within the context of Nigerian 
social media culture is the most dominant cultural form of civic engagement and the articulation 
of outrage in Nigerian digital culture. In my closing chapter, “The Hashtag as Archive: Internet 
Memes in Nigeria’s Social Media Election,” I will focus on how Internet memes constitute a 
cultural genre that disseminated the voice and agency of ordinary people during the 2015 general 
elections. In my analysis of Internet memes as a cultural genre, I analyze the trajectories of 
citizens’ engagement with Nigerian domestic politics, identifying the most viral social media 
hashtags since the inauguration of the present government in the country. I conclude the chapter 
by examining viral hashtags such as #BringBackOurGirls and their constitution of a digital archive 
of contemporary Nigerian culture and politics.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE RE/TURN TO AGENCY IN NIGERIA 
My starting point in this chapter is the contention that Web 2.0 facilitates the agency of the 
user and situates online subjects as “authors” in the centre of their own narratives. Social media’s 
foregrounding of the users and their activities—in the context of online social movements, for 
instance, has informed an enormous scholarship, including those of Paolo Gerbaudo (2012), and 
Manuel Castells (2012). These studies highlight new forms of social movements seeking to address 
and redress social injustice through the rhizomatic routes of social media and other user-based 
media. Despite the important roles of social media in recent social movements, critics point to the 
ways the activities and performances of users are mediated, recorded, and conditioned through 
algorithmic protocols. Rachel Dubrofsky, for instance, writes of how users are constructed as self-
panoptic subjects on Facebook.  Facebook, she argues, “effectively situates users as the master of 
their own surveillance and as the producers of their self under surveillance. On Facebook, 
surveillance is a practice of the self” (Dubrofsky 120). Dubrofsky’s view as well as the idea that 
both the Internet and the culture it distributes serve mainly as an apparatus of power, delivered 
through the paradox of free but controlled computer protocols (Galloway 2014) do not sufficiently 
address the situation in many parts of the world where repressive and/or dictatorial governments 
exist and limit citizen participation in the public sphere.  
Even when the monuments and documents of history, as Walter Benjamin asserts, are, in 
their ontology and transmission, inherently tainted by barbarism (Illuminations 256), it is possible 
to argue moments of resistance can emerge from them. In a similar manner, one may still be able 
to deploy such cultural forms as social media to expound radical politics, without ascribing any 
messianism to it. This view is true even if the Internet, like earlier technologies such as print, is 
ideologically responsive to the subtly vicious operations of capitalist modernity. Those who 
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mainly conceive of social media as another way the culture industry repositions itself to pacify the 
masses neglect to see “the ways in which the cultural industry, while in the service of organized 
capital, also provides the opportunities for all kinds of individual and collective creativity and 
decoding” (During 32). Simon During’s claim is central to the ways I think of agency and the 
counter-hegemonic impulses of the images of popular culture examined in this dissertation. His 
view stresses a fundamental idea in cultural and media studies: the potential of the culture industry 
to facilitate creative forms of reinterpreting and challenging normative culture. It is precisely 
because virtual environments such as social media are not ideologically neutral that resistance to 
totalities and hegemonic culture is possible. Nigerian netizens, sometimes unperturbed by possible 
ideological undercurrents of the Net, are using online network platforms as social spaces from 
which they assert a political voice. The idea of agency in this work corresponds to the capacity for 
individual action which social media facilitates and can be appreciated from a socio-cultural 
perspective that facilitates communication. This communication is achieved, as Jillianne Code 
writes, “through Internet-based applications by enabling identity experimentation, social 
identification, and ultimately enhances self-development through the expression of human 
agency” (Code 39).  Agency, within the context of Nigerian social media, is the newly found 
capability through which Nigerian young people, hitherto marginalized in the corridors of power, 
collectively exercise political influence (Bandura 2) in the country’s political conversations. This 
agential power is evident in how the social actions and politicized speech that now originate from 
them have resonances in the corridors of power.  As Patrick Chabal notes, “the processes of social 
change actually taking place in Africa” (11) require an analytical framework. This analytical optic 
is what I have identified as a performative agency in Nigeria social media. 
In December 2014, for instance, about eight months after the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter 
campaign in Nigeria and around the world had waned, Nigerian social media user Mike Asukwo 
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tweeted an image that urged some political responsibility among candidates seeking elective 
positions in the country’s 2015 election. Asukwo is a Nigerian cartoonist who publishes his works 
on various social media handles and enjoys a huge following online, aside from producing cartoons 
for some traditional media organizations in Nigeria. Like many around the world who called on 
the Nigerian establishment to rescue the Chibok girls, he reached out to Twitter to remind a 
bourgeoning social media community in the country of the apparent absence of any effective 
intervention of the Nigerian military in rescue efforts of the almost 300 high-school girls abducted 
in Chibok, Borno State by Boko Haram. Boko Haram is an al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorist group, 
fighting to impose an extreme interpretation of the Sharia Law in Northeast Nigeria. Figure 2.1 
illustrates his creative use of a political image that maps and narrates the disposition of the political 
elite in the country to a major sociopolitical issue, such as Islamist fundamentalism. 
 
Fig. 2.1 Mike Asukwo. “Don’t Just Sit there…Condemn something!”  Facebook [5 December 
2014] 
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In the image, the former Nigerian president is represented as indifferent to Boko Haram’s persistent 
assault on the Nigerian nation. Asukwo uses the president to depict a political class that is largely 
indifferent to the struggles of the underclass and therefore unresponsive to the parlous economic 
and social conditions Nigerians are persistently confronted with.  Perhaps the most productive 
interpretation of the image is its disapprobation of an online culture of activism that has no impact 
on street protests. This political cartoon critiques the Nigerian state and its response to postcolonial 
tensions and precariousness. It mocks and resists the normativity of abusive power and the 
predictable pattern of empty political rhetoric in the face of, for instance, a Boko Haram terror 
attack. One may conceptualize “Don’t just sit there…condemn something!” as a text prodding the 
state and online dissidents to political action, but a closer scrutiny reveals the image uses the 
political inaction of government to unsettle the very idea of an online activism that ends in 
cyberspace. Asukwo is using an image of the former president to perform a resistance grounded in 
anti-slacktivism. “Don’t just sit there…condemn something!” may also be a euphemistic plea to 
the Nigerian state to carry out the functions of governance, aside from the implicit urging of an 
emergent shared community of online dissidents in Nigeria, to shun indifference and political 
apathy. The political cartoon, with 69 retweets and 7 likes on Twitter is one of the many cultural 
forms in Nigerian social media that illustrate how young and ordinary people are engaging directly 
with one another both for personal and political purposes. Over the last three decades in Nigeria, 
the influence and agency of these young people has been limited by a political culture in which 
they have a nearly non-existent voice. This culture of exclusion informed a petition launched in 
May 2016 on Change.org,3 seeking support for “the #NotTooYoungToRun bill to reduce the age 
                                                          
3 The petition can be found here: https://www.change.org/p/national-and-state-assemblies-support-the-
nottooyoungtorun-bill-reduce-the-age-limit-for-running-for-elective-office. On July 26th 2017, the Not Too Young 
to Run Bill was eventually passed by the Nigerian parliament—another indication of the success of hashtag activism 
in the Nigerian social media context. http://dailypost.ng/2017/07/26/nigerian-senate-passes-not-young-run-bill/ 
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limit for running for elective office.” Writing on this bill, Adebowale Adeniyi reminds Nigerian 
young people that: 
2019 is around the corner; we all need to renew our interest in politics, have a 
common voice in unity, vision and take our future in our own hands. If the best 
political position the president of Nigeria could afford to give us is the Personal 
Assistant on New Media, Bashir Ahmad who is 24 years old, despite the full and mass 
support he enjoyed from us during the campaign both online and offline, then we need 
to have a rethink, mobilise ourselves en masse to have a mutual interest and fight for 
what belongs to us. Remember, the time is now! (Sahara Reporters) 
The use of the hashtag symbol in the phrasing of the bill is a significant indication of how hashtag 
activism can translate into other symbolic contexts, illustrating the way in which digital culture 
exerts influence on both individual perception and larger political processes. Although I will be 
discussing hashtags and the publics that converge around them in chapter five, it suffices to note at 
this point that the interventions of Nigerian young netizens in political governance in the country 
has the emblem of social media written all over it.  The fight for “what belongs to us” above is an 
expression of the desire for a more democratic public culture and is what Figure 2.1 succinctly 
articulates. While 69 retweets may not be significant on its own, networked social media means 
that such cartoons have the potential for extensive reach. With social media, many of these young 
actors now gain a more articulate and forceful entry into the arena of political conversations and 
contestations in Nigeria. It is possible to assume images like this have had an insignificant number 
of likes and retweets because of apolitical Internet users who have already succumbed to 
resignation, especially about the capacity of their activism on social media to effect any meaningful 
changes.  However, what this assumption would overlook is that social media inherently facilitates 
a rare form of agency, namely a personal and citizen-driven engagement with the agents and 
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mechanisms of power in a corrupt country, such as Nigeria. The closest to this new cultural order 
was during military dictatorships in the 1990s in Nigeria, when the few young people that 
participated in any visible public sphere constituted an informal parliament organized around street 
newspaper stand exchanges (Otiono 113). Their narratives on unfolding events in Nigeria 
constitute part of what Nduka Otiono refers to as street stories, mentioned in the introductory 
chapter.   
The situation began to change with the emergence of the Internet in the mid-90s and reached 
a critical peak with the arrival of social media, as many more Nigerians, especially young people, 
hitherto with very limited ways of engaging with the Nigerian postcolonial state, and unmodulated 
by any apparatus of the Nigerian governance, began deploying network platforms as alternative 
media for engaging with the state. Asukwo’s cartoon tweets and Facebook posts together with 
many other popular images from other Web 2.0 applications provide a fascinating lens through 
which my work appraises how the performance of individual agency enlivens resistance politics in 
Nigeria. A sustained cultural analysis of popular images from social media stresses that social 
media applications provide a vital corrective to a political culture that limits the agency of certain 
individuals in the public sphere. This analytical perspective engages with social media as a domain 
facilitating new self-representational spaces for the articulations of resistance, expressed through 
the performance of new forms of popular culture in a shared community of network users. The idea 
of a limited agency speaks to how earlier forms of cultural and media representations such as 
television and film do not locate the user and consumer of these texts as an active subject the way 
Web 2.0 platforms do. In any case, government censorship creates situations in which the state 
determines forms and contents of these traditional sites of representation in Nigeria.  With Web 
2.0, ordinary Nigerians have a new cultural economy of self-representation through which they 
scrutinize and reorganize power relations. Both professional artists such as Asukwo and the 
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ordinary citizens who create viral memes do not merely provide visual metaphors for interrogating 
systems of rule and domination, they also legitimize spaces for online popular consciousness and 
for performing counter-narratives.  
Although there is an obvious dearth of cultural perspectives and scholarship on Nigeria 
social media, there are a few pertinent contributions, including Innocent Chiluwa and Esther 
Ajiboye’s work which tracks the ideologies embedded in and disseminated by tweets from Boko 
Haram members (Chiluwa and Ajiboye 2014). Chiluwa’s lone study on social media networks and 
the discourse of resistance offers a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the sociolinguistics of 
Biafra separatist agitations in Nigeria. Other discussions on the use of new media in the Nigerian 
political sphere have focussed on the role of blogging for mobilizing grassroots participation and 
for monitoring and measuring electoral activities (Ifukor 2010). Using a qualitative approach of 
discourse analysis to present a variety of discursive acts that blogging, and microblogging afford 
social media users during the electoral cycle, Presley Ifukor analyzed data from 245 blog posts and 
923 tweets and concluded that “citizens’ access to social media electronically empowers the 
electorates to be actively involved in democratic governance” (1). There is also the article by Nancy 
Ogundimu, which undertakes a textual analysis of user comments on the Facebook page of former 
President Goodluck Jonathan. Ogundimu’s work identifies how Nigerians through these Facebook 
posts, raise “fundamental issues about the terrorist activities of Boko Haram and the President’s 
policies for addressing the problem” (219). She writes that the interaction of Nigerian netizens on 
Facebook “is important for understanding how the social networking site is changing the way 
Nigerians are discussing issues that affect them” (219).  As these studies demonstrate, the Nigerian 
reality confirms much of the techno-optimism present in the criticism of social media as an enabler 
of radical politics. I expand this scholarship by assessing the symbolic practices of defiance 
produced within the context of these interactions with the Nigeria state and its agents, avowing that 
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the study of the role of popular images and other cultural productions can be useful as supplemental 
strategies of digital resistance for social media research.  
 
2.1 From Nollywood to Facebook  
At first, the term “Nollywood,” like similar labels such as India’s Bollywood, may invoke 
an imitative aspiration towards empire and the Western cinematic imagination represented by 
Hollywood. A closer study of Nollywood shows it has little affinity with the American model, even 
though it draws cultural influences from it (Haynes 133). The shift to social media and other Web 
2.0 applications that foreground the poststructuralist devaluation of authorship and accentuates the 
direct participation and agency of regular citizens in the production of cultural meanings intensifies 
the field of popular culture in the country. By asserting itself as a cultural space in which Nigerians 
converge for local and global conversations, social media evinces that both Nollywood and new 
media, such as user-generated media are symptomatic of the impact of global media ecology in 
local contexts. Jonathan Haynes’s assertion in 2006 that “Nigerian video films are the leading form 
of Nigerian popular culture” (511) conveys the fact that Nollywood possesses expanded, cultural 
ramifications among everyday people in Nigeria. However, a medium such as Facebook had been 
founded only two years before and Twitter the same year as Haynes’ publication. These two digital 
platforms have transformed cultural expressions and political agency among everyday people 
worldwide. In Nigeria, the images and texts distributed on social media by ordinary Nigerians have 
now become the leading form and source of popular culture as well as the dominant mode of 
producing political subjectivities in the country. Although I do not intend this section to be an 
examination of Nollywood and the digital social mediation of political and cultural life in Nigeria 
within a comparative frame, the idea that the field of popular culture in Nigeria is currently being 
reconfigured through digital media cannot be contested. These digital networks of playful sociality 
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and participatory politics provide some kinds of digital hub or public sphere—in the Arendtian 
sense in which ordinary users of digital media are easily seen and heard in the public arena, 
exchanging political ideas and mobilizing one another through popular images and other cultural 
practices for political actions.  
With social media, Nollywood, the Nigerian video-film culture appears to have been 
overtaken in the articulation of popular agency and of counter-hegemonic expressions by subaltern 
or marginal groups. This relegation of Nollywood can be explained by the fact that a larger number 
of young people can now directly engage with culture and power, deploying different technologies 
including digital cameras. The netizen now has some agency and cultural visibility which social 
media platforms avail young demographics in the new Nigerian public sphere. They express this 
agency through the various ways their own activities and conversations on social media, which 
significantly influence and determine to some meaningful degree the functioning of governmental 
power in the country. A selfie protest or a political commentary expressed through tweets may not 
be able to depose a president, yet everyday Nigerians now have a shared voice for resisting, 
revising, and altering articulations of dominance through these media forms.  
Although the Nigerian video film, during the country’s fiscal vicissitudes of the 1990s, 
furnished a space for young people on the margins of social life to represent themselves, new media 
technologies such as social media have now become more effective cultural spaces from which 
these individuals network with one another to articulate resistance to oppressive socioeconomic 
conditions in the country. The shift from modes of filmic expressions to the individual sites of self-
narration that social media enables is consistent with the centrality of social media to recent 
arguments by Mahmoud Eid and Stephen Ward (2009) that new media are inherently social and 
network-based. It is almost inconceivable in the contemporary digital media ecology to imagine a 
new media object that is not inherently structured as a platform for social connection.  Eid and 
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Ward (2009) stress this point when they note that the “rapid transformation of traditional media 
into new media” should be seen as encompassing “digital, computerized, and networked 
information and communication technologies” (1). In other words, a description of new media 
should account for network platforms such as social media, which personalize social ties and make 
online connections and communities possible. Perhaps important is the way in which Web 2.0 
invites a focus on individual production and circulation of media forms. How the individual user 
functions as a free agent or author of content within the framework of social media invites one to 
appreciate Karl Marx’s reckoning that an assertion of the individual ties well in a dialectical sense 
with the social or collective. In understanding the “social” in social media, therefore, I am guided 
by this Marxist perspective in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 that “above all 
we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The 
individual is the social being. His manifestations of life – even if they may not appear in the direct 
form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others – are therefore an 
expression and confirmation of social life (45). In other words, an individual enters a social and 
productive relationship to appear in the public sphere. Similarly, the individual author, or user on 
social media remains in association or friendship with others in a social network by interacting 
with them through a shared and conscious performance of social media rituals as expressions of 
their social being or sociality. This active participation of the user who authors content online is 
based on an individual agency that manifests among an interactive and relational network of other 
netizens. Social media is not thus merely a production of algorithmic combinations or prior 
economic calculations determining the activities and behaviour of users, but also of the activities 
and traces of active individuals that converge as social and producing beings online. A cultural 
analysis of social media ought to begin with the individual and his relationship among other users 
in a network.  
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The shared and shareable community of popular images, absent in the traditional media, 
has revitalized cultural and political relations in Nigeria and in other parts of the world, with a 
significant number of young social media users that engage with one another to produce content 
that challenges asymmetrical relations of power. While it is possible to see social networking sites 
as central to social media, the latter makes possible individual representation and presentations, the 
capacity for (personal) publishing, which some social networks do not necessarily entail. Social 
media is described, therefore, as “a group of Internet-based applications that enable communication 
amongst individuals and groups, the creation and exchange of participative user-generated content, 
and the expression of individual and collective agency” (Code 39). This definition transcends the 
idea of social networking and links social media to the promotion of the kind of agency that enables 
young people to narrativize their struggles, while challenging postcolonial excess and oppressive 
systems of abuse and domination.  
Although Nollywood directors such as Kunle Afolayan now produce films in digital 
formats, the dominant material mode of production at the inception of Nollywood was video-film 
technology. Onookome Okome writes that the video film came directly out of the practice of the 
now-famous Yoruba theatre troupes whose directors felt the crunch of the structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1980s in Nigeria. The video film was thus a response to economic problems 
that made celluloid production unsustainable for early practitioners of Nigerian cinema and 
difficult for the directors of the travelling theatres, who, according to Okome, “turned to canning 
their performances in VHS cassettes” (Okome 2). Nollywood redefined the concept of African 
cinema when its practitioners successfully evolved a film tradition and popular culture in which 
film-texts were shot straight to video formats, instead of celluloid, which was the distributional 
medium in early African Cinema. In 1992, large-scale production of such films as Living in 
Bondage, and later, Glamour Girls, inaugurated an industry with films by and about Nigeria 
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produced and marketed by young people to a Nigerian audience. Its popular acceptance and home-
video appeal resulted in the huge commercialisation of the film industry in Nigeria. Noting that 
Nollywood is a major signifier of Nigerian youth culture, Paul Ugor locates the emergence of 
Nollywood in “an enormous influx of small media technologies such as digital video, VCR players, 
VCD/DVD machines, and other portable digital hardware—laptop computers, GSM phones, iPods, 
and the Internet” (393) and so forth. He argues that once marginalized cultural producers and new 
voices now find a creative outlet for their individual narratives. Ugor also asserts that Nollywood 
as “a new public sphere, animated primarily by the democratization of media technologies” (393) 
is a direct outcome of the globalization of the media. From Ugor’s analysis, it can be argued that 
Nollywood interposed the lingering Americanization of the Nigerian media space, reauthorizing 
narrative spaces for disadvantaged Nigerian youths to own and tell their stories to both local and 
global audiences. 
However, while Nollywood has remained central to the recent local and global circulation 
of stories about Nigeria and indeed Africa, its representational spaces do not lend themselves to 
any shared and network community that underscores the kind of individual narratives social media 
economies of self-representations make possible for ordinary Nigerians. For instance, during the 
2015 Ebola epidemic in some parts of West Africa, some creative and young people in the country 
produced comic narratives around an online trickster character, Akpos, distributing these stories 
through digital media applications and social media. Aside from the fact that Ebola jokes on social 
media further increased awareness of the disease in the country, they also showed how new media 
technologies are now the first disseminating points of popular narratives and political events in 
contemporary Nigeria. In the past, it would take Nollywood directors a longer time to produce a 
film that instantly revolves round the Ebola virus. With social media, on the other hand, there are 
immediate, and sometimes, real-time cultural representations of ongoing sociopolitical political 
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events in the country.  Unlike Nollywood, social media offers a sense of immediacy, what David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin refer to in Understanding New Media as “an immediate relationship to 
the contents of the medium” (318), that dispels barriers and repositions users as producers of 
narratives. What social media brings to the field of popular culture in Nigeria is, therefore, a space 
for individuals, with little or no technical expertise in digital media, to broadcast themselves on 
YouTube and rewrite their own perspectives into the circuits of cultural and political conversations 
in Nigeria. Principles such as immediacy and connection, sharing of user-based content, as well as 
interactivity that are central to Web 2.0 make social media the most creative and effective 
interpreter of culture and social reality in Nigeria. 
Hence, from the viewpoint of media scholarship, my work is a shift from the limited 
narrative economies of Nollywood to the more ubiquitous user-based sphere of social media, with 
its vibrant and participatory network of digital actors. These subjects are authors who share, 
comment on and distribute popular images as a community of reader-writers. While social media 
is already pervasive in Nigeria, there is still a dearth of critical perspectives on the subject from the 
perspective of cultural studies. The production, distribution, and consumption of popular culture in 
Nigeria have moved from the policed boundaries of a few individuals in Nollywood and the 
mainstream media, to a new domain in which ordinary citizens redefine the production of culture 
as an inclusive category. It is within this context that I attend to social media as a (re)turn of the 
agency of the regular citizen, of the marginal class in Nigeria, since they do not have to wait for 
their stories to be told by Nollywood auteurs or other professional artistes. With social media, the 
subaltern class, functioning variously as auteurs, writer, and even audience of their own narratives, 
infuse the public space with the perspectives, epistemologies, and politics of ordinary citizens. As 
Stuart Hall insinuates, the audience of a form such as Nollywood may be an engaged and active 
participant who decodes different forms of ideologically encoded messages. Yet, it is in new media 
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ecologies such as social media that one finds the idea of user activity reconstituted as a productive 
mode that locates the audience as meaning maker. The possibility of subverting dominant political 
narratives disseminated through government-controlled media forms takes place within a social 
media sphere in which oppositional readings (Hall 144) are always almost guaranteed, especially 
in societies that deny people’s voice in the public space. More importantly, social media offers a 
more nuanced and complicated landscape than the sender-receiver model Stuart Hall analyzed in 
his television discourse. Rather than this linearity, what is evident is a network of codes sent and 
resent through a complex pathway involving a sender, and their network of friends or followers.  
The fact that it is ordinary everyday users that facilitate the production, distribution and 
consumption of texts in digital culture further foregrounds the role of the popular in Nigerian 
cultural life. Since artists such as Mike Asukwo and other cultural producers can interact with 
audiences that decenter authorship and provide instant feedback, social media affects the creative 
process and makes the distribution of new cultural voices a popular and shared practice. As a way 
of further explaining the notion of the popular, there is then the need to understand how the social 
media landscape ensures that the modes of experiencing and representing contemporary Nigerian 
culture extend to the everyday online practices of its digital subjects.  Social media facilitates new 
ways of engaging with expressive popular forms in Africa, something made possible because of 
the noteworthy remediation of earlier forms of narratives—from print and electronic media such 
as film, as well as cultural performances, such as theatre—in digital environments.  These online 
popular forms of expression conform to Karin Barber’s idea of “the popular” in African popular 
arts, in their dominant inclination to function as “expressive/communicative” texts which must also 
be pleasurable and perhaps also memorable” (74). Analogous to Barber’s view that popular arts 
“play a crucial role in formulating new ways of looking at things” (4), social media texts occasion 
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new vistas for knowing and engaging with everyday life in Nigeria, particularly its structures of 
culture and agents of political power.  
In their explanation of “the episteme of the everyday,” Stephanie Newell and Onookome 
Okome describe “everyday Africa” as shifting and unstable, much like how I approach popular 
culture in Africa as a provisional and unstable category. The authors suggest that online culture 
itself shares resonances with the unmediated, interactive and indeterminate nature of African 
popular arts Barber had identified before the era of the Internet (Newell and Okome 20). Since I 
am examining the cultural activities of both artistes and regular citizens in these online spaces, it 
is expedient to note that the postmodern erasure of the boundaries between popular culture and 
high culture is inapplicable in the African sense. The politicization of everyday life and culture in 
Africa, which I argue is now extended onto digital environments, has fascinated scholars in the 
field of popular culture in Africa for quite some time. Karin Barber’s pioneering voice in the field 
is echoed by her view of the high and low culture dialectic:  
What this binary paradigm has obscured is the cultural activities, procedures, and products 
of the majority of people in present-day Africa. There is a vast domain of cultural 
production which cannot be classified as either traditional or elite, as oral or literate, as 
indigenous or Western in inspiration, because it straddles both and dissolves these 
distinctions. (1-2) 
Similarly, there is “a vast domain of cultural production” in Nigerian social media. A great deal of 
people invested in this production are using social media applications to rearticulate cultural 
activities and practices, such as political cartoons, self-portraits, and Internet memes with structures 
of power. These texts not only straddle the boundaries of high and low cultures; they also show the 
creative ways through which people are deploying new media that promote interactivity and user-
generated content to represent and engage with the Nigerian postcolonial condition.  While much 
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of the scholarship on new media in Nigeria and other African countries has been devoted to 
cinematic representations such as Nollywood and in recent times on the political language of 
Internet memes, I argue that social media, because of the ways it informs and is informed by the 
individual agency of the user, is a more effective cultural space for charting the representations of 
subaltern struggle for visibility and political representation in contemporary Nigeria.   
Aside from Fiske’s perspective on popular culture discussed in chapter one, Stuart Hall (1981)’s 
sense of the term, as “one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful 
is engaged” (239) is pertinent.  Hall notes that popular culture “is also the stake to be won or lost 
in the struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, and 
where it is secured” (239).  In the Nigerian context, social media as a cultural field enables symbolic 
forms that reveal these struggle and negotiations. Users are thus engaged in what Lisa Gitelman 
refers to as “popular ontologies of representation” (14) pitched, in the case of Nigerian activist 
networks, for the performance of agency and resistance.  
Partly because of the global acknowledgement Nollywood’s success as a video-film and 
homegrown medium of (visual) storytelling, a number of (new) media scholars in Nigeria, 
including Ugor, have continued to locate their analyses of contemporary culture within the 
framework of a cinematic representation of the marginal classes. While the film medium is 
important, such new media spaces as social media show that Nigerians, young people particularly, 
now participate more actively in the negotiation of meanings from media narratives. With less 
censorship on these new media spaces, more marginal groups such as youth and women are 
positioned to assert a presence denied them in a previously government-controlled media 
environment. The examples from Nigerian social media highlighted in this chapter illuminate the 
ways in which postmodern media culture enables individuated “aestheticization of everyday life” 
(Featherstone, 2007) expressed as an everyday online articulation of agency.  
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As hinted earlier, the digital media restructuring of cultural and political realities in Nigeria 
began during the 2007 electoral process with the deployment of new media platforms, such as blogs 
for mobilizing grassroots participation (Ifukor, 2010). In that electoral year, civil societies and 
NGOs targeted a growing segment of the Nigerian electorate with access to digital mobile devices, 
circulating information about the election through bloggers and a nascent Nigerian Twitterverse. 
By the 2015 elections, these platforms played even more crucial roles in the political process, with 
voting updates and election results announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission 
INEC on platforms such as Twitter. More importantly, social media by this time had become a kind 
of digital contact zone for those at home and in the diaspora to perform a dialectical critique of the 
Nigerian state and its varied mechanisms of dispossessions and oppression through the sharing and 
discussing of popular memes. Mary Louise Pratt introduced the term “contact zone” to describe 
“social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly 
asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination-like colonialism, slavery, or their 
aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today” (4). I am redeploying the term here to refer 
to the various social media spaces in which disparate Nigerian subjects and cultures, whether at 
home or in the diaspora, meet and grapple with each other, with respect to domestic socio-political 
issues in the country. Like Pratt’s formulation of the term that emphasizes asymmetrical power 
relations, social media as spaces of shared communities and online networking harbour possibilities 
for the capitalist cooptation of user identity by the builders of the Net’s architecture. Nevertheless, 
the medium furnishes people with moments of productive authorship and sociality, taking on 
different configurations as users refashion hegemonic structures for practices of self-presentations 
and resistance. As for the Nigerian diaspora itself, the deterritorialization of Nigerians from their 
homeland in the 1990s was inspired, among other factors, by government’s failure to provide 
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economic opportunities and the country’s highly oppressive military regimes between 1983 and 
1999.  
During that period, many Nigerians migrated to a pre-9/11 immigration-friendly America, 
as well as to other parts of the English-speaking world. Because Nigeria is the most populous 
country in Africa, it leads other countries from the continent in terms of African immigrants all 
over the world. The significant role of the diaspora in Nigerian social media is what Farooq Kperogi 
describes as the Nigerian digital diaspora, composed of members invested “in the politics and 
discourses of their homeland, from their exilic locations in the West through the instrumentality of 
online citizen media” (8). With social media, therefore, Nigerians at home and in the diaspora 
effectively participate more directly and openly than they did in obscure traditional media outlets 
in an online public sphere in which they constantly pillory the state and its systems of abuses. 
Unrestrained by any effective social or political forces on social media, their performance of 
agency is expressed for both personal and political purposes. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2012) have argued that online media such as Facebook and Twitter are spaces through which 
“subjectivities capable of democratic action” are beginning to emerge. This position is apposite 
within the Nigerian paradigm, considering the way digital media users mobilized popular images 
such as Internet memes and satirical YouTube videos to perform resistance to nondemocratic 
practices. Examples from Nigerian social media illustrate that the Nigerian netizen engages with 
spaces of power through direct posts and status updates, deepening participatory democracy in the 
country. The intervention of this cultural netizen, that is, the social media user who deploys cultural 
forms to destabilize repressive power, however, can set loose the rethinking of dystopian arguments 
about the Internet, such as those of Jodi Dean (2003) and Alexander Galloway (2004). Both 
scholars conceive of the Net, not as a virtual agora that fosters a liberal democratic consciousness 
or a public sphere that catalyzes political consensus, but as an extension of pro-capitalist regimes 
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which depoliticizes individuals and re-cements bourgeois ideologies through inherent technical 
mechanisms of control.   
Although some critics of new media such as Zizi Papacharissi (2002) assert that the Net is 
a digital public sphere that consists of several spheres of counterpublics, excluded from mainstream 
political discourse (21), Jodi Dean argues that the notion of the public sphere is tied to the nation. 
In her estimation, the Internet should be seen as “a space of conflicting networks and networks of 
conflict so deep and fundamental that even to speak of consensus or convergence seems an act of 
naïveté at best, violence at worst” (106). While Dean’s argument regarding the ideologies that are 
embedded by digital technologies is not totally invalid, Nigerian social media is a corrective to this 
view that the Net chiefly promotes conflict, without any capacity to legitimate an inclusive and 
rational realm for political participation and consensus. With a preponderant multi-ethnic and 
multi-faith population on social media in Nigeria, it may be sometimes difficult to find a coherent 
articulation of commonality on sociopolitical issues. However, on the whole, an educated and 
creative class of social media users appear to agree on the tenacity of abusive power and the 
prevalence of disempowering conditions, as well as the necessity to critique and challenge them in 
rational debates. The view that a degree of consensus is evident in Nigerian social media is 
contingent on the fact that the performance of political identities in Nigerian social media organizes 
the Net as a public sphere that contests prevailing order and rebut dominant state narratives 
disseminated through the propaganda of the traditional media. What is more important than the 
possibility of consensus, however, is that capacity to critique postcolonial oppressive conditions in 
a more direct and self-involving manner that, aside from few instances, does not always invite 
censure or punitive action, except in few instances. Even when some users deploy anonymity for 
whatever reasons, the mere fact that people have these conversations in the first place is supremely 
important. This newly secured power underscores some of the ways social media returns agency 
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to young media consumers, hitherto on the margins of political discourse and civic engagements 
in Nigeria. 
The articulation of this engagement in terms of a performance of resistance through the 
politics of visual signifiers can be shown by the way Nigerians from all over the world engage with 
these cultural symbols as mechanisms of response to political excess and juridical abuses. For 
example, the meme below is a reproduction of images from the mainstream media on President 
Jonathan’s visit in Kano State after a Boko Haram terror event in 2014. Social media makes 
possible a more dynamic response to these events for young people than the limited interventions 
they could have made either through the limited space of a newspaper comment or a passive group 
discussion among peers. Figure 2.2, therefore, is an instance of an online visual culture form that 
ridicules the response of the country’s former president to Boko Haram’s abduction of the Chibok 
schoolgirls in Northern Nigeria: 
 
Fig. 2.2. A Screenshot of two Memes mocking the Nigerian Government. 
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This example demonstrates one of the ways popular memes were used in Nigerian social media to 
perform power relations during the height of the #BringBackOurGirls campaign on Twitter. The 
President’s visit to the scene of another terror event is being used in these images to critique the 
persistent inability of the Nigerian military to rescue the 300 girls abducted. The screenshot 
combines two different memes as a single text to mount an imaginary dialogue between President 
Jonathan and President Barack Obama. The first text is an altered version of a real image from the 
president’s visit to a scene of a terrorist situation, combined with a textual subversion of his defense 
of corrupt allegations in a media chat with the state broadcasting network. The Nigerian president 
had said that America would know if a politician had stolen any significant amount of money from 
the Nigerian national treasury and his words have been combined in this meme to indict his political 
incompetence in the light of the Chibok abduction in Borno State. The second meme completes the 
transnational narratives of the text, as President Obama is cast as mocking Goodluck Jonathan for 
his response, while also gesturing towards the tendency of the American government to police the 
boundaries of global security. It is also possible to see the meme as an expression of the creator’s 
criticism of President Jonathan’s negligence and expectation of an American military assistance in 
the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. President’s Obama’s “Of course, America will know. 
American runs Nigeria.” might then be read as an acerbic reply that ridicules the former’s handling 
of national security. There is also an implicit critique of a needless African deference to American 
hegemony and the West’s mockery of a country’s inability to protect its own sovereignty. 
Alongside the performative potential of these images is the way they are reproduced on social 
media as new forms of satirizing power, and expressing resistance to oppressive conditions. These 
texts as cultural expressions in social media environments are performative representations of the 
structures and actors of power in Nigeria.  
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To buttress this point, one can consider an example of a puppetry video on YouTube. 
Produced by Buni TV, the musical “Drunk in Power by G.E.J. and Dame Patience” presents a 
narrative in which former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and his wife dance to a remixed 
version of Beyoncé and Jay-Z's song “Drunk in love.” The video starts with an echo of Beyoncé’s 
“I have been drinking,” recast as “I have been praying” by the former first lady, Mrs. Jonathan. 
The religious twist is symbolic, considering that political corruption is often coloured with religion 
in the Nigerian public arena. The fictive first lady cannot keep her mind off the 2015 presidential 
elections, declaring that “I want you, now, now.” This obsession for political power that is at odds 
with the real desire of the electorate is metaphoric of how Nigerian leaders tend to cling to public 
offices even when the social contract between the political elite and the people is a mere illusion. 
President Jonathan joins in and sings that he does not care if the people abuse him, as long as he 
and Mrs. Jonathan “eat the cake.” The cake is a ubiquitous symbol of Nigeria’s national treasure 
and is the driving force for many a Nigerian politician who divests the people of their 
commonwealth. In parodying the Jonathans as drunk on power, the video sets the stage for debates 
among its followers on YouTube. In their revision and appropriation of a popular item of American 
rap culture, the makers of the video use social media to intensify the discourse on the production 
of locality in terms of global flows or “scapes” carrying capital, information, images, people, ideas, 
and technologies (Appadurai 33). In this case, the iconic representation of a corrupt Nigerian 
administration bears the cultural markings of American popular culture and invites one to 
appreciate the intersection of glamour and materialism in the critique of political excesses.  Social 
media thus extends this idea of global flows beyond a Nigerian locality, presenting a transnational 
rhetoric that critiques the Nigerian condition. In his explanation of a way informational capitalism 
is mediated through the capillaries of digital publics, John Michael Roberts agrees with the idea 
that global capitalism has transformed itself from “an industrial form to a network form based on 
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fluidity, flows and informational social media” (12). By resisting and constantly critiquing a 
corrupt state hegemony through social media, Nigerian young netizens actively join in national 
conversations that seek to regulate the flow of capital from thieving politicians in Nigeria to foreign 
accounts.  
Although the country has the most virile press in Africa, the combined circulation of all 
newspapers does not reach half a million in a country of about 180 million citizens (Olukotun, 33). 
A complaint letter to a newspaper editor, therefore, is at best read by a few Nigerians at home with 
its anti-corruption message not able to have the kind of reproduction and distribution social media 
creates. A satirical video on YouTube or a political cartoon on Facebook or Twitter has the potential 
to be reproduced in such a way that it reaches the millions of internet users in Nigeria and its 
diaspora.  Sometimes, the explosion of information in the media does not have to lead to a loss of 
meaning, as Baudrillard imagined. With a media landscape defined by a network of people with 
similar ideological interests, it is possible to have material results that reshape power relations in 
the nation-state. For example, the head of the current Nigerian Senate, the third highest-ranking 
public official, was mentioned in the recent Panama Papers,4 leading to calls by some Nigerians on 
social media for his impeachment. Amidst that, the Nigerian parliament decided to purchase 
expensive vehicles for legislators, despite that the Nigeria people were being confronted with the 
economic agonies of global fall in oil prices. Some activists on social media launched the hashtag 
#OccupyNASS to mobilize people for a protest scheduled to hold on April 25, 2016. As in most 
other cases, this protest, whether online or offline, was simply a demand for a political 
                                                          
4 Luke Harding of The Guardian reports that “the Panama Papers are an unprecedented leak of 11.5m files from the 
database of the world’s fourth biggest offshore law firm, Mossack Fonseca.” The online leaks reveal how the world’s 
famous and rich hide their money in offshore accounts. (See “What are the Panama Papers? A Guide to History's 
Biggest Data Leak.” The Guardian, Sunday, 3 April 2016; http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-
need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers Web. April 29, 2016 
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representation that assured decent living conditions for the Nigerian people. In addition to hashtag 
conversations, other users of digital networked media distributed political images that served to 
critique of government officials, while decrying the silence of elected representatives in the light 
of economic hardships.  
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Kayode Ogundamisi. “Why Our Lawmakers are not Talking.” Twitter.  
Kayode Ogundamisi is renowned in Nigerian social media as an activist journalist who uses Twitter 
to critique and narrate the Nigerian state. The tweet indicates some level of consensus, shown by 
the 124 retweets and 22 likes, and emphasizes the point that “Nigerian lawmakers are not talking” 
because their capacity for speech is hindered by corruption and avarice. With a retweet by the user, 
@gaisebaba who has 7,587 followers, these retweets can get to thousands more readers, in Nigeria 
and other parts of the world. This decentred reproduction of the image in other contexts expands 
its interventions and publics. The profound visual rhetoric of the image itself is consistent with the 
ways the mouth and other parts of the body, such as the phallus, the backside, and the anus are 
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recurrent corporeal elements in political humour in many parts of postcolonial African state. As 
Achille Mbembe notes, “beyond this concern specifically with the mouth, belly and phallus, the 
body itself is the principal locale of the idioms and fantasies used in depicting power” (7) in the 
postcolony and it is the site for enacting and critiquing the festivities and celebrations that often 
define the expression of hegemonic authority. I will return in the next two chapters to the other 
ways regular citizens construct the body as a carnival of metaphors for the caricature and ridicule 
of juridical power. Meanwhile, the fact that the mouths of the Nigerian leaders are wide open and 
stuffed with vehicles in the present example is not just intended as a parody of the political culture 
in Nigeria. It affirms the perception of political leadership in the country among netizens, and 
suggests the centrality of obscenities and grotesqueries to the representation of postcolonial 
relations of power in the country. 
Social media are thus new media of networking through which informational capitalism 
grants disenfranchised subjects some form of agency, which is deployed in the Nigerian context to 
grapple with the conditions of political exclusion in public discourses. That Nigerians at home and 
abroad can engage with social media texts such as the tweet in Figure 2.3 supports the notion that 
social media and its users in Nigeria signify as “mobile texts and migrant audiences” (Appadurai 
9). This expression can be used to highlight both the ways popular texts in social media 
environments are fluid, alterable and remixable, as well as the fact that repoliticized subjects, 
diasporic or national, engage with the texts as local articulations of resistance inflected with global 
concerns. De Bruijn, et al.  have marked the import of mobile devices in a study that locates mobile 
phones as the new talking drums of everyday life in Africa. The talking drum is a ubiquitous 
musical instrument in West Africa and can be made to reproduce the tonal and prosodic elements 
of natural speech. In the volume, the authors discuss mobile telephony as a marker of globalization 
in Africa. For them, the mobile phone enables dialectical conversations between technology and 
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society and serves as a new symbol of material culture that reinvents indigenous modes of 
communication (12). That the political critiques of the state by ordinary citizens take place mostly 
on digital mobile devices is thus important to the statuses of these migrant and immersive audiences 
who use smartphones and iPads as symbolic spaces for revising and resisting the prevailing 
orthodoxies. It bears repeating that not every Nigerian netizen deploys social media, whether 
accessed on desktop computers or on a mobile device, for the performance of citizenship or of 
political selves. There are those who are not sufficiently literate to comment rationally on political 
issues, while some others, though literate and few, are not social media enthusiasts. There is a third 
group that is constituted by literate youths who, though online, may not be interested in political 
activism or commentaries, but merely “like” what they perceive as a good commentary on politics.  
My focus is the progressive and creative group that organizes political dissent around 
images from popular culture. The resistance practices of this group constitute a threat to the 
Nigerian state which modulates social media and its denizens in various strategic ways. The 
example of blogger and writer Tolu Ogunlesi, recently appointed to the role of Special Assistant 
on Digital/New Media by President Buhari, is important to understand how the dominant class 
assimilates and sublates the alternative narratives young people are producing on social media. 
Ogunlesi’s appointment can lead to two possible conclusions. One, it is a significant affirmation of 
some of the ways the Nigerian state is responding to young people’s expression of civic agency on 
social media. The fact that Ogunlesi, the main scriptwriter for the Buni TV YouTube satirical 
series, was appointed to a position which has now gained official traction in the Nigerian political 
system is unprecedented. Considering that before the era of social media, young people such as 
Ogunlesi, aged 34, would never have made an inroad into political administration, it is fascinating 
that having a huge Twitter following and writing stories for a YouTube channel can reorganize an 
apparent marginalization of young and minority voices in Nigeria’s political conversations. Being 
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attentive to the ways of abusing power in Nigeria, and this is the second possible conclusion, would 
mean one has to be mindful of how Ogunlesi’s appointment also signifies some of the ways power 
seeks to neutralize resistance.  
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Constant Ozurumba. Facebook. 9 December 2016. Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10207254742999964&set=a.4377662412820.107374
1825.1625924076&type=3&theater 
 
In this example, Ogunlesi’s tweet is a defence of the Buhari government and a reply to another 
Twitter user who observes the economic situation of the country may have been better during the 
Goodluck Jonathan era. Ozurumba, the user who posts a screenshot of the conversation on 
Facebook is calling attention in the post to how hitherto progressive actors are easily bought over 
when invited to serve in government. The emergence of young people in newly created digital 
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media offices is an indication that wielders of power in Nigeria appreciate the need to ingratiate 
themselves with Nigerian social media actors whom they recruit for insidious purposes online. The 
appointment of Ogunlesi is therefore the subtle staging of state ideology in the country’s digital 
body politic. Unfortunately, as is often the case with some Nigerian progressive voices who serve 
in governments, Ogunlesi has been more of an apologist for the policies and actions of the current 
administration, than a defender of social justice and equality. His Twitter feeds have been replete 
with tweets that affirm his principal’s campaign against political corruption, a crusade that is the 
mantra of the present administration. Ogunlesi’s new role is thus similar to that of social media 
commenters that constitute a vocal group of online warriors planted by the state on social media to 
defend the Nigerian government and its actions or inactions. Ogunlesi’s appointment is indicative 
of a potential cooptation of social media for propaganda, which began with President Goodluck 
Jonathan’s appointment of a certain Reno Omokiri as chief digital propaganda mouthpiece. 
 
2.2 Social Media and Agency 
One can understand Arjun Appadurai’s statement that “the consumption of the mass media 
throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and, in general, agency” (7). 
Appadurai’s idea was a description of the electronic media that fascinated him as part of the 
dynamics of global cultural systems driven by the relationships among flows of people, images and 
ideologies. Even more, social media as an intensified form of this global media flow fits his 
examination of popular media and the production of agency. The reason for this is the 
personalization of the media which Web 2.0 facilitates. Despite digital media’s growing influence 
in Nigeria as of 2009, Paul Ugor wrote in the same year, not of social media, but of Nollywood 
that “creative classes of marginal Nigerian youths have now taken initiative, appropriating and 
adapting new media technology in reinventing not just their social and economic lives, but also in 
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narrating their social struggles in everyday life for both local and international audiences” (1). 
Indeed, Ugor’s study might be said to have been on the cusp of an unforeseen revolution in creative 
production, one in which marginality and everyday life, enmeshed in digital media, are new 
locations of agency. I am thus building on the precedent set out by scholars such as Ugor to show 
that social media is a more effective media space through which “creative classes of marginal 
Nigerian youths” redefine power relations and create a “new social space” for themselves. For 
instance, in April 2014, Boko Haram, an al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorist group, fighting to 
impose an extreme interpretation of Sharia Law in Northeast Nigeria, abducted about 300 high 
school girls. The Nigerian government was initially silent on the kidnappings, until the tweet of a 
Nigerian lawyer was retweeted by Obi Ezekwesili, a former Nigerian cabinet minister and Vice 
President of the World Bank: 
 
 
Fig.2.5. The Tweet that started the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter Campaign in Nigeria. 
Ibrahim M. Abdullahi had heard the former Education Minister Obiageli Ezekwesili speak at an 
event in the Nigerian city of Port Harcourt, and tweeted about her words on 23 April 2014, using 
the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls (“#BBCtrending: The Creator of #BringBackOurGirls”). After 
#OccupyNigeria, the hashtag is a major signifier of the change in citizens’ mobilization of 
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new/social media to resist political excess and economic corruption in Nigeria. In addition to this 
important Twitter activism the tweet inspired, it also led some users of social media in Nigeria to 
post subversive and satirical works in these online media. These satirical texts, which sought to 
undermine the political negligence of the ruling class, had been inspired by the government’s initial 
apathy. Figure 2.6, a screen shot of the YouTube series by Buni TV, “Ogas at the Top,” is a good 
example of such texts. 
 
Fig. 2.6: Buni TV. “GEJ Meets Boko,” YouTube, 6 July 2014.. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13u8C-hRKN0. Feb 9, 2016. 
 
  
The video highlights a scene in which Nigeria’s former president, Goodluck Jonathan, invites the 
Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau for a conversation. The president walks around in fright 
while waiting for his guest, uncertain of what to expect from the Islamist terrorist. The video begins 
with the president’s acknowledgement of his loss of credibility among Nigerians who are likely to 
believe Shekau more than him. Shekau arrives and startles Jonathan, who upbraids the president: 
“Why do you ogas at the top fear so much for your life? Is it that you have not eaten enough 
already?” “Oga” is the word for “master” in Nigerian Pidgin English. In this context, it refers to 
“leaders” and has been borrowed from a viral story of an interview in which a government official 
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constantly defers to certain senior bureaucrats (the “Ogas at the top”) before answering any 
question. The expression “Ogas at the top,” which also provides nomenclature for the Buni TV 
series, recalls Nigeria’s first viral moment on social media and refers to the corrupt Nigerian 
political elite that is impervious to citizens’ parlous conditions. Shekau’s question, then, has 
implications for class, since it ridicules the nonchalance of a political class satisfied with persistent 
thievery, and unwilling to respond to the oppressive living standards of other Nigerians, as long as 
the ruling elite is protected by its economic pillages.  
The video, while also satirizing the inequality and social injustice of the Jonathan regime, 
takes a swipe at Islamist fundamentalism when the president himself observes: “All animals are 
not equal, Mr. Man. Some foolish ones are willing to die to meet virgins, according to what you 
people believe. Some are so sharp, they get their virgins here before death comes.” First, while “all 
animals are not equal” summarizes the leadership ethic and attitude of the Nigerian political class 
that is being lampooned in this text, “You people,” has a metaphoric reference to the project of 
Islamist jihadism, even if in the president’s estimation, it may gesture towards the Boko Haram 
leader and his band of terrorists.  The fact that “some animals are so sharp, they get their virgins 
here before death comes” is an important attack on Boko Haram’s practice of abducting young 
girls and turning them into sex slaves. The text therefore sets up an ideological debate about the 
nature and motives of violent religious extremism in Nigeria, and around the world—since Shekau 
threatens to kidnap five thousand boys and send them into slavery in “the Sudan, Senegal, and even 
Mecca too,” the holy city of Muslims. The text is a representation of political Islam as a harbinger 
of transnational terrorist ideologies, and is effective because of the online medium through which 
it is disseminated. It is significant that digital network platforms facilitate a distributional and non-
restrictive media that ensure that such a vehement criticism of religious extremism can be 
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undertaken by Buni TV and even individuals, without any fear of effective censorship from 
government or Islamic groups in Nigeria. 
Also, this text is infused with other narratives about the character of political governance 
in Nigeria. For instance, the lie detector the president has bought on a recent trip abroad could be 
conceived as a symbol of the growing influence of technologies, such as digital media and 
networked platforms in the reconstruction of truth claims. In the text, the political assertions of 
both the Boko Haram leader and President Jonathan are subjected to a technology of verification. 
It is instructive to note that the video contests the truthfulness of the “I had no shoes” mantra that 
drove Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign for office. During his first term for office, the president, in 
a bid to appeal to ordinary Nigerians, had in a political commercial told the nation he “had no 
shoes” as little boy. The rhetoric of the commercial is being used in this video as way of refuting 
such a claim. The lie detector test is therefore important to the narrative as it symbolizes the 
insincerity and dishonesty of both groups. The grotesque representation of the Nigerian leader and 
the satire that is inherent in his conversation with Shekau are both used by the creators of the 
puppetry video to ridicule oppressive mechanisms of power, whether religious or political.  A final 
point to note in regard to the transnational significance of the cultural critiques social media 
facilitates is the idea that the entire continent of Africa is open for political engagement by network 
actors who use global media as a way of affirming agency. In addition to Buni TV that produce 
content from Kenya for a Nigerian audience, there are other sites of transnational engagement in 
Africa. The image below is a newspaper cartoon that has been remediated online by a US-based 
social media user from Ghana. What is fascinating in this example is that ordinary citizens from 
different parts of Africa, resident in the continent or in its diaspora, are able to form a community 
around popular images that are shared online, with a view to contesting hegemonic narratives.  
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Fig. 2.7. Kwabena Opoku-Agyemang’s Post of a Newspaper Cartoon. Facebook  
 
The background to the image is the viral video5 in which a former Prime Minister of the UK is seen 
calling Afghanistan and Nigeria “fantastically corrupt countries.” While Nigerian officials and UK 
                                                          
5 Cameron was caught on camera at the verge of the opening of an anti-corruption conference in London. More from: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-video-corruption-quote-comment-nigeria-
afghanistan-queen-a7022586.html 
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opposition party members expressed disapprobation of David Cameron’s sentiment, ordinary 
citizens of Nigeria and other African countries could be found on social media expressing 
alternative perspectives. The cartoon narrates the response of the Nigerian president, who after 
Cameron’s statement insisted less on an apology from London than a concrete effort by UK 
officials to have Nigerian stolen assets in UK banks returned to the country. The Ghanaian user 
who published the image prefaces his post with thoughts that reference corrupt activities dating 
back to England’s colonial presence in other parts of the world, as well as to the recent Panama 
Papers leaks that mention Cameron’s father. The fact that subaltern narratives take on a 
transnational configuration is testament to social media’s capacity to connect disparate voices 
across the globe. The commenters on the image contribute to the rhetoric of the text in a way that 
is not possible in the limited and unilineal space of the original newspaper context of the cartoon. 
This last point is in addition to the online reproduction and distribution of the image that enable 
anybody from anywhere in the world to participate in the circulation of the text. The fact that 
netizens digitize newspaper cartoons and post them unto social media indicates the limited impact 
of print culture that is being rehabilitated by using digital technologies to circulate the rhetoric of 
the image more widely and to preserve its meaning and message. This remediation also shows one 
of the ways new media informs how some readers relate to print culture. People probably read 
newspaper content in the past and moved on, or at best, shared its content with a friend or two. 
With social media lurking in the unconscious, people encounter content differently, knowing they 
can share information with many people who in turn distribute it further. In any case, the “moment” 
of consuming print culture expressed as remediation and distribution on social media is part of the 
production process. The next two examples further illuminate how the newspaper content 
reproduced on social media invite a different response. 
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Fig. 2.8: A Facebook User Publishes a Digitized Newspaper Cartoon Mocking Politicians. 
 
In this status update, Olu Adegoke combines a cartoon by Asukwo and a quotation—The duty of 
youths is to challenge corruption—attributed to Kurt Cobain to provoke friends in his network to 
confront politicians seeking re-election. The image presents the archetypal narrative of the Nigerian 
corrupt politician who, having been elected into office, forgets his electoral constituency and his 
stewardship to them. After diverting public funds for personal use, the politician returns to the 
electorate, which does not recognize him. This social media text illustrates one of the new ways 
Nigerian netizens are reusing older cultural forms such as satirical cartoons to challenge the 
domination of abusive and oppressive power. In understanding how young people relocate 
themselves from the margins of social and political life to the centres of meaningful political 
conversations, my work attends to social media and the various cultural content these young people 
are creating and uploading onto them to underpin an alternative political culture grounded in youth 
creativity. As this appearance in the Nigerian public space becomes a naturalized practice for many 
netizens, online subjects such as Adegoke continue to generate political images and verbal status 
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updates that critique different aspects of Nigeria’s sociopolitical ecosystem. In a recent 2016 status 
update published on Facebook, Adegoke posts a digitized image of a newspaper advertorial 
dedicated to a former Nigerian governor serving a jail term in London. 
 
 
Fig. 2.9. Olu Adegoke. “Celebrating Crime. Only in Nigeria”. Facebook 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10153559326911261&set=pb.507071260.-
2207520000.1470936965.&type=3&theater 
 
Adegoke is using an item from the traditional media to mock a popular practice among the Nigerian 
political class. James Ibori, a former Governor of Delta State who was arrested in the UK for money 
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laundering is being celebrated on his birthday by the present governor. Adegoke remediates the 
advertorial to lampoon and subvert its celebratory message for his community of friends who 
contribute to the discourse. Aside from his view that Nigeria celebrates and rewards crime, 
Adegoke is calling attention to this misdemeanor among his network of social media friends, who 
respond through shares, likes and damning comments on both James Ibori and Ifeayin Okowa, who 
signed the advert. The opportunity for civic engagement, and debates on corruption that the image 
provides makes it an effective means of asserting a presence in the public sphere. That elected 
official uses public fund to congratulate an indicted politician in prison is symbolic of the degree 
of corruption among the ruling elite in Nigeria. Adegoke’s hashtag, #wewantpositivealternative 
which along with the title expresses a desire among young people for a corruption-free political 
order in the country. The comments on the image gesture towards a vibrant public sphere in which 
people can participate in rational conversations on corruption in Nigeria. The remediation of this 
newspaper publication overhauls the structure and dynamics of newspaper-stand public spheres 
highlighted in the first chapter. Part of this reconfiguration is locatable in the comment sections 
that signify a new form of community that expands the narrative of an original post in various 
ways.  
Worthy of highlighting is the comment of Adam Eve, whose response in Nigerian pidgin, 
gathering a storm of counter perspectives, calls netizens to “stop them” and not merely stay online 
and exercise freedom of speech.  His comment stresses the democratization of speech in online 
networks and imagines the possibility of slacktivism when individuals merely post content not 
supported by any concrete political action. The outrage against the abuse of political privilege is 
one of the factors marking the symbolic entry of an unprecedented number of young and savvy 
Internet users, many of whom are still on the margins of actual political power, into the country’s 
public sphere. In the days that led to the 2015 election in Nigeria, this digital class reached to new 
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media technologies to mount an alternative vision of governance, such as Adegoke’s “hashtagged” 
desire above, with the performance of social media rituals as productive practices of untying 
normative socio-political entanglements.  
What is significant and innovative about these critiques is how social media facilitates a 
distributary common space in which users simultaneously participate as producers and audiences 
in a network articulation of resistance. The rituals of sharing, tweeting and uploading cultural data, 
in this context, serve to make the critiquing of autocratic power a communal practice, one that is 
not foreign to the shared cultural spaces of indigenous forms of representations in Nigeria. What 
social media occasions is a return to the participatory ethos of these pre-colonial modes of cultural 
representations and performances that electronic media such as print, television, and radio had 
relegated, following colonial modernity. A major feature of oral tradition, storytelling is achieved 
in an interactive space that fosters connection and immediacy of the spoken word. Most of the 
times, oral subjects co-create the meanings of the aural/oral text they participate in. For instance, 
the idea of call and response is central to indigenous modes of storytelling and musical 
performances in many African cultures, with performers and audiences jointly invested in the 
production of cultural meanings. This is the extent to which social media recollects indigenous 
modes of communication. Aside from the fact that many users mobilize these online networked 
spaces to narrate and perform personal narratives, the ways networked communities encourage 
participatory politics also gesture towards a mode of communication in precolonial societies that 
is affirmed by immediacy and connectivity. The idea of user-generated content can then be likened 
to how participants in indigenous forms of storytelling can contribute personal contents and 
anecdotes when ‘resharing’ an earlier tale. Similar to the practice in indigenous forms of 
communication, social media invites a community of performers, who join in the interpretation of 
a text’s meanings, and hence, in a popular performance of dissent through the rhetoric of images 
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circulated in these network platforms. To illustrate, Figure 2.6 has about a hundred comments, with 
many of them in appreciation of the performance of humour in the text. However, there are a few 
other commenters who object to the portrayal of the president. Joe Badmus, for instance, claims 
that the text oversimplifies and mocks the gravity of Boko Haram’s menace:  
There goes Nigerians; your people are been [being] 
killed unreasonably everyday and all you can do is 
make jokes about it. (YouTube, Feb 25. 2015) 
This commenter seems unaware of how Nigerian culture positions people to mobilize humour as a 
coping and mocking strategy in oppressive socio-political conditions. With social media, this 
culture of combating precariousness through humour might be framed as a practice of “LOLing” 
at the structures of power, that is, mobilizing satire and popular laughter on the Internet to critique 
power and authority with a view to undermining their hegemonic affront. Fundamental to this 
perspective is the way new media such as social network and internet apps reinvigorate humour, 
both as “a form of collective self-critique” and of “political resistance” (Obadare 102) for 
individual citizens who are simultaneously producers and consumers of social and political jokes. 
Through social media, humour in postcolonial states like Nigeria achieves a more caustic emphasis, 
as those who are subject to abusive power can directly travesty the state and its hegemonic 
apparatus of systemic oppression. The implication of organizing the rhetoric of political humour 
through the images and texts of social/new media is that humour as a site of resistance is 
individuated, with the ‘private spaces’ of citizens online becoming public sites of power 
contestations, hereby affirming the importance of treating social media texts as embedded in 
broader social and cultural discourses. In chapter four, I will be discussing humour in Nigerian 
social media culture more fully, using examples from the creative texts of ordinary citizens to 
illustrate my arguments. 
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Also, to return to Figure 2.6, germane is the participatory and dialogic process of 
undermining the state, facilitated by the shared community of commenters, who restate the logic 
of the video, and expands its semantic and thematic orbits through varied comments and 
explanations. For instance, Kelechi Agu’s response to Joe Badmus’s objection both rearticulates 
the implicit assumptions of the video and explains the way cultural producers mobilize the media 
landscape to empower people: 
For your information, this video is not made simply for humor and entertainment. It 
sends across a message as well. Yeah even Media and entertainment can be used to 
empower people. If you cannot see the serious and concerned undertones beneath 
the wittiness of the video, then it's your loss. But expression is real no matter the 
form. I don't know where you are from, but I think if you are ready to point fingers, 
then you should be ready to stand up and show example no matter the minuteness 
of it. (Feb 25. 2015) 
Kelechi Agu’s response, which clarifies the video for readers and viewers who may not be familiar 
with the text, marks the way social media in Nigeria functions as a contact zone in which Nigerians 
at home and abroad engage in cultural and political dialogues. The commentary on the video 
suggests that Nigerians from around the world now participate in a virtual public space to discuss 
Nigerian political narratives with their countrymen at home, supporting the claim earlier that, 
unlike Jodi Dean’s zero consensus possibility, the Net for many activist Nigerian youths is a digital 
community in which some level of consensus is achievable.  
Another point to make about the video in (Figure 2.6) is its virality. The viral puppetry 
show, produced by Kenya-based Buni TV, is hosted on a website but is largely distributed through 
social media. A Google search for the “Ogas at the top videos” shows that the video has been 
shared and redistributed on numerous websites, and Buni TV’s social media, not its traditional one-
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to-many broadcast station, has been the source of this dissemination. Like Asukwo’s page that 
hardly gets visits and comments from viewers and readers, the website of Buni media also gets 
more dialogues and commentaries from its social media outlets. This fact is another significant 
indicator of the way social media is ingrained in the imagination of young internet users in Nigeria 
and other parts of Africa. With thousands of shares through different users on Twitter and 
Facebook, the “GEJ meets Boko” video enjoys a viral status. Its virality suggests that many digital 
citizens endorse its satirizing of both Boko Haram and the Nigerian state.  Although much of the 
commentaries around the video focus on its comic strategies, there are many commenters on 
various threads on the video that appear to provide the consensus that the Nigerian state was 
ineffective in its response to the Boko Haram crises and, especially, to the abduction of the Chibok 
girls. Social media in Nigeria, since the abduction, has remained a contested space of negotiation, 
as netizens seek to refigure power and speak back to it at the same time.  
Furthermore, the mobilization of satire in the image (see Figure 2.6), evident in the way the 
video lampoons a Nigerian regime, is particularly instructive as it provides an optic to understand 
the location and function of online dissent in the community of readers/viewers in the country’s 
network society. The cultural politics and ideological significations implicit in the many 
representational spaces of popular culture on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter evokes performance 
and performative identities. This perspective is similar to that in the work of Liesbet van Zoonen, 
Farida Vis and Sabina Mihelj, who examine how “the participatory opportunities of 
[YouTube]…invite performances of citizenship, especially with respect to the articulation of 
religious and/or political identity” (250). Digital network technologies enable the social mediation 
of cultural and political life in Nigeria. In particular, the representation of the political in social 
media environments informs a postmodernist performative identity, through which ordinary 
citizens, empowered by Web 2.0 platforms’ re-centering of the user as the “message” of the 
 84 
 
medium, affirm the constructedness of political identifications. The political is locatable in 
processes of postmodernist self-fashioning organized around visual culture and the performance of 
political selves, not merely in the posting of activist messages and coordinating oppositional 
politics on social media. The popular culture forms that accompany social movements online 
demonstrate how social media platforms are sites of organizing counter-hegemonic activities, 
meaning they function as spaces of personal creativity and performative self-presentations, which 
articulate resistance. These images serve as visual signifiers of a subversive discourse reaffirming 
a contemporary moment of network power (Castells 774) in Nigerian political communication. It 
is this network potential that producers of the Buni TV series, Marie Lora Mungai and Godfrey 
Mwampembwa, two former producers of television series, engage in to distribute their satirical 
interventions to a global audience. The fact that they produce content about Nigeria from Kenya 
emphasizes how social media makes possible connections and communities of resistance at a 
transnational level that is rare within Africa. With these social networks, different people across 
Africa are now able to engage at a global level with one another.  
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, like Castells, have also described how the governing 
apparatus of the network structures modern society. Within the Nigerian context, the mobilization 
of these cultural forms within network environments and the participation of readers/viewers who 
also join in the articulation of textual meanings show how the network has become a way of 
understanding and interpreting the world (Hardt and Negri 142) and acting in repressive and corrupt 
societies such as Nigeria. The network as a location of power relations is here seen with respect to 
cultural texts that signify the individual on social media as a performer who connects with other 
people to contest dominant narratives. For instance, in the Asukwo image below, the cartoonist 
contests a dominant practice in the Nigeria society: that of undermining judicial procedures so that 
politicians who defraud the state can avoid punishment. The text depicts the apparatuses of the 
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Nigerian state as corrupt institutions unable to midwife justice as it is done in Euro-American 
locations. 
 
 
Fig. 2.10. “How my Pencil Reacted to the News of Ibori’s Imprisonment in London.” Facebook, 
20 April 2012. 
The cartoon delivers a powerful critique of the state in Nigeria and how government encourages 
corruption among state officials. That said, since it is published on social media, it leads to an 
(un)intended discourse on the intersections of politics and religion in Nigeria. Asukwo is asking 
“friends and fans to study it carefully” because he wishes to know what possible ideological 
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impulses the text may disseminate or motivate. Although the immediate setting of the narrative is 
not a mosque, the men, who represent some of the country’s juridical institutions, have buried their 
heads in shame on the floor. This portrayal, reminiscent of the ritual of prayer in Islam, constitutes 
a problem for some readers who understand the cartoon as a religious narrative. Such readings 
demonstrate that religion, especially Islam and Christianity, impacts upon everyday citizens’ 
interpretation of signifying practices. What should not be missed is the understanding of a cultural 
producer who discerns that the (new media) space of engagement and authorship is not the once 
univocal and authorizing frame of traditional media, but a de-hierarchized and polyvocal space in 
which cultural meanings are negotiable, performative and dialogic. This new space is one in which 
authorship is both shared and collective, and constantly in a state of flux, since the process of 
commentary, liking, or sharing is always ongoing. Within, Asukwo’s original authorial space, now 
decentered, the author gains in authority and agency, becoming a legitimate producer of cultural 
meanings. That fans and friends can co-habit the space of cultural meaning is another reason social 
media is significant in the articulation of Nigeria’s recent sociopolitical history. As a shared media 
space between cultural producers and their friends and/or fans, social media enables a kind of 
online carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1941) that restructures spaces of power through the chaotic carnival 
of popular humour and classless interactions focusing on sometimes grotesque political 
representations and subversions of power.  
These texts motivate the argument that social media enables a culture of political 
participation that was previously almost inconceivable within the domains of traditional media 
such as radio, television and cinema, over which the Nigerian government exerts significant 
influence. A critique of the texts’ meanings uncovers discursive space for an examination of how 
social media platforms articulate performative representations of individual agency. The images 
and the conversations they engender also illustrate some of the ways everyday citizens contest 
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dominant narratives, resist hegemonies, reframe political identities, and perform a subversion of 
the state’s regulatory mechanism of dispossession. Users perform citizenship and construct 
political identities that subvert regimes of oppression and corruption in Nigeria. The idea of social 
media rituals is a suggestion that what people do in network environments can be depicted as 
“ritualized behaviour” (Schechner 52), conditioned by a sense of play, or digital flânerie. In other 
words, it suggests that the activities of people on social media are usually processual, as people, in 
the Nigerian reality for example, repeatedly share and reshare creative content as a way of 
imagining or gesturing towards a more productive political environment. This processuality 
informs why I conceive of practices such as liking, posting and other similar social media 
performances as “rituals” that potentially generate meaning and knowledge. In other words, 
epistemic consequences also arise for connecting with other characters, fictional or not, in social 
media environments. Users connect with one another, not only to identify with friends and 
relatives, but also because the rituals of liking and following occasion the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge. Expressions such as Follow us on Twitter and Like us on 
Facebook are, therefore, linguistic imperatives that seek both a performance of comradeship and 
of knowledge production.  In other words, “Twitter follows” and “Facebook likes,” are important 
sources of information that situate users and their followers in a shared media space. In this media 
space, social media users constantly construct their own versions of reality and producing 
knowledge about varied aspects of global, or in the case of Nigeria, local cultural politics. Both 
knowledge and the identity of users on these platforms are contingently framed through the social 
media rituals of sharing and posting content. In the example below, this collective and shared 
production of knowledge can be illustrated in this status update in which Mike Asukwo seeks the 
suggestions of his readers as to what to tell President Buhari in his next cartoon:  
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Fig.2.11. Mike Asukwo. “In the Next Cartoon What Should I tell the President?” Facebook. 5 Aug. 2016. 
 
In this example, Asukwo as an artist is in some form of conversation with his friends—other 
netizens whose consumption of the text is expressed as “comments” and “likes.”  The post elicits 
the agency and participation of the reader in the production of meaning, with Asukwo, aware of 
the discursive positioning of the reader, inviting their perspective for his next cartoon. The response 
of his readers on the thread indicate their acknowledgement of Asukwo as some form of 
spokesperson saddled with the task of representing their popular views through the symbolic 
context of the cartoon. “Tell him there is hunger in Nigeria,” one of the commenters write; while 
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David Christopher wants Asukwo to tell the president “to resign,” a view that is shared by others 
on the thread. There are other comments in this screenshot that raise other contentious issues, 
including Steve Aborisade’s comment that Asukwo should tell the president “to stop laughing at 
your cartoons.” Aborisade’s comment is an allusion to a statement released by the presidency that 
President Buhari is initially drawn to the cartoon pages anytime he opens a newspaper. These 
comments reaffirm the view earlier that, in conjunction with professional artists such as Asukwo 
or the crew at Buni TV, regular citizens in Nigeria are now much invested in the process of 
expressing voice and agency in Nigeria’s public sphere. These comments serve to prove that, for 
the cartoonist and his networks of friends, there is a self-awareness that the Nigerian government 
and its actors are paying attention to their social media feeds. 
Social media, therefore, demonstrates the individualization of the information age through 
the agency of the personal narratives that Web 2.0 occasions. For instance, Mike Asukwo’s 
Facebook post, Figure 2.12 below, functions to disseminate the cartoonist’s discursive posture with 
regard to the Nigerian ruling party’s attempt to muzzle politicized speech on social media, after 
using the same platforms for campaign activities themselves. As discussed below, the text, while 
mocking government’s attempt to regulate social media, provides an incentive for dissent to 
ordinary Nigerians empowered by social media. It illustrates the way a user’s social media profile 
alters or resists some of the dominant narratives of the Nigeria state. 
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Fig.2.12. Mike Asukwo. “Notorious Fact.” Facebook  
This text is particularly important since it engages with the social media bill, “Act to Prohibit 
Frivolous Petitions,” discussed in the previous chapter.  While responding to the Nigerian state’s 
attempt to regulate social media, Asukwo uses the image to recuperate a civic space on social 
media, producing a text that encourages a pertinent political conversation between producers and 
audiences. In the text, a man vilifies members of the Nigerian Senate before his wife but later 
recants his statement when his wife reminds him that he might be jailed because of the proposed 
social media bill, which is not mentioned in the text. A gender analysis of the cartoon can yield 
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additional insights, including the implicit womanist undercurrents of the cartoon. By womanist, I 
am referring to the discourse of African feminist aesthetic that reconfigures Western Feminism in 
such a way that is apposite to the experiences and particularities of African women and women of 
colour in the African diaspora. It is valid to argue that while rejecting the label of “feminism” is an 
ideological act itself that asserts difference, “womanism” allows for an Africanist formulation of 
gender that is less Eurocentric and sufficiently adjusted to an African epistemology. Womanism, 
as Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi defines it, “is black centered, it is accommodationist. It believes 
in the freedom and independence of women like feminism; unlike radical feminism, it wants 
meaningful union between black women and black men” (Okonjo Ogunyemi 65). Although, to 
return to the couple in Asukwo’s text, a man can be seen in a seated position while his wife stands 
to communicate with him, as if she were subject to him, it is the woman that ultimately wields the 
greater power—evident in how she, through a rhetorical assertiveness gets her husband to recant 
his statement regarding the senators. Womanism constructs a social space in which both men and 
women can complement each other in shared and meaningful sociopolitical interactions. 
Many of Asukwo’s Facebook and Twitter followers who share and circulate this image are 
not only invested in altering and resisting a dominant juridical commandment, they also join in the 
authorization of subaltern narratives that contest the power of government and its traditional media. 
They participate in the articulation of a common knowledge, or a “notorious fact” among many in 
Nigerian social media, the idea that “half of our senators are idiots” for proposing a bill to control 
online activities and police the various sites of creativity and imagination among Nigerians with 
Internet access. The Twitter version of this cartoon has an interesting reader response that suggests 
how some social media users in Nigeria respond to power through popular laughter. The 
commenter writes:  
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@Asukwoeb Draw all you want now cos [because] very soon when d bill is passed, u won't 
have d right to draw any senator. LOL (Posted on Dec. 5, 2015) 
Asukwo’s epistemological position as an author whose texts convey alternative meanings is being 
questioned by other social media users whose sharing of the posts affirms the decentralization and 
creative appropriation of his own authorship. For instance, the comment above is fascinating for 
the way the writer appears to share an ironic joke that sympathizes with Asukwo’s situation, while 
also alluding to the state’s desire to censure free speech and artistic expressions such as the cartoon. 
Social media shares and retweets, as this example shows, may therefore be a weakening of the 
authority of the writer or creator of online content, since the content produced by a user is subject 
to frequent reproduction and appropriation. The cartoon, as of February 18, has 249 likes and 71 
shares on Facebook, while managing 96 likes and 20 likes on Twitter, and this is without even 
mentioning its potential for wider distribution, considering that a follower has 2,577 followers. 
This, and indeed other Asukwo cartoons, not only gesture towards the popularity of Facebook in 
Nigeria, but also towards how much of the cultural forms in Nigerian social media invite popular 
participation. While I have highlighted agency in this chapter, I will be turning more fully to the 
question of performance in the next chapter. I hope to discuss the performance of political selves 
and show how the structure of social media inspires measured and performative presentations of 
political identities. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PERFORMATIVE CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN NIGERIAN SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
In contemporary digital culture, users of social media who take photographs of themselves 
or of other people using a smartphone are arguably unable to take these photos without the frame 
of some social media lurking in their unconscious. The photographic pose for the digital phone 
camera therefore becomes an inadvertent and simultaneous pose for a digital public audience for 
which these users carefully present performative versions of themselves. This imagined social 
media audience, functioning simultaneously as a peripheral subject of the performance, silently 
inserts itself into the privacy of every offline moment of self-photography, conditioning the gaze 
and pose of the actual person who takes the selfie. The selfie, as the signifier of this performative 
behaviour, is a digital representation of the self’s involvement in a politics of presentation and 
identity on digital or social media platforms. Scholars such as Laura Levin (2009) have 
documented the varied ways the self and the selfie are mutually constituted within the framework 
of identity formation. In this chapter, I contend that, aside from actual self-presentations, popular 
images such as political cartoons and videos published on digital networks are re/produced within 
social media as a performance of self that intersects with power relations. The chapter addresses 
the question:  how effective are the various ways through which ordinary users of social media in 
Nigeria deploy fictional representations and actual self-presentations to perform resistance to 
power? I consider this performance (of the self) to be constituted by a broad variety of activities 
that includes the selfie, as well as the publication of comic images through which users construct 
and deconstruct identities that overlap with state power. In this regard, I examine specific examples 
of social media images organized around the performances of citizenship and political identities 
as forms of participation in the country’s public sphere.  
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In a Nigerian social media context in which online subjects use images and photos as 
ideological signs for performing protest identities and political selves, this performance is further 
intensified as an online ethic of resistance to systemic corruption and political abuses.  In a country 
perceived by its citizens to be unjust and unequal, there is the predilection by savvy digital subjects 
to push back at oppressive articulation of power and social injustices through the cultural spaces 
facilitated by the Internet. They do these as one of the ways of performing a citizenship not 
regarded as inclusive of their agency. This disposition to scrutinize and rehabilitate the structures 
and agents of state power overlaps with the social media rituals and activities of the subaltern in 
Nigeria. As a formerly marginalized and unrepresented class, young people invest creative energy 
in online networked communities to unsettle hegemonic activities. They utilize the 
representational economies of social media as cultural mechanisms for performing political selves 
and protest identities. In earlier chapters, I mentioned that, aside from posting political status 
updates, a digital activism-minded group of social media users in the country and elsewhere prefer 
the sharing of popular images such as political cartoons and videos as tactics of challenging 
systems of rule and domination in Nigeria. I also highlighted how other users deploy network 
platforms as mere expressions of social interactions, while acknowledging the possibility of a third 
group, sometimes planted online by the ruling elite to mimic and justify the workings of hegemony 
by rationalizing and endorsing the activities and policies of government. What is common to all 
these groups is the ways the idea of the “social” in social media enables the emergence of a vibrant 
virtual public sphere in which regular citizens, from the diverse ethnic and religious groups in the 
country, represent themselves in political discourses and perform political and cultural selves 
through the apparatus of speech—whether as words or images. This capacity for representation on 
Facebook, Twitter, and other networked platforms is articulated by participating in democratic 
conversations without the hitherto limiting structures of the state or of the traditional media. To 
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introduce the idea of social media as performative space, I am guided by Natasha Lushetich’s 
chapter in Chow and Mangold’s volume Žižek and Performance.  Lushetich identifies the 
Facebook medium as an environment in which exists a liberal totalitarianism that masks itself in 
what she, in agreement with other scholars, identifies as the illusion of online freedom. My interest 
in her work primarily lies in her idea of a certain “performative constitution” that is inherent on 
Facebook. The Facebook wall, for instance, is the central stage on which, according to Lushetich: 
The user interacts with a number of different audiences in the form of comments, images, 
hyperlinks, and, most recently, also via live feeds. Unlike face-to-face communication, 
which depends on gesture, facial expression, intonation, and movement the wall affords a 
co-mingling of social as well as graphic languages and is the site of linguistic performativity 
par excellence. Having established a personal profile, the performer lays out the tools for 
his/her performances. In generic terms, these tools consist of her favourite books, films TV 
shows and quotes. In specific terms, they consist of user-specific referential scaffoldings 
whose semantic value is derived from the combination of linguistic and pictorial 
performativity. (98) 
Important here is Lushetich’s shift from “user” to “performer” when describing how the settings 
of Facebook urge varying degrees of performative behaviours. Lushetich’s notion of pictorial 
performativity is central to my argument about the operation of visual metaphors serving as 
cultural strategies through which the Nigerian subaltern perform political selves in network 
environments such as Facebook and YouTube—digital platforms that offer performative agency 
to users. 
In addition to the structure of the medium that inspire users to articulate performative 
identities, the social media rituals of tweeting, posting, and sharing cultural content can also be 
understood as processual and symbolic expressions of performance that produce and bring 
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identities into the world. In this instance, though, there is a reworking of the popularly held 
pessimist view in cyberspace research that identity and subjectivity are plastic and incoherent in a 
play of images that knows no end (Taylor and Saarinen 6) for, as examples below affirm, digital 
media subjects can reinvest a creative and sometimes liberating force in popular images online. 
For instance, Facebook user Francis Nnamdi’s post in Figure 3.1 draws attention to how ordinary 
Nigerians share popular images on social media as a strategy of performance and political 
participation. The focus of this chapter is to outline how social media provides a platform for 
creative and ordinary Nigerian citizens such as Nnamdi to do things with cultural signs such as 
cartoons, the selfie, and language, especially the performance of political selves and identities in 
a shared and interactive community online. In other words, how is the politics and “drama of 
everyday life in the postcolony” (Gikandi 225) retransmitted by everyday citizens on social media 
as a strategy for performing political selves, and resistance? 
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Fig. 3.1: Francis Nnamdi Chiedu “Meanwhile Somewhere in 9ja. . .”  Facebook, 19 April, 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1176745809002145&set=pb.100000002100036.-
2207520000.1475694065.&type=3&theater 
 
From the thread in the image, there seems to be a consensus that the Nigerian parliament 
represented in the text is constituted by a mob of riotous “troublemakers,” defined by disorderly 
tendencies and not by lawmakers sympathetic to the electorate. The desperation these politicians 
bring to fore when power and pecuniary gains are involved is altogether absent when it comes to 
protecting the interests of the common man. An oil-based economy, the Nigerian state lacks an 
accountable social contract between citizens and the states, and many citizens are using online 
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visual culture to show that relationship. While the comments on the image provide evidence for 
the argument that more Nigerian citizens have a platform to engage in political ideas and 
conversations, it is the way the image itself represents Chiedu’s performance of politics that 
animates some of the concerns of this chapter. To view the image on social media is to be put in a 
voyeuristic frame in which the subjects in the cartoon do not initially come across as 
parliamentarians but as actors.  The result is that an imaginary representation momentarily 
displaces the reality of a political class, and the “reader” is interpellated as a spectator on a 
Facebook wall. The readers of this social media performance are themselves “active, engaged, and 
bring with them their own interpretative frameworks” with which they extend the frontiers of the 
knowledge produced in the performances, while also interpreting and deconstructing the 
performative behaviours of others (Pearson, 2011). “I’ll let you be the judge” is the voice of an 
ordinary Nigerian netizen asking other digital citizens to be involved in a communal process of 
scrutinizing an apparatus of the Nigerian state. Rather than the unidirectional space of much of the 
mainstream media, social media allows for this dialogic environment in which the production of 
meaning and knowledge is fluid and community-based. The commenters on this post perform 
political selves to the extent that their comments similarly affirm them as individuals who respond 
to the discussion and similar others on social media as a way of participating productively in 
Nigeria’s online public sphere. 
In contrast to the more radical instance evident in the case of groups such as Anonymous 
and other revolutionary users that deploy technology for political interventions, my exploration of 
performative behaviour is informed both by popular images and actual performances of the self in 
social media environments. Although there are other forms of performance, such as an Anonymous 
post or message one might find on social media, forms such as the selfie or video broadcast options 
like Facebook Live or/and YouTube create scenarios in which users perform in front of a camera 
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to audiences, whether live or not.   The activities of Anonymous and other groups usually include 
a political vision that locates hacking computer systems as a practice of resistance. For many 
countries of the global south, however, popular culture proliferated on social media is a more 
appealing strategy of political intervention than practices such as alternative computing. The tweet 
below (Figure 3.2), though, suggests there could be occasional practices of hacking even in places 
with a developing digital culture like Nigeria’s. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. A tweet by Nigeria’s Electoral Commission (INEC) during the 2015 election in Nigeria. 
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Fig. 3.3 A Screenshot of Hacked INEC website during the 2015 Election in Nigeria. 
The tweet, published by the Nigerian electoral commission during the 2015 elections, confirms 
that partisan Internet users in developing economies can also utilize hacking as a digital practice 
of political resistance. Nevertheless, the fact that posting popular images of satire and humour are 
more widely distributed than other resistance activities such as hacking might gesture towards the 
productive use of expressive cultural forms, such as music and storytelling as dominant modes of 
experiencing and interpreting everyday life. The argument here is not the unproductive nature of 
hacking and other forms of alternative computing deployed for resistance and online activism. The 
idea, rather, is that posting satirical images and selfies is an articulation of a new media order in 
which people now participate directly in Nigerian political and cultural life. One may not always 
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be able to judge the effectiveness of these posts, nor gauge their real-world materializations, but 
the fact that they alert the ruling class in Nigeria to the transformed nature of the public sphere is 
telling. In 2015, for instance, the Nigerian government spokesperson described the many young 
people who publish alternative political narratives on social media as “idle and twittering, 
collective, children of anger, the distracted crowd of Facebook addicts” (Abati 2012) bent on 
ousting the president from office. Indeed, one can argue that social media was one of the major 
cultural fields that contributed to the defeat of the former President Goodluck Jonathan. In an 
interview with Jerry Eddings in Mediashift Nigerian journalist Samson Dare observed that the 
election in Nigeria was “decided, dominated and directed by social media. The power of social 
media came out for this country. Social media played a central role as a watchdog in keeping the 
integrity of the process. Within minutes of votes being counted at a polling unit, the results were 
all over social media” (n.pag). The thrust of Dare’s analysis lies in the varied ways in which 
Nigerian political conversations, now expressed through performative self-presentations and 
through online commentaries, have been reconditioned by a social media culture facilitating 
interactive and repoliticized communities. Dare describes how ordinary people were eager “to 
make comments, write their views, post pictures,” since they were invested in a process that has 
potential for actual change in the social body. Some of these images were not only photos and 
videos from electoral venues around the country, but also popular humorous images and cartoons 
through which a subaltern imagination was written by ordinary actors of the state into the fabric 
of power in the country. These images are the cultural signs symbolizing the new regime of 
participatory politics through which people push back at power and its excesses in Nigeria. In 
addition to the real-world outcome of online performativity within the context of electoral 
practices, there are also the ways social media enables the administration of social justice and 
discipline in society. For instance, in recent times, governmental apparatuses such as the Nigerian 
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police, notorious for its corruption and inefficiency, have had to respond to pressures from citizens 
who distribute messages concerning unlawful activities in network spaces. There are examples of 
social media campaigns, including the 2012 #Alu4 hashtag Twitter protest, that eventually 
prompted the Nigerian police to investigate criminal activities they may have been inattentive to 
were it not for social media. When the police deny, in their unwillingness to carry out their duties, 
that crimes take place, citizens who seek justice and investigation take to social media to publish 
video and photo evidence that eventually compel state authorities to investigate such acts. The fact 
that the social and cultural conversations people have on social media have material impact in 
places like Nigeria underscores the import of digital media in contemporary in the country. While 
my work is attentive to the ways a diverse array of communicative styles enables such decentered 
and networked conversations, what is emphasized the most is the performative presentations of 
selves and identity organized around popular images and cultural forms such as the selfie and 
online cartoons. The tendency to invoke cultural signs, as evident in the hacking example above, 
may explain why the group Nigerian Cyber Army accompanied their original post on the INEC 
website with one of Mike Asukwo’s images (see Figure 3.19). The use of the cartoon stresses the 
importance of image politics to the expression of the visual rhetoric in users’ political resistance 
online. The proliferation of Asukwo’s political cartoon confirms the suspicion that the artist’s 
works are some of the most dominant political images in Nigeria social media. I will therefore 
conclude this chapter by returning to how some of the cartoons illustrate the expression of 
performative identities in Asukwo’s network.  
 
3.1 Self-Spectatoriality and Rituals of Performance on Social Media 
Performance on social media is predicated on what I have called self-spectatoriality, a 
notion that I deploy to explain the situation in which a social media user is active as performer and 
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spectator in the performative spaces of user-generated media. An essential attribute of social media 
is its ability to put the user in a spectatorial posture in which they are conscious of the gaze of both 
the self and others. Self-spectatoriality is thus useful in stressing the critical place of the user of 
social media as a spectacularized subject performing diverse identities for a public gaze that 
influences and perhaps reproduces the user’s performance. It also helps to navigate the layered and 
nuanced ways social media signifiers, such as the selfie, as well as actual self-presentations, rather 
than fictional representations alone produce performing citizens rehabilitating their exclusions 
from power. Since user-based content is definitive of Web 2.0, one can see how social media 
narratives and viewership converge on the user, who, inspired by a performative space, is both 
producer and consumer of the spectacle on display in online performances. Self-spectatoriality is 
analogous to what Alice Marwick identifies as social surveillance (1), which explains watching 
others and the awareness of being watched in a fluid and unstable social media space. Marwick, 
working in a new media context, appears to reiterate John Berger’s idea about the way women are 
depicted as being always aware of the male gaze in European Renaissance art (49). On social 
media, that awareness of being watched is both external and internal: the user watches themselves 
(in their social media posts) being watched by other people.  
Self-spectatoriality is thus that performance assured by an awareness of a virtual gaze for 
which social media users perform using symbolic forms such as the spectacle of the image or the 
liking of content. Also, important here is the Sartrean perspective that the audience of a traditional 
medium such as film brings “itself into being as an object before its own eyes,” and that “without 
playing itself as a role, it comes to understand itself” (Sartre 74). The social media 
spectator/audience, on the other hand, occupies a self-reflexive role in which meaning is 
constructed through the audiences’ binary position as producer and consumer. The audience on 
social media therefore plays an active role in the production of meaning. Ideas of spectatoriality 
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and the self can inform an appreciation of performance and performativity with regard to Nigerian 
social media texts. The term draws attention to how Web 2.0 enable digital subjects to locate 
themselves as the point of reference in social media environments. Ato Quayson proposes looking 
at Facebook “as one of a long genealogy of modes of reader/viewer identification starting from 
the oral folk tale, through the novel, film and television,” claiming that since users have tools at 
their disposal, they are able “to insert themselves into the circuits of spectatoriality for others to 
look at,” making Facebook a profound “instantiation of a completely new socio-cultural template” 
(n.pag). This cultural order is a new regime of the spectacle that expresses itself in the way 
individuals are both spectator and participant in the process of online performance. A netizen who 
posts a protest selfie—which will be discussed in chapter four—can function simultaneously as a 
social media user who watches others watching them. The user is, thus, both performer and 
spectator in his own performance.  
It is possible, in the light of this last point, to conceive of self-spectatoriality as a social 
media indication of the poststructuralist fusion of the identities of readers and authors. On 
YouTube, for instance, a user is the auteur of a unique vision of self, with an identity carefully 
fashioned to articulate a specific image. YouTube nicely illustrates the capacity of social media to 
shape and produce the users’ identity performatively. By responding to the plea to “broadcast 
yourself” on YouTube, users activate the process of enacting or producing particular forms of 
subjectivities and identities. For example, Figure 3.4 presents an anonymous White YouTube user 
who performs a parody of the wife of the former Nigerian president, Patience Jonathan. The former 
first lady had, during the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter campaign, responded on national TV to the 
Boko Haram abduction crises by crying openly and effusively criticizing public officials for 
abandoning their responsibility.  
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Fig. 3.4. “Darris God o.” YouTube Post, 11 May 2014.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ku7yKAmEhco 
The original video, “Chibok Girls: First Lady Breaks Down in Tears,” uploaded by a mainstream 
news portal Channel Television on YouTube on March 4, 2014, has been mixed and remixed by 
users who subvert its original content to mock the emotional outburst of the president’s wife. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates how the digital culture of remixing is a strategy of postmodern parody, 
mobilized to ridicule the Nigerian government’s handling of a terrorist activity. The character in 
the video is performing a comic self, which is foregrounded by the identity politics YouTube 
facilitates.  In some remixed versions of the original video, YouTube users infuse the original text 
with humour to satirize the political establishment in Nigeria. The white lady inserts her 
subjectivities into the narrative, performing a Nigerian political identity in the process. As 
Papacharissi asserts, the “performances of the self are indicative of the shapes individuals take on 
as they claim agency and negotiate power within social structures and imaginaries” (2). The 
performance of self, thus, occurs on platforms such as social media when users mix and remix 
different shapes of media content to incorporate their own subjectivities into ongoing political 
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narratives. As the identity of the woman is not clear, it is difficult to locate the original source or 
producer of the video. The version with the most views is the upload by Olajumoke Olaniyan, 
which had 72, 706 views as at October 5, 2016.  The image emphasizes self-spectatoriality as a 
productive mode for demonstrating the performance of self on social media. Most of the comments 
on a YouTube thread of this image are mostly dismissive of the participation of an outsider in the 
mockery of the first lady’s melodramatic outburst. There are some commenters, though, who are 
quick to reject the suggestion by Obinna Chinedu that “this is our first lady and we are OK the 
way she speaks.” Chukwudi tells Chinedu to “speak for [him]self! I am NOT ok with the way the 
so-called First Lady speaks or carries herself,” a view that resonates with other commenters that 
join in the conversation to decry the first lady’s theatrics.   
Thinking of performance as self-representation resonates more with this YouTube video 
than conceiving of performance in terms of fictional characters such as Mike Asukwo’s online 
political cartoons. The “Darris God o” video has remained fascinating as the subject of some other 
similar comedy skits on YouTube, with many parodies of the former first lady’s outburst created 
by young humourists. Some of these videos provide more evidence for a reflection on how creative 
young people in Nigeria use social media to perform versions of selves moored in the political. 
The intersection of three crucial viral stories in the history of Nigerian social media so far can be 
seen in different adaptations of the original video from Channels TV. These revisions include the 
“Darris God o” video, the collected speeches and interviews of a Nigerian politician who loves 
bombasts. There is also the “Oga at the Top Video,” which refers to the name of a TV interview 
in which Shem Obafaiye, a government official from the Lagos Command of the Nigerian Security 
and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) consistently defers to certain senior bureaucrats (ogas at the 
top) before answering almost every question from a panel of interviewers.  Viewers across the 
country saw the officer’s prevarication and unnecessary bureaucratic deference to a boss in 
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government, absent at the time of the interview, as the defining disposition of government workers 
who hide their incompetence behind the veil of official loyalty. At the height of a very 
disconcerting performance, the officer, asked about the official website of the Civil Defence, is 
unable to give a coherent answer: (“ww.nscdc...that’s all”). The interview provided fodder for 
satirists on the Internet to lampoon the Nigerian government and its body of uncritical officers 
pandering to them. People shared the video on various platforms since they identified the interview 
as a metaphor of political incompetence in Nigeria. I will be exploring this video, together with 
similar other images within the framework of the question of humour in Nigerian social media in 
a subsequent chapter.  Suffice it to say at this point that the ordinary people who make these videos 
are involved in a presentation of self that uses parody and satire to critique government and its 
institutions. The response of the Civil Defence Corps to a viral story that framed the organization 
as incompetent was the removal of the officer from his Lagos office; an outcome that shows 
another way conversations on social media, whether performative or mere posting of messages, 
have real-world effects in a Nigerian context.  
On the idea of social media performance and the stylized presentation of self, I now 
examine social media activities as rituals of performance by exploring how the ideas of two 
traditional names in performance studies intersect with Nigerian social media performance. I 
examine Richard Schechner’s theory on the subject, before turning to an example from Nigerian 
social media to show how users perform political selves and ideologies through these rituals. 
Richard Schechner (2006) draws insights from the anthropological explanation of Victor Turner’s 
social drama, and from Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical theory of self-presentation and social 
interactions. He locates his theory of performance in a model in which performances occur in many 
different instances. “Performance must be construed as a “broad spectrum” or “continuum” of 
human actions ranging from ritual, play, sports, popular entertainments, the performing arts 
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(theatre, dance, music), and everyday life performances to the enactment of social, professional, 
gender, race, and class roles, and on to healing (from shamanism to surgery), the media, and the 
internet” (3). This wide-ranging construal of performance suggests that any action that is “framed, 
presented, highlighted, or displayed is a performance,” and the Internet is a space in which actions 
and self are framed and presented in such a way that points to a paradigm of communication in 
which identity is unstable. For instance, the new Facebook Live video option, which allows users 
to become more visible in their performance of selves, complicates this presentation and display 
of the self.   
The live broadcast prevents anonymity and enables any users of the medium to livestream 
their performance in real time. The opportunity to broadcast activities to audiences in real time 
makes Facebook Live another instance of a performance that can be stored and retrieved for a later 
use. The self-presentation inherent in the performance of such videos can be easily modified and 
oriented towards the feedback of a watching audience, unlike what obtains in the fixed context of 
a selfie whose performance and message entails an imagined audience prompted to decode the 
selfie. In other words, real-time videos that position audiences to give immediate feedback 
interpellate both performer and audience as co-producers of an unstable meaning constituted while 
the video is ongoing. Perhaps an eloquent example that succinctly illuminates some of the ways 
social media videos can have impact on the performance of political identities is the example 
below, in which a Nigerian senator can be seen dancing mockingly to his viewer. The video, among 
other possibilities, harbours the conscious framing of a virtual self oriented towards an audience 
of supporters and detractors online. The online news portal Sahara Reporters recently stated in a 
publication that Senator Dino Melaye did not have the requisite academic qualifications to be in 
the Nigerian legislature. Having made some face-saving efforts to debunk the story on his social 
media accounts, he eventually posts a video Truth Will Always Win onto YouTube, mocking the 
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publisher of Sahara Reporters. This image is not just important because a notorious Nigerian 
politician is using the video selfie to perform politics, but also because it proves the point that the 
social media culture in the country is a new terrain in which power relations and performative 
treatments of Nigerian political culture intersect. 
 
 
Fig. 3.5. Senator Dino Melaye. “Truth will always win.” Twitter. 
https://twitter.com/dino_melaye/status/846420813972754432 
In the first video, Melaye asserts: “You speak the truth you die; you lie, you die. I Dino Melaye 
have chosen to speak the truth and die.” He gets up and sings: “àjekún ìyà niyo je, enití ò tó nií nà 
tó n dìnà deni. àjekú ìyà niyo je”—a rough English translation of this might be: “He will be 
severely beaten who, though incapable, tries to block one’s path. As a Nigerian senator is using 
the video selfie to convey threat to the media, one of his followers on Twitter responds to him, 
reminding him that “2019 is around the corner,” a suggestion that the senator could be voted out 
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of office in a future election. The politician’s video, which went viral in a sense, attracted untold 
mimetic re-creations and comments that wonder why a legislator would invent a song to mock and 
undermine a section of the Nigerian press. Aside from the many parodies the video has triggered 
among creative and humorous netizens, the comments on the senator’s Twitter handle reflect the 
views of many others who responded to the senator’s “infantile behaviour,” as @KolaSaidu asserts 
in his response to the senator. Besides some fictional representations produced to mock the senator, 
another video, Figure 3.6, produced to counter Senator Melaye’s musical narrative similarly went 
viral on Facebook. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. A Nigerian citizen’s video-selfie critique of Senator Dino Melaye. Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/ReportYourself/videos/10154341121527703/?hc_ref=SEARCH 
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In a response to Dino Melaye’s video, another social media user makes a video selfie in which she 
parodies the dance performance of the Nigerian politician, subverting his song-text as a form of 
alternative perspective to Melaye’s rhetoric. The user revises Melaye’s words: “If you ask Nigerian 
leaders for accountability, you will die. If you do not ask Nigerian leaders for accountability, you 
will die. I, Cynthia, will ask Nigerian leaders for accountability.” She also sings the Yoruba song, 
but modifies it to read in English and Nigerian Pidgin English: “If you don’t ask Nigerian leaders 
for accountability, àjekún ìyà niyo je, People wey govern Nigerian with fake results, àjekún ìyà ni 
o je.” She not only criticizes Melaye for his video and the fact that he may not have the right 
university credentials, she subverts his originally intended meaning and turns it on Melaye’s head 
in her own message to other netizens: hold corrupt politicians such as Melaye accountable since, 
either way, you will eventually die. It is crucial to note that a video selfie by a female voice is a 
bold performative act of resistance in a Nigerian social media space that largely mimics the 
patriarchal configurations of Nigerian culture.  
That many supporters of Dino Melaye disparage Cynthia shows the oppressive and 
hegemonic nature of public discourses for most Nigerian women. Some may see the myriad of 
insults she receives as a reflection of a partisan interest, since her video has gone viral because it 
has been posted by Sahara Reporters, the online media organization Senator Melaye is up against. 
In any case, both video selfies are important documentations of the new face of political 
conversations in contemporary Nigeria: ordinary citizens, whether male or female, can speak back 
to power themselves, without any fear of censure. Also, I am highlighting this response of a regular 
Nigerian citizen to a legislator because it shows how the performance of the selfie on social media 
can be co-opted by anyone and reinfused with new meanings and ideas. Because of digital tools, 
social media allows spectators to recreate the performance they view and refashion it to include 
 112 
 
the perspectives of the spectator; hence, performance in the social media space is always 
contingent and unstable.  
This unsettling of the highly patriarchal space of Nigerian political discourses through 
performative expressions on social media is perhaps best demonstrated by a recent viral video6 by 
the Twitter user @AishaYesufu. A notable #BringBackOurGirls activist, Yesufu is one of many 
women using Twitter to repossess voice and agency for Nigerian women. She recently demanded 
that Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari resign from office because of his failing 
health. Disrupting the popular notion of northern Nigerian female as an oppressed, subservient 
Muslim woman demurely wearing Hijab, she ventured into an area that is typically reserved for 
male commentary. Her appearance in this hegemonic space invites the rethinking of the role of the 
Nigerian women in online spaces. Yesufu’s selfie is pertinent because it is of a minority Muslim 
woman venturing a critical perspective in a public sphere dominated by men.  
Another dimension to performance in this work is from Erving Goffman’s classic The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life that conceives all social interactions, such as the ones in the 
video selfies, as self-presentations. Although Goffman’s 1959 text appears to be dated, it is still 
useful to conceptualize how public performances can be imagined beyond the theatrical stage. 
Goffman explains that a person’s identity and the sense of self other people get about them are 
deliberately framed to communicate intended messages. In other words, people’s daily activities 
usually evoke a dramatic quality, since individuals self-present based on contexts and the 
expectations of audiences. He uses the term performance to refer to “all the activity of an individual 
which occurs during a period marked by continuous presence before a particular set of observers 
                                                          
6 Aisha Yesufu is one of the conveners of the #BringBackOurGirls protests in Nigeria’s capital Abuja. The tweet in 
which the video was posted can be found here: https://twitter.com/AishaYesufu/status/865274452376006656  
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and which has some influence on the observers” (123). This definition is similar to the performance 
of the photography that produces an affect in relation to the spectator. In the rituals of everyday 
social life, each of us presents a vision of self that is sanctioned by an unwitting audience of friends, 
family, colleagues, or even by ourselves. Since social interactions can be understood from this 
theatrical model, one could argue that users mobilize social media rituals constituting performative 
behaviour as practices of online performance. If people can control the presentations of selves 
within these digital spaces, then they are involved in some form of performance since there is the 
possibility of editing ourselves and projecting identities we adjudge to be the best of who we are. 
And whenever “one has time to write, edit, and delete, there is room for performance, with the 
‘real me’ turn[ing] out to be elusive” (Turkle 180). Unlike Sherry Turkle’s cynical idea of online 
performance, however, these self-presentation strategies in contexts such as Nigerian social media 
are productive tactics through which the self is refashioned as an active participant in a public 
sphere that precluded its voice before the era of digital media.  
Goffman’s dramaturgical model explains the ritual of everyday living as evocations of 
dramatic qualities. He uses the terms “front stage” and “backstage” to refer to the various arenas 
of identity performance in human communication that social actors navigate. He also identifies a 
critical aspect of this conception of performance as front, “the expressive equipment of a standard 
kind intentionally or unwittingly employed” (123) by individuals in social performance settings. 
In online communities, images, avatars, colour, and font might constitute the front of performance, 
a reason Papacharissi identifies the personal homepage as “a carefully controlled performance 
through which self-presentation is achieved under optimal conditions” (644). Her idea rearticulates 
my contention that people not only perform themselves on social media but also produce carefully 
constructed and controlled identities through which, in the Nigerian context, they author and 
challenge political perspectives. 
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This performance of the self in Nigerian social media can also be understood within the 
contexts of the emerging history of digital activism and subaltern tactics of resistance in Nigeria. 
The #BringBackOurGirls campaign provides the clearest optic for judging how the selfie, for 
instance, is an embodiment of the performance of the self in Nigerian political contexts. The 
campaign presented (or presents—since it is still ongoing) spaces for virtual performances in 
which individuals upload selfies and self-portraits of themselves onto social media as a way of 
protesting the government’s initial apathy to the abducted Chibok girls. The #BringBackOurGirls 
selfies and self-portraits from different parts of Nigeria, and indeed the world, signify how people 
deployed the rhetoric of visual culture to perform political selves with respect to the precarious 
conditions of the Nigerian school girls. In this case, users’ self-portraits, not any fictional image, 
are the primary modes of this performance. The example of Charles Kehinde Alasholuyi whose 
story was featured on the CNN iReport is an important demonstration of how ordinary Nigerian 
youths, armed with digital media, perform protest through selfies and self-portraits on Facebook. 
For over one year, following the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, Alasholuyi published video and 
photos of a self-portrait, featuring a sign containing the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag on social 
media. 
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Fig. 3.7. Charles Kehinde Alasholuyi. “#BringBackOurGirls.” Facebook, 22 Aug., 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10206483346095770&set=a.1898542936629.10729
1.1033316389&type=3&theater 
 
Alasholuyi’s performance rearticulates his body as a social and political construction, confirming 
the argument of Amelia Jones that the self-portrait is “a technology of embodiment” (950) that can 
be used to naturalize a counter-hegemonic response to totalities and oppressive conditions. The 
performance of the self in his image is grounded in a social construction of identity in which the 
virtual self is linked to power relations.  Similarly, Bukky Shonibare’s example further shows how 
the self-portrait is being used as an important symbol in the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. 
Pictured below, Bukky Shonibare also posts a picture each day to represent the number of days 
the Chibok girls have spent in the terrorist stronghold.    
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Fig. 3.8. Screenshots of Bukky Shonibare’s self-portraits, Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10157571567945416&set=a.10151203752655416.7
97294.670615415&type=3&theater 
 
The extent of Shonibare’s digital agency is expressed in the semiotics of the images she posts on 
Facebook. The dark background to some of the self-portraits signifies an activist who inserts 
herself into a gloomy photographic space representing the anguishes and hardship of the school 
girls. Unlike Alasholuyi’s performance, however, Shonibare shows that digital activism can be 
reproduced in actual street protests, as one of the images depict her holding up a sign in Chibok, 
the area from which the girls were abducted by Boko Haram. Although this gesture may be a 
performance of activism that brings Shonibare into a precarious environment, it explains how the 
symbolic language of the image is mobilized by the subject as a signifier of protest. Also, 
Shonibare’s visit to Chibok some days before twenty of the abducted girls were released is 
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pertinent to understanding the strategic way social media has continued a conversation the 
mainstream media in Nigeria and other parts of the world have abandoned. While the mainstream 
media reported the release of the twenty girls by Boko Haram and swiftly moved on to other 
stories, Shonibare’s continued performance of activism through the aesthetic of the selfie is one 
way the abduction narrative remains in public consciousness, a fact that affirms social media as an 
alternative location for the distribution of subaltern narratives. Although there are scholars who 
believe that digital activism would only succeed in situations that do not require people “to make 
a real sacrifice,” (Gladwell 47). Shonibare’s visit to Chibok is an affirmation of the praxis of her 
selfie advocacy, asserting the fact that her personal involvement materialized through the selfie is 
indeed political.  What makes these two examples relevant is the way the individual subjectivities 
are organized for a communal denunciation of social injustice. Self-portraits and selfies with a 
political sign or message immediately personalize the protest situation, showing a much stronger 
commitment from individuals willing to be seen and heard, than merely tweeting a hashtag or 
anonymously signing an online petition. 
The best example of this performance, however, is the image below (Figure 3.9), which 
demonstrates how the selfie can be utilized as a cultural supplement for challenging and 
questioning of forms of dominance and social inequality, while foregrounding the performance of 
citizenship.  
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Fig. 3.9. #BringBackOurGirls Protest. Twitter, 6 July 2014. 
https://twitter.com/iyani_wura/status/485969992425689088 
In the image, prominent Nigerian social media user Japheth Omojuwa, together with other 
protesters at a #BringBackOurGirls protest, takes a selfie that is carefully presented to include 
some Nigerian security personnel who block their march around the Nigerian seat of government 
in Abuja. This selfie not only signifies the user’s awareness of social media’s facilitation of agency 
but also his deployment of that agency as an instrument of resistance organized around the 
aesthetics of the selfie. Omojuwa intends this selfie as a practice that conveys a particular gesture, 
which, in this case, is a defiance of both the Nigerian Military and the Nigerian Government that 
have refused to “bring back our girls.” Theresa Senft and Nancy Baym write that the selfie is a 
cultural practice with “a gesture that can send (and is often intended to send) different messages 
to different individuals, communities, and audiences” (Senft and Baym 1589). In other words, the 
selfie is a representational space that is used by a person to perform multiple, and sometimes, 
contested meanings. Since it is a representation that communicates meaning, the selfie can be read 
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as a major language of social media, with language in this context understood beyond the 
normative frames of written or spoken discourse. Stuart Hall, writing on the intersection of 
representation, signifying practices, and culture asserts that elements such as sounds, words, 
gestures, and expressions: 
[A]re part of our natural and material world; but their importance for language is not what 
they are but what they do, their function. They construct meaning and transmit it. They 
signify. They don't have any clear meaning in themselves. Rather, they are the vehicles or 
media which carry meaning because they operate as symbols, which stand for or represent 
(i.e. symbolize) the meanings we wish to communicate. (5) 
The selfie, as language of online activism symbolizes a particular meaning, which in the case of 
the #BringBackOurGirls protest, can be located in the non-explicit details of the photo. Because, 
like most representations, the selfie is a constructed space that allows performative presentations, 
people tend to think of it as a shallow and narcissistic self-absorption functioning to promote its 
subject. However, there are important elements in this selfie that indicate Omojuwa is not 
interested in any self-promotion. His positioning shows how a selfie subject can take the 
conventions of the selfie and use them to destabilize and critique those same conventions. At first, 
his placement at the margin of the image may reveal his desire that audience appreciate the 
presence of military officers seeking to disorganize their protest. Aside from the placement of the 
subject in the selfie, the place of protest is also suggestive. Mark Nunes elaborates on this place-
marking effect of the selfie when he writes that “the placemaking selfie does more than broadcast 
(or narrowcast) one's location to the world; rather, it asserts an identity that borrows from the social 
and cultural encoding of a place as part of an evolving performance of citizenship” (110). In the 
context of this selfie, the place of Omojuwa’s performance of citizenship is symbolic, being the 
seat of power and official authority in Nigeria. His selfie thus bears witness to how the country’s 
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capital marks itself as space of austerity and the suppression of protest, rather than signifying as a 
place in which a photographic self-indulgence occurs. A closer scrutiny might also uncover how 
his position, together with his facial expression, in the image affirms him as someone taking a 
protest selfie that harbours little consideration for self. The defiance of his expression shows his 
investment in a resistance project being undermined by soldiers acting on behalf of the state.  
These elements in the selfie suggest that Omojuwa deploys his body as a site of performing 
resistance to the hegemonic forces represented in the image. The clenched fist, a traditional symbol 
in the context of resistance and activism, can be seen in the background of the selfie. Omojuwa 
carefully represents these two other protesters in the selfie to show an awareness of the body’s 
precarious involvement in the performance of protest. In addition, the words, “our courageous 
citizens, walking the walk” in the tweet highlights the ways the selfie is an archival testimony to 
the growing relationship between online activism and street protest in Nigeria. The employment 
of the language of association—our courageous citizens—not only reaffirms Omojuwa’s unselfish 
interests, it also identifies the activities of these virtual citizens protesting social injustice as 
transcending mere digital activism. The citizens are thus “courageous” because, by getting on the 
street to protest, they affirm online activism as a practice that transcends the slacktivist conception 
some have of it. To “walk the walk” even in the face of a potential military brutality thus 
symbolizes an embodied performance and self-presentation facilitated by the symbolic space of 
the selfie. The selfie’s staging of Omojuwa’s irreverence, despite a culture of disposability marked 
by frequent police violence during protests in Nigeria, underpins the varied ways state actions and 
inactions often highlight citizens as expendable subjects.   
This selfie post, together with the two earlier examples contribute to digital activism in 
Nigeria by the ways they have resulted in many other digital forms of activism through which 
citizens now engage with Nigerian hegemonic forms and power formations.  The example also 
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illustrates Adam Levin’s position that the selfie serves as a “real-time” performance of self 
oriented towards an audience situated elsewhere” (4). While the Omojuwa selfie might have been 
taken on a #BringBackOurGirls campaign ground in Abuja, its performance was meant to be 
restaged somewhere else, to a global audience more like, considering that the natural ecology of 
this cultural form is a space that can be reconstituted in many locations online. Adam Levin states 
that the performance of the selfie is “so integral to processes of individuation and identification 
within groups” (4) and is “always defined by a spatial and temporal displacement, as well as a 
separation between the self and the sign (the selfie) that is its surrogate” (4). It is therefore 
important to read selfie performances such as the examples above as cultural signs that refute the 
assumption that the use of selfies in digital activism are mostly oriented towards a narcissistic 
representation of the digital dissident. The resistance of the selfie is realized in the moment when 
the selfie protester materializes himself, like Omojuwa, in an oppressive offline environment, 
performing defiance in the face of danger. Both Omojuwa and Shonibare—who visit a major Boko 
Haram territory as sign of solidarity—are first performing resistance in actual environments of 
offline protest before documenting their activism through the digital culture of the selfie. The 
selfie, and its later derivative the selfie stick, are the material symbols of a self-presentation that 
overlaps with the performance of politics. In the Nigerian context, the selfie is, therefore, a critique 
of the politics of self-presentation and performance in social media. Whereas some Nigerian digital 
network users use the selfie to explore self and identity, the focus in this chapter is Nigerian social 
media users who deploy images as a way of performing a self that connects to broader social and 
political issues, and not one moored in the kind of playful and self-regarding logic of the selfie. 
The exception to this latter position is when the selfie has explicit connections to structures of 
power, as in the Japheth Omojuwa example. Omojuwa and the many other social media figures in 
Nigeria using selfies and self-portraits to embody resistance are entrenched in what may be called 
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performative citizenship. Performative citizenship stems from the spectacular matrix of social 
media and underscores the various ways citizen perform civic agency and political speech in a 
social media environment structured on performativity.  
In terms of this performance of citizenship mentioned earlier, these political categories 
extend into virtual spaces, with processes of posting satirical images on Twitter and Facebook and 
uploading videos on YouTube posturing as artistic practices of social resistance, which relate to 
the construction and performance of online identities. Visually performed citizenship is at play in 
the texts examined so far, with the idea of the citizen enacted through posting and sharing of 
popular images.  Besides the traditional conception of citizenship as a status within the 
geographical boundaries of a nation-state, therefore, the current new media environment “makes 
it necessary and possible to think of citizenship as a performance” (van Zoonen et al.  253). 
Performativity, thus, relates to how the representation of politics and political actors in “networked 
publics” (Boyd 1) gestures towards the production, maintenance and subversion of identity, with 
respect to the articulations of power. Some of these processes through which an online culture of 
political participation and performance of citizenship among ordinary people shape actual political 
events in Nigeria are manifest in the popular images examined in this study. 
 
3.2 Performativity and Identity in Nigerian Social Media Culture 
Aside from Goffman’s and Lushetich’s ideas that undergird my work, theories of 
postmodern performativity on identity as performance also support the proposition that social 
media rituals are performed through online popular images, with respect to the undermining of 
repressive and abusive power in Nigeria.  Although the representations of self and identity as 
framed on social media recall Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) claims that we have lost the ability to 
distinguish nature from artifice in the postmodern age, since representation precedes and 
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determines the real, Nigerian social media culture contrast the pessimism inherent in Baudrillard’s 
theorizing. His concept of the simulacrum as a location of unreality is relevant to social media 
discourse, as images from the Nigerian social media context can help to reinvest in it a positive 
potential as suggested by Gilles Deleuze's reinterpretation of the simulacrum. The limitation of 
Baudrillard’s critique regarding the simulacrum is its absolute conception as a negative which 
locates reality as a mediatized world in which resistance is futile. Unlike Baudrillard’s damning 
evaluation that sees no resemblance and/or productive relationship between a model and its 
representation, Deleuze’s more optimistic analysis of the simulacrum has a positive resonance with 
the ways in which images operate in the Nigerian social media imagination. The simulacrum is 
not a degraded copy, Deleuze asserts, neither is it inferior to an original. He writes further: 
It harbors a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and the 
reproduction. At least two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum— neither 
can be assigned as the original, neither as the copy.... There is no longer any privileged 
point of view except that of the object common to all points of view. (53) 
Deleuze’s reversal of the Platonic paradigm of the simulacrum helps to legitimize the standpoint 
that the simulacrum is not necessarily a perversion of reality since it has “no possible hierarchy” 
(53) in which the meaning of a reproduction is subject to the significations of an original. Instead, 
the simulacrum functions to erase any possible distinction between a copy and its original, while 
also expressing itself as an inherently whole image that is not a facsimile of any representation. 
Deleuze thus locates some agential power in the image as his interpretation of simulacrum, though 
analogous to Baudrillard’s, finds the sign productive for meaning and affect. Deleuze thinks of the 
loss between the original and the copy as a welcoming reality since the copy’s distinction makes 
the original irrelevant. Many Nigerian social media images constitute a positive simulacrum in the 
way they also produce certain effect, a performative force that is affirmed by the simulacrum’s 
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self-sufficient representation of the Nigerian condition. The images are not intended as degraded 
copies of any political or cultural reality in Nigeria; they are self-regulated representations of 
counter-hegemonic identities. The social media images are illustrated, not as simulacra of, for 
instance, social protests, or as substandard copies of street resistance, but as simulacra that exist 
as performative supplements of defiance in digital media. This productive force of the simulacrum 
inspires the application of theories of performance and performativity to political discourse in 
Nigerian social media. In this regard, the idea that performative expressions of resistance on social 
media are merely slacktivist is not applicable in some countries of the Global South, where social 
media users perform public speech and resistance through different popular images. The sharing 
of online political cartoons in the Nigerian social media ecology, for instance, demonstrates a 
decentered performance in which images are being used by netizens to critique power and to 
circulate an alternative and progressive perspective of the country.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, Judith Butler, following from J. L. Austin’s 
performative utterances and Michel Foucault’s idea of discourse as practices that inaugurate what 
they name, conceives of gender identity as an unstable and constitutive category that is produced 
by the reiterative power of discourse. For Butler, a person’s gender “identity is performatively 
constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (25). In other words, Butler 
locates subjectivity and identity in a poststructuralist and anti-foundational frame that draws from 
Nietzsche and Derrida, showing identity and selfhood to be fluid and contingent constructs, which 
operate in historical, cultural, and discursive structures. I am applying this perspective to my work 
on social media in two ways. First, I suggest that the social media rituals of vlogging, posting, 
liking, sharing, tweeting, and retweeting, like speech acts, produce performative identities, since 
they also constitute an identity for the person who performs these rituals. Also, as I describe these 
social network practices as rituals, it may be fitting to see them as signifying and reiterative acts 
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that portray the practices they symbolize. Facebook and YouTube can thus be seen as digital 
environments that inherently frame and produce identities distributed/published to imagined 
audiences. Through the protocols of self-presentation online, social media users deploy the space 
as a performative stage, which enables them to frame identities through the digital performances 
enacted by its rituals. In this theoretical framework, as Rob Clover cautions, “it would be 
unperceptive to think of social networking behavior, for example, as being only a representation 
or biographical statement or set of conscious and voluntary choices made by individuals or in 
accord with particular backgrounds or demographics” (180). Rather, social media activities, such 
as “liking” a post, adding a friend or choosing a gender category are best seen as performances 
which are “not merely voluntary, self-conscious decisions but acts which at a deeper level of 
analysis can be seen to construct the identity or self perceived to be making those decisions” 
(Clover 180). In other words, social media rituals actively construct and produce selfhood and 
identities, even if their subjects are unaware of this production.  
For Nigerians in the diaspora especially, social media functions as a more performative 
space than earlier cyber communities through which an exilic imagination overlaps with the 
cultural politics of the homeland. Farooq Kperogi writes that members of what he calls “the 
Nigerian digital diaspora” (8) participate through online citizen media in political and cultural 
discourses of their homeland. This situation “illustrates that citizens, especially in the age of the 
Internet, are not mere powerless subjects and receivers of informational flows from the institutions 
of the state and corporate mass media but can be active consumers and producers of informational 
resources and even purveyors of political power” (Kperogi 8-9). I argue that the social media 
rituals of posting and sharing of cultural items as new cultural paradigms through which Nigerians 
at home and in the diaspora, engage with the nation-state produce and reproduce citizenship—as 
a conceptual category that is performed in Nigeria’s digital public sphere. The many ways people 
 126 
 
engage in everyday political conversations on Facebook, seen in Pius Adesanmi’s viral post in 
Figure 3.10, for instance, gives credence to a new level of performative citizenship in Nigeria 
social media. Social media users enact political identities through the content they publish, 
becoming what they tweet or post, since these rituals, as Clover notes, are performative acts of 
identity which constitute the user (178). 
 
Fig. 3.10. “It Will Get Worse Before It Gets Better.” Facebook, 14 May, 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/padesanmi/posts/10153793622241715  
 
This post has 283 comments and 706 shares, figures that indicate some of the ways social media 
has changed people’s participation in political discourses in Nigeria. Adesanmi’s Facebook wall 
has become a sort of digital hub for political conversations, as he and an army of commenters 
engage in rational-critical debates on the Nigerian state.  The tweet of the post shows more 
interesting perspective of this political participation: 
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Fig. 3.11. “It Will Get Worse Before It Gets Better.” Twitter. 14 May, 2016 
https://twitter.com/pius_adesanmi/status/731536791157637120 
Although the Facebook post has more commenters who engaged with the post to express their 
political views, the tweet positions other commenters to mention Nigerian politicians on Twitter 
in their comments. The user @Moshoke, for instance asserts that the view of the post “is one of 
the best argument about the illusions of sacrifice” and that @DinoMelaye, one of many corrupt 
politicians who use social media, “needs to read, learn and act after reading this.”  @Moshoke is 
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using the agency of Twitter mentions to initiate a direct but unsanctioned conversation with a 
member of a ruling elite naturally disinclined to interact with the electoral population. Adesanmi’s 
posts and the comments produced on them are markers of a performance of citizenship previously 
organized aurally and orally around newspaper stands in offline spaces. With social media, that 
performance is articulated through likes and shares, as well as verbal and/or visual languages 
through which the Nigerian netizen performs an agency that disrupts the political order.  
The second way I examine performativity on social media is by focusing on the affective 
force of the images produced and circulated online as spectacle. The images people publish onto 
social media elicit some form of response from spectators, just like the spectacle of Greek tragedy 
ought to elicit cathartic responses. The images produce an effect through the spectacle they embed, 
compelling the public gaze to experience some shock when looking at the narrative of the image 
(Sontag 42). This shock might lead a user to do something, which in the case of social media, is 
usually expressed through rituals of re/shares, re/tweets, likes, and comments—all of which are 
processual behaviour. Performativity in this sense is a way of scrutinizing the texts in a way that 
is consistent with how Susan Ash understands some photographs as having a “dual capacity to 
operate as a sign and as a kind of theatre, or site of performance” (511). For example, in Figure 
3.12, the performative appeals of the image elicit a desire to share by one of Asukwo’s friends:  
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Fig. 3.12. Mike Asukwo. “Buhari Has Replaced Jonathan on the Catwalk.” Facebook. 3 April 
2015. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10206606977513709&set=pb.1250241460.-
2207520000.1475703673.&type=3&theater 
 
The perception of the visual power of this image by netizens who engage with it by commenting 
or liking it lead to the conclusion that social media is central to an appreciation of the shifting 
relations between the spectacle of the image and its performance. The performative force of the 
image is expressed by the commenter whose predisposition to the rhetoric of the text is a desire to 
share it.  To share therefore becomes a symbolic process that not only endorses the ideas of the 
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artist but also serves to perform Kash Comfort’s political identity. In the image, Asukwo recasts 
the identity of the current Nigerian president in the mode of his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan, 
who, the Nigerian media believed, spent a significant part of his administration pandering to 
Western leaders.  The performance of this photo relates to both the ways political actions and 
identities have been produced and how the image occasions a response from a community of social 
media users who share, like and comment on the photo, extending its rhetoric in the process. That 
“Buhari has replaced Jonathan on the catwalk” suggests not only the new president's continuation 
of Jonathan's frivolous and ephemeral style of governance but also the staging of political actors 
represented in the image.  Many other images, mostly political cartoons by Mike Asukwo are 
distributed by the artist and his fan-friends as a way of engaging with the Nigerian state and are 
ideological signs that offer a site of performance. For instance, one of the commenters on the thread 
in Figure 3.13 notes that Asukwo already occupies a stage from which he speaks through his 
works:   
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Fig. 3.13. Mike Asukwo. “Get Your Yansh Ready for More.” Facebook, 13 May 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10209805228427983&set=pb.1250241460.-
2207520000.1475703564.&type=3&size=810%2C600 
 
The image narrates the 2016 increase in gas prices in Nigeria and shows how the masses are made 
to bear the brunt of government’s fiscal decisions. It depicts an image of the Nigerian president, 
represented as a medical doctor, and a patient on whose body has been administered different 
“medical procedures” that range from high salary delay to a failed currency. The injection of 
another dose of austerity into the body politic is represented by the doctor’s attempt to inject 
another shot into the yansh of the patient, who by now has a bloodied posterior to deal with. This 
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example is a way a non-embodied performance gives life to the agonies of embodied realities in 
postcolonial states such as Nigeria. The body of the patient as the metaphoric site of oppression, 
conflict and dispossession is depicted as being powerless and unable to resist the pain inflicted on 
it by quack politicians.  This is how Foucault, in his genealogical work on Nietzsche and history, 
explains how the body bears the marks of dissolution and systematic destruction:  
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by 
ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), 
and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is 
thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a 
body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the 
body. (83)  
In any case, the close reading of social media images as cultural productions encoded with 
meanings uncovers a dissociated body in the Nigerian political landscaped impoverished by a 
history of precariousness and political excess. The representation of the abject body is thus a 
recurrent motif in not only Asukwo’s cartoons, but in many other sites of visual satires in Nigerian 
social media. This endless return of the repressed body is significant because of the way in which 
the body signifies as the ultimate location of colonial violence and postcolonial contradictions. 
The fact that this image has been shared by a large number of friends in Asukwo’s network 
underscores its strong exemplification of the sentiments of Nigerian social media users regarding 
the removal of a petroleum subsidy by the government. The cartoon, affirming its performativity, 
stages a narrative that invites and affects the audience who share it as a reproduction of its message 
and a performance of its satirical impulses. The representation of the relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled is consistently cast in a predatory light in which the masses do not have any safety 
nets from the attacks of their political representatives. 
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Fig. 3.14. “Where There Are No Safety Nets.” Twitter, 20 April, 2016. 
https://twitter.com/Asukwoeb/status/722857092760145920 
 
The body is also here presented as a site of economic and political plunder. In the image, the 
masses are unable to find a place of refuge from the “bites” of the government they have voted 
into power. Malnourished and resigned to fate, they are unable to protest partly because of the 
disempowering structures the state has put in place. Since, as Foucault asserts, “the body is the 
inscribed surface of events” (83), it is easy to appreciate how it functions in many of Asukwo’s 
works as a document of the struggles of the underclass against the impunity of the proto-autocratic 
regime in the country. The bloated size of the insect suggests that the oppressor is becoming 
increasingly powerful while the oppressed and their possibility for resistance continue to wane. 
The empty plate beside the body symbolizes hunger and the attendant lack of strength or capacity 
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to resist the oppression of elected officials who are indifferent to the suffering of the masses. Most 
of the time, when people are unable to protest injustice and uneven socio-economic conditions in 
Nigeria, the response is to recline into powerlessness or reach out to humour, as will be discussed 
in the next chapter, as a mechanism of coping. This last point is why one of the commenters on 
the thread in Figure 3.13 invites Asukwo to allow him “the luxury of a hearty laugh in these trying 
times.” In other words, sharing and liking a cartoon on Facebook as well as tweeting and posting 
content are performative acts through which some social media users in Nigeria cope with the 
agonies of life in a repressive and biting environment. They are performing, through social media 
sites of popular culture, a citizenship that lacks economic purchase, since they are, in most cases, 
excluded from power and are subjected to austere conditions by elected officials. In chapter four, 
I will return to this staging of “a hearty laugh” both as a mechanism of coping, and a subaltern 
tactic of subverting hegemonic culture. The irreverence of casting the government and the 
president in the negative frames above demonstrates the grotesquerie and bleakness of a dire 
situation citizens respond to in various creative ways online.  Another example of this performative 
potential of the image as a producer of affect can be illustrated in Figure 3.15: 
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Fig. 3.15 “Nigeria is Broke,” Facebook, 21 May, 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10209861661998787&set=a.2058448341395.12675
8.1250241460&type=3 
 
The performativity of the image can be located in the way the cartoon as a symbolic economy of 
alternative political meaning is being used to produce a public discourse that commenters on the 
thread can participate in as an elongation of the rhetoric and meaning of the image. The original 
post, that is the cartoon as well as the set of comments on it both constitute a shared performance 
in which both Asukwo and his readers are authors and readers at the same time. Beyond the visual 
persuasions of the image, the commenters produce verbal interpretive feedbacks that take the 
conversation in different other directions untended by the artist. The meaning of the image is 
therefore locatable in the collective epistemic production of both the cartoonist and the 
commenters who infuse it with their own interpretations. For instance, Abusa Bennie comments 
that Nigerian “federal government officials are living large but the country is broke.” The 
statement reaffirms the message of the cartoon that the cracked body of the Nigerian masses signify 
a broke and broken country whose leaders hypocritically cling to affluence at the expense of the 
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people. Another commenter suggests Nigerian leaders “are living like kings,” having dispensed 
economic gains of public office for themselves. These image, with a display of performance that, 
like previous examples, arouses different emotions, also presents the theme of a Nigerian political 
elite that feeds on the privations and deprivations of helpless citizens, unable to resist the might of 
looting machines and the power of corrupt oligarchs.  
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Fig. 3.16. Mike Asukwo. “Change is But a Dream. Twitter, 18 May, 2016. 
https://twitter.com/Asukwoeb/status/733031913594716161 
  
Figure 3.16, with 117 shares on the feed of another Twitter user, presents an image that functions 
as a sign of Asukwo’s performance on Twitter. It uses both its textual component and allegorical 
company of animal characters to tacitly invite Asukwo’s community of friends to participate in 
the performative critique of the new government and their electoral promises. The last two lines, 
a departure from the wording of the original nursery rhyme: “Change is but a dream” is the artist’s 
way of appraising the failed promises of the new government in Nigeria, and it is a view that is 
being widely disseminated on social media, as evinced by the growing number of retweets the post 
has had as at May 18, 2016, one year after the president assumed office. The image makes a 
powerful statement regarding the way state apparatuses such as the department of security service 
limit the activities of civil society and the official opposition in Nigeria. The allegorical narrative 
that is presented in the image reinforces the view that the Nigerian state would rather control 
freedom of expression, instead of having activists protest social inequality and hold politicians 
accountable to their party platforms. The responses to the post on Facebook7, which has been 
shared 72 times with almost 255 likes, is even more illuminating, as they repudiate government’s 
policing of the opposition party and activists. For instance, a Facebook user comments that “an 
#artist is a necessity put in every generation by the designer of humanity.” He then thanks “Mike 
for putting our current realities on canvas. ” Asukwo’s performance of a political self is thus 
affirmed by another user as representative of the views of many other regular citizens in Nigeria. 
Hence, another commenter believes nobody “captures the current Nigerian situation, condition and 
circumstance like Mike Asukwo.” The comments of the threads of these images are important 
                                                          
7  Asukwo, Mike. “Row, row, row your boat.” Facebook. 18 May, 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10209842638003199&set=rpd.1250241460&type=3&theater 
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components of Asukwo’s performances on social media, as they supply vital verbal interpretations 
of the visual messages of the cartoons, even taking a new life of their own with refractive and 
analytical vigour. 
Considering the ways professional artists such as Mike Asukwo and the auteurs of the 
“Ogas” YouTube videos use cartoons, puppetry, and the grotesque to represent political actors in 
Nigeria, therefore, what Achille Mbembe calls “aesthetics of vulgarity” come to mind as these 
texts exhibit elements that are “intrinsic to all systems of domination and to the means by which 
those systems are confirmed or deconstructed” (182). There is a need, though, to revisit Mbembe’s 
reasoning that the humour expressed in these images as a practice of counter-hegemony does not 
have any material impact on the state. Because digital media ecologies such as social media make 
possible a more personalized and interactive mechanism for presenting political satire, this strategy 
of resistance sometimes leads to both consciousness-raising and offline material results. From a 
global context, Taylor Owen (2014) has noted similarly that the authority of the state, as 
traditionally understood, is currently undergoing a crisis, as digital actors engage with technology 
to disrupt the traditional function of the state as the sole organization of people for democratic 
activities (2). In Owen’s account, however, the focus of digital actors appears to be subjects with 
the right technological skills, such as the members of the group Anonymous, who have the 
technical abilities to claim and reclaim counter-hegemonic spaces through their performance of 
dissent. The fact that individuals such as Asukwo have to be overly careful in places like Nigeria 
suggests that there could be real implications for any forms of social media critiques, including the 
publication and distribution of political images. Unlike Asukwo, his group of fans/friends are 
hardly scrutinized for censorship by the government. This is because regular citizens who use 
social media to protest institutional corruption are wrongly perceived by the state as passive agents 
of change. On the other hand, Asukwo’s social commitment often attract professional editors in 
 139 
 
the traditional media he produces content for that are pressured by state officials to proscribe some 
of the artist’s work. Hence, he publishes his materials on social media and other personal digital 
media spaces such as www.Brohahamedia.com. 
The point I have been developing is that the images Nigerian social media users share in 
these online network communities have a positive force that is contained and expressed in the 
performative effect the images have on users. Since digital media enables social contexts in which 
individuals perform everyday life with an awareness of the possibility of reproduction on social 
media, it can be suggested that people bring themselves within the realm of performativity, and of 
the performance of political selves in the Nigerian instance. As Sherry Turkle asserts:  
Our online lives are all about performance. We perform on social networks and direct the 
performances of our avatars in virtual worlds. A premium on performance is the 
cornerstone of the robotic moment. We live the robotic moment not because we have 
companionate robots in our lives but because the way we contemplate them on the horizon 
says much about who we are and who we are willing to become. (26)  
Although Turkle rightly identifies much of online life as performance, the idea that this 
performance is constituted by “a robotic moment” is a misreading of the productive engagements 
informed by performative self-presentations in contexts where people use social media essentially 
as contested sites for negotiating speech and agency for themselves and marginal groups in society. 
This meticulous production of the self can be discerned in the act of publishing, say, a political or 
religious post or image, which constructs a political or religious identity for individuals. Likewise, 
the ‘writer’ of the post and those who participate in its discourses are involved in a performance 
that constitute them as political or religious subjects. The social media performance can thus be 
grasped in its articulation of a dialogue between the content and its writer, the commenters on the 
post, as well as the social media environment that enables performative behaviour.  The conception 
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of performance I have applied to social media discourse also fits the extensive formulation of 
performance as a broad spectrum of human actions (Schechner 3). Being a term that is a contingent 
category with shifting and contested meanings, I explore performance here within the trajectory 
of online political conversations in Nigeria. This examination helps to understand, as the image 
below demonstrates, the subversive significations of the social media texts through which such 
network actors as Asukwo, ordinary citizens, as well as the producers of the “Ogas” YouTube 
series perform political selves.   
 
 
 
Fig. 3.17. Mike Asukwo. “The Back Scratchers.” Twitter, 4 Nov., 2015. 
https://twitter.com/Asukwoeb/status/661813973105451009 
 
By publishing this image on Twitter, the cartoonist transcends the then 140-character limits of the 
platform and instead unpacks through a single image the many ways politicians in Nigeria lobby 
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for cabinet positions. Asukwo also shows how Twitter is a representative space for critiquing the 
identities of two Nigerian political leaders, the current president and one of his cabinet ministers, 
who was prominent in the president’s campaign for office. The title “Back Scratchers” is an 
allusion to a local practice in which people, politicians, in particular, expect others to reciprocate 
the good deeds they have enjoyed. As in his other texts, Asukwo is, therefore, using a local idiom 
his many followers can relate to. The fact that the image has had 58 retweets can be explained by 
not only the performative force of the image as social media text that inspires an affective response 
but also the desire to disseminate a critique of a political practice in Nigeria that is impervious to 
merit.  To return to Lushetich’s point on how the structure of a social network application such as 
Facebook can occasion performances, I examine the relatively new Facebook setting that allows 
users to share memories of past posts and updates.   
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Fig. 3.18. “Remember This…” Facebook, 3 March 2016.  
Asukwo, like any other Facebook user, is reminded by the Facebook database of an image he had 
posted three years earlier. He reposts the image, telling his community of friends and fans to 
“remember this.” What is evident in this particular example is not just a sharing of memory, but 
also a recovery of performance, as the Facebook structure gives users the option to re-encounter 
what has been shared and encountered previously. By being asked to enact acts previously 
performed by other users, the Facebook option of sharing memories affirms the idea of 
performance as “twice-behaved behaviour” (Schechner 28).  In “Performance as Metaphor,” Bert 
States avers in regard to the photograph that the “performance of the photograph can only occur 
by means of reproduction, that photography is the quintessential art of reproduction, and that it 
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survives only in the encounter and re-encounter of the spectator. Performance, then, is recoverable 
in time, though it is obviously never the same performance, even for the same individual” (11). In 
other words, one can be put as a spectator in a position in which an encounter with an image and 
its performance is produced essentially in terms of its reproduction. In the Facebook sharing 
memory option, we are being asked to restore and re-encounter an earlier ritual of online self-
presentation. With respect to Nigerian social media discourse, this option can be a major strategy 
of (re)documenting Nigeria’s contemporary socio-political history, while functioning as a 
performance of political memory online. With persistent acts of police brutality in Nigeria, the 
image is a symbolic digital re-enactment of citizens’ performance of denouncing an apparatus of 
the Nigerian state. Aside from the broad idea that digital netizens network on social media to 
perform political selves by publishing and commenting on images, there is also the particularizing 
of this performance in the ways Asukwo and his cohorts organize resistance around state 
hegemony. Finally, the Facebook option to “share a memory” offers us an opportunity to rethink 
the view that “performance’s only life is in the present” (Phelan 146). If we take the virtual 
performance on social media as a performance event, unlike the art form whose ontology Peggy 
Phelan describes, that can be stored, documented and then reshared as in the case of the Facebook 
option; performance exists beyond the present. The social media performance by definition 
becomes itself by reappearance, a fact affirmed by the popular notion that the Internet never 
forgets. 
A final example of some of the ways Asukwo performs a political self are presented in the 
rhetorical strategies of posts on Brohahamedia.com, Facebook, and Twitter.  His posts in these 
media, among other things, seek to dislodge the hegemonic narratives of the postcolony, satirize 
and critique unconstitutional and corrupt policies of the state. The cartoons also invite other 
citizens to a network of resistance through which they critique the regulatory frameworks the state 
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uses to dispossess a vast majority of Nigerians. Much of the self-fashioning done on social media 
is a process that, on the one hand, affirms personal subjectivity and contests the dominant 
narratives of the political class in Nigeria and, on the other hand, is nuanced in the broadest 
formulation of the concept of performance. This latter direction lends itself to performativity since 
it imagines the possibility of social media rituals as practices that intricate with power structures. 
Asukwo’s post on the 2015 election in Nigeria is an example of an image through which he 
performs a civic identity in the framework of the electoral process: 
 
 
Fig. 3.19. Mike Asukwo. “Absolutely no Post-Match Hooliganism.” Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10205740461811358&set=pb.1250241460.-
2207520000.1474404087.&type=3&theater. 
 
A close reading of this text reveals how its author borrows the metaphors of football [or soccer, as 
it is known in North America], a game many Nigerians fanatically adore, to presage the March 28, 
2015 presidential elections in Nigeria. The country’s sectarian debates about the ethnic or/and 
religious affiliations of political aspirants or officeholders are other latent ideas that a symptomatic 
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reading of the text can produce. The various commenters on the post are active participants in the 
overall performance of political selves evident in the image. The overarching sentiment expressed 
in the comments is agreement with Asukwo’s call for an electoral season that is, as Mustapha 
Adbulkarim notes, “we understand.”  The text also contains some other cultural semiotics that 
gesture towards the users’ understanding of contemporary politics in Nigeria. Some of these may 
include the significance of former president Jonathan’s jersey—red as a signifier of danger; and 
the fact that the match referee, a professor of political science who heads the electoral commission 
INEC, appears to have his eyes towards the incumbent president who appointed him. Also 
important is the captain band on President Buhari’s arm, a possible signifier of his past military 
atrocities as military head of state.  Alert to the politics of electioneering and the fraudulent 
practices that often accompany them in Nigeria, Asukwo, on the scoreboard places PDP above 
APC. While this order in sports usually indicates which of the teams is playing at home as well as 
the visiting team, it harbours an awareness of the role of political incumbency in the determination 
of election results in the country. With 3546 Facebook friends and 2207 Twitter followers as of 
December 19, 2014, Mike Asukwo infuses the minds of his many readers with reformist ideas 
about the Nigerian state and uses the image to construct a progressive version and vision of the 
country. This image is important not only because of the identities of the politicians it represents 
but also because of the way it was shared and reshared by a community of people in Nigerian 
social media during the election to communicate the need for a violence-free electoral process.  
The comments on the image, together with the four shares and 38 likes, contribute to a shared 
sense of community that is lacking in traditional modes such as print media. These shares, in turn, 
reach audiences beyond the first shares, resulting in circuitry in which discourses around the text 
is continually subjected to critique. With social media, the author produces knowledge that is 
engaged with and reproduced in different ways by thousands of fans and friends in his community, 
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who, in turn, reproduce contents that are open to re-exploration in many creative redirections. 
Authorship in this space is therefore both a shared fragmentary process, always in a flux and never 
finally conclusive. 
An interesting fact about Asukwo’s works is that his personal websites at both 
http://www.asukwo.com/ and http://www.brohaha.com do not enjoy this degree of participation 
from his community of friends and fans as his Facebook and Twitter pages. There is a suggestion 
here of social media’s capacity to connect people in a shared and sharable space where cultural 
meanings are made possible. The idea of a shared media community also informs a possible 
revision of how bell hooks proposes marginality as a space of resistance and interventions on the 
politics of oppression (hooks 1990). Social media thus highlights how the project of resistance can 
be a shared practice between artists and their community of online friends, even as these friends 
reproduce the content of the initial post a new post from which more dialogic and performative 
relations can emerge. Figure 3.17 is a Facebook post of Asukwo’s that other users have reshared, 
making the performance of political self embedded in the ritual of posting a shared and decentered 
practice. 
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Fig. 3.20. Reggi Uzoechi. “Buhari, The Supreme Priest.” Facebook, 7 Jan. 2016 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1195885477105892&set=a.167353296625787.4113
0.100000533520465&type=3&theater 
 
Here is another example that is significant for a number of reasons. First, Reggi Uzoechi 
reproduces a political cartoon by Asukwo to express his own version of a contentious political 
debate, the independence of the judiciary in Nigeria. A quick glance at Uzoechi’s timeline reveals 
his consistent engagement with Nigerian political conversations. Whether he employs a visual text 
such as this cartoon or not, he constantly critiques agents and structures of government, performing 
a self that is moored in the political. Also, Uzoechi acknowledges Asukwo’s unique narrative of 
the new Nigerian president’s abuse of the judiciary. In a recent interview with the mainstream 
media, the President had made condescending remarks about the country’s judicial processes, and, 
in response Asukwo shared the image on Facebook, representing the president’s remarks: “MR 
HIGH PRIEST, CONSULT THE ORACLE AND CONVINCE HIM THESE GUILTY ONES 
ARE GUILTY.” If the men are already guilty, then Asukwo appears to be suggesting that the 
President is autocratic in his instructions to the judge. The president is positioned in the cartoon as 
a leader who scorns democratic principles. From the disparity between his high throne and the 
standing judge, it appears not suited for democratic governance. The larger issue critiqued here is 
the apparent disrespect of the Nigerian ruling elite for government’s institutions. The user’s 
resharing of the image and the comments that follow therefore point to how Asukwo and his 
Facebook friends perform political selves, using social media to present carefully edited versions 
of the self to respond to political debates in Nigeria. They do things with these images, showing 
that the performance of social media rituals as a presentation of political selves is consistent with 
Austin’s idea about the way people do things with words (Austin, 1965).  The overlapping of social 
media as popular culture and structures of power in Nigeria “provides powerful resources for 
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people to present their own politics” (van Zoonen, et al. 536) and their alternative political 
imaginations concerning different cultural discourses. The capacity to use and reuse a comic 
image, or create a meme as an expression of political dissent on social media is an indication of a 
reclaimed agency for many in Nigeria. 
Despite the idea that the agency social media enables may be limited because of the global 
forces of communicative capitalism (Dean 108) that structure and conditions network economies, 
I have attempted to show that in countries like Nigeria, this agency yet affords the marginal 
populations class participatory opportunities, including the performance of political selves through 
popular images. These images, the YouTube videos by Buni TV, Asukwo’s political cartoons, and 
actual self performances that position their rhetoric as interventions in the political, can be seen as 
new forms of popular culture. They locate their creators as participants in the global networks of 
resistance to state power and other sources of hegemony around the world. Creators of these 
cultural forms produce texts that are consciously ideological, and sometimes intend them to 
intervene in power relations.  Many political memes, for instance, in social media environments 
point to how some global netizens appropriate the paradigms of digital culture and informational 
capitalism to destabilize dominant hegemonies. These texts show that the creators of online images 
are re/politicized subjects who use social media for resisting institutional injustices in Nigeria. The 
ways social media repoliticizes ordinary and young people in Nigeria are similar to Castells’ 
reflections on the role of communicative network power in the Arab Spring and Occupy 
movements. He comments on how social media concurrently served as networks of outrage and 
hope for many young people in the Middle East: 
No one expected it. In a world darkened by economic distress, political cynicism, cultural 
emptiness and personal hopelessness, it just happened. Suddenly dictatorship could be 
overthrown with the bare hands of the people, even if their hands had been bloodied by the 
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sacrifice of those fallen. Financial magicians went from being the objects of public envy 
to the targets of universal contempt. Politicians became exposed as corrupt liars. 
Governments were denounced. Media were suspected. (1) 
In the case of Nigerian social media and the Occupy movement, the government might not have 
been overthrown, yet young people suddenly realized they could participate directly in political 
conversations through social media. Through this participation, expressed broadly through 
commentaries and popular images, they perform their status as citizens. The cultural practices I 
have discussed so far became the most efficient and fastest means to perform resistance. The 
deployment of these popular images in protest activities in online environments is just beginning 
to receive critical attention.  Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg’s study (2012) of memes as 
a tool of protest, and of framing personal or collective action speaks to this growing scholarship 
and suggest that popular culture on social media are connected to institutional power.  In the next 
two chapters, I focus exclusively on how these ordinary citizens use humour and internet memes 
as cultural tools of performative citizenship and participatory politics. I am interested in how both 
humorous presentations of selves and Internet memes constitute symbolic forms that subvert and 
undermine oppressive power, and how they function as discursive fields occasioning a fascinating 
understanding of how some Nigerian netizens, hitherto excluded from the corridors of power, 
express political agency through social media images.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CARNIVALESQUE AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF HUMOUR IN NIGERIAN 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
The basic assumption underlying this chapter is that humour within the context of Nigerian 
social media culture, as in other places, is a major cultural practice through which netizens 
articulate their outrage and perform relations of power. Humour offers a creative space in digital 
media for the expression of previously silenced voices in social and political conversations in 
Nigeria. In discussions of humour as a cultural practice, the dominant tendency is to identify its 
function as a strategy of resistance, a means of subversion, or a coping mechanism in oppressive 
cultural and political contexts. For instance, Joseph Boskin observes that just as “humor has been 
used as a weapon of insult and intimidation by dominant groups, so it has been used as a weapon 
for resistance and retaliation by minorities” (38). Although humour can be a weapon that conserves 
the power of the upper class, its function as a form of resistance among the marginalized is an 
irrefutable fact this chapter seeks to identify. This function of humour was exemplified in a recent 
New York Times publication in the aftermath of Donald Trump’ victory in the 2016 American 
presidential elections. The Times on December 5, 2016, in sympathy with distraught New Yorkers 
who “cried on the subway the morning after the election,” published an OP-ED titled “How to 
Cope with Trump? Laugh.” The short article was an introduction to the main video narrative on 
the perspectives of nationals from seven different countries on the elections. With the awareness 
that “in many parts of the world, being depressed about politics is a tradition” and that millions of 
“people have spent their entire lives ruled by leaders they detest,” the contributors of the piece 
“asked a group of comedians, cultural commentators and political satirists from around the world 
to share their experiences and to offer a tool kit of coping mechanisms for American liberals — via 
video selfies.” Although one can locate in the video selfies a subtle stereotype renaturalizing the 
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assumption that the governments of the countries represented are mostly and always dictatorial, 
what is more relevant is the idea that political laughter has a cultural function evident in the 
performative agency of the video selfies and the messages articulated through them. In relation to 
Nigeria, one of the contributors to the Times video was Njakiri Damages, a Nigerian satirist who 
hosts a weekly online show that caricatures political leaders and cultural events in Nigeria and 
other parts of Africa. Njakiri Damages’ suggestions concerning how Americans can learn from 
some of the ways Nigerians respond to cultural and socio-political oppression through humour 
gesture towards the cultural politics of laughter and humour in contemporary Nigeria.  
What Njakiri Damages does with his online satirical show, part of which is reproduced in 
the New York Times publication, is a form of humour that is familiar to citizens in the Nigerian 
digital media environment. For instance, the use of humour as a coping mechanism can be 
illustrated with the media coverage of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. A prejudicial 
representation of Africa as a lingering site of pathologies played itself out yet again, as the dominant 
narrative of major news channels around the world was fixated on a disease that barely affected 
only a handful of countries on the continent. While the media, both online and mainstream, focused 
on the potential spread of the disease around the world, some Nigerian netizens with access to 
digital media posted and tweeted subversive stories, especially comic tales on Ebola, as counter-
narratives to these dominant media representations. Jokes circulated in social media became 
productive mechanisms for engaging with a public health crisis that potentially threatened society. 
The jokes were productive in so far as they were cultural outlets through which new media 
consumers coped with the tragic impact of the Ebola outbreak. One of the jokes Nigerian users of 
these new media applications distributed extensively on the BlackBerry Messenger narrates the 
experience of a fictional character, Akpos, who is abducted by kidnappers and taken to an unknown 
location. The kidnappers beat him for a while and ask him, “Which of your family members should 
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we call to pay ransom?” A surprised Akpos replies: “I don’t have a family now. All my family 
members ran away after I was suddenly bogged down with fever, intense weakness, muscle pain, 
headache and sore throat. This was followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, rash…” Akpos has not 
finished speaking before the kidnappers jump out through the windows and flee. While facilitating 
a space of laughter for ordinary Nigerians in a debilitating environment, the Akpos joke illustrates 
how regular citizens, mostly netizens, respond through humour to the parlous conditions of life in 
Nigeria. In this chapter, I develop the argument that social media users in Nigeria mobilize humour 
as one of the dominant cultural modes of narrating and representing the Nigerian political terrain. 
My interest is to understand and articulate the specific ways social media has transformed the 
nature and form of humour production and consumption in Nigeria. I uncover some of the ways 
Nigerian netizens engage a global audience in conversations around social media by presenting 
Nigerian cultural life through the creative and humorous voices of some of the country’s Internet 
users.  
The description of the Nigerian postcolonial society as a sociopolitical contraption defined 
by “the politics of “suffering and smiling” (Afolayan 1) is apposite in framing the question of the 
cultural function of humour. The expression, “suffering and smiling” derives from Fela Anikulapo-
Kuti’s 1978 musical album, Shuffering and Shmiling. As this reference indicates, the ability to 
express outrage on social media, discussed in this chapter as a form articulated through 
performative presentations of humour, is evident in other forms of expressive culture in Nigeria. 
The songs on the album highlight how the Afrobeat musician perceives the tension between 
precarious living conditions and the religiosity of the Nigerian masses. Anikulapo-Kuti derides 
common people’s lack of agency (Olaniyan 66) in a musical idiom that locates religious hegemony 
as a weapon of subordinating the underclass. The song is as much a scathing critique of uncritical 
religious followership in Africa as it is a social commentary on the socioeconomic pillages forced 
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on non-dominant groups by exploitative leaders in Africa. Theorists such as Achille Mbembe 
(1992) and Ebenezer Obadare (2009, 2016) have located in humour a counter-hegemonic character 
through which individuals refashion the burdens and adversities of urban postcolonial contexts.  
For instance, Ebenezer Obadare has termed this capacity to suffer and smile in oppressive climes 
as an “aesthetics of misery” (Obadare 2016 74) supplying fodder for creators of humour, which 
may include the content creators on platforms such as YouTube studied in this chapter. By that 
phrase, Obadare refers to the creative re/appropriation and subversion of austerity as a strategy for 
survival. The dominant articulation of the character of humour in Africanist cultural studies has 
thus been expressed by scholars such as Obadare in terms of this predilection to enable postcolonial 
subjects to cope with the precariousness of existence in the postcolony. Wilson Harris, the 
postcolonial Guyanese writer, sums up this tendency of creativity to erupt from unlikely and 
oppressive situations when he poignantly states that: 
Wherever one looks, whether in the West or in the societies of the Third World, 
it would seem that moral being cannot be divorced from a deepened cycle of 
creativity through which we may visualize a breakthrough from absolute 
violence. Such a breakthrough requires us to accept the adversarial contexts in 
which cultures wrestle with each other but to descend as well into camouflages 
and masks as flexible frames within the mystery of genuine change. (128) 
Similarly, for Nigerians genuine change can begin when people first adorn the camouflages and 
masks of cultural forms such as humour and performance, visualizing a breakthrough from the 
violence of political abuses and systemic inequalities. Unlike the fascination with humour in 
precolonial Nigeria societies as a mode of conveying didactic knowledge, the contemporary 
operation of Nigerian humour lies in adversarial contexts because people find reasons to smile and 
laugh despite disempowering conditions. While this focus is a valid way to understand the 
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variegated sites for the articulation of humour, a more contemporary way of conceptualizing the 
cultural significations of humour is to examine the discursive and aesthetic merits of forms of 
laughter, such as the social media examples discussed shortly. Through the examples, it will 
become apparent that the productivity of subaltern humour consists in the ways popular forms of 
laughter facilitate an understanding of everyday life in Nigeria, enabling an appreciation of the 
social inequalities being experienced by the poor. Obadare links the preponderance of humour in 
contemporary Nigeria to the ubiquity of new media technologies, which assure the “simultaneous 
expansion and profanization of the public sphere” (75). In contrast to his work that is less focused 
on “the medium of humor” (75), I am concerned about the ways viral humour on digital platforms 
informs and is informed by a virtual public sphere. This public sphere is constituted by new, and 
in many cases, young voices engaging with political orthodoxies on social media. Through much 
of the comic interpretations of these netizens, it becomes possible to appreciate the ways through 
which ordinary Nigerians respond to everyday existential anxieties. Before fully examining the 
carnival politics of humorous posts from the social media landscape in Nigeria, I proceed in the 
next section to track the evolution of humour as an expression of popular culture in the country. 
This discussion is necessary to mark the continuum that exists in the performance of Nigerian 
humour, whether on a stand-up comedy stage or on social media.  
 
4.1 Shifts and Continuities in Nigerian Humour 
Aside from the Nigerian film industry Nollywood, discussed in chapter one, Nigerian stand-
up comedy is another site of popular culture that aids an understanding of contemporary everyday 
culture in the country, although pre-Nollywood comedy series by veteran actors such as Baba Sala, 
and Gbenga Adeoye existed before the popular stand-up comedy stage. These comedians, 
responding to austere living conditions, produced humorous commentaries on Nigerian social and 
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political life and distributed them through technologies such as cassette tapes and, later, the CD. 
There was also Mazi Mperempe, a comedy programme on Radio Nigeria and the old Anambra 
State Television, Enugu, between the 1970s and the early 90s (Ayakoroma 5). With more advanced 
technologies such as the Internet enabling people to share past comic materials, some works by 
these performers have recently re-entered the public consciousness. There were also stand-up 
performances such as Opa Williams’s “Night of a Thousand Laughs.” The show, which now 
distributes recorded live performances on social media, is Nigeria’s flagship stand-up comedy 
event. Williams, a pioneer video-film director, had produced comedic home videos in the early 
days of Nollywood before turning attention to the stage. The first “Night of a Thousand Laughs” 
was held on Sunday, October 1, 1995 at the premises of the University of Lagos. The show became 
iconic for the outlet it provided for artists such as Muhammed Danjuma, Sam Loko and Ali Baba, 
who had all migrated from television and radio to live performances.  
With social media, however, the production and distribution of humour potentially gets 
more than a thousand laughs and likes, with both established comedians and even ordinary citizens 
with a humorous inclination publishing content that attract huge followers online. These followers 
also extend the message and performances of the comic posts they share or retweet, interacting 
with one another as co-producers of the rhetoric of these posts. Because of social media, the 
production of humour is undergoing a transformation from a performance event, such as the so-
called night of a thousand laughs to an iterative and performative process, such as that of 
re/tweeting and reposting comic posts that receive more than a thousand likes and shares. It is 
possible to conceive of this processual nature of social media rituals—tweeting, posting, liking, 
etc.— as normalizing factors that depoliticize social media subjects. Yet, without essentializing the 
medium, I reason that hegemonic articulations of power and culture will always attract some forms 
of resistance, expressed by citizens whose everyday life is performed on social media. Just like 
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consumers of popular culture, such as Nollywood, have become legitimate producers of cultural 
forms on social media, there is a similar shift in the production and consumption of Nigerian 
humour by Internet users. Aside from giving visibility to social media users who are naturally 
predisposed to humour, there is also the emergence of new comic voices that would have perhaps 
never gained visibility had there not been a Facebook or YouTube stage for them to perform their 
comic talents.  It is safe to conclude, then, that the proliferation of digital and social media in 
Nigeria has led to a relocation of the stage of stand-up comedy in Nigeria.  
Social media has occasioned a cultural order in which ordinary people no longer only 
perform laughter as a way of responding to suffering as Anikulapo-Kuti observed, but they must 
now also “share” the source of laughter on different networked social media as a tactic of 
responding with many others to the precarious and disempowering conditions of life in the country. 
Audience reception to jokes on social media is evident in the participation of online subjects in the 
reproduction of laughter. As a social function of relating with others, humour fits well into a social 
media environment in which interactivity and social ties are sacrosanct. For instance, the humorous 
works I examine in this chapter including those of social media-inspired groups such as Naija 
Craziest and WoWo Boyz, suggest that any scholarly consideration of contemporary Nigerian 
humour should scrutinize the ways digital technologies empower ordinary Nigerians to perform 
comic selves in network communities and to respond individually to precarious economic 
conditions. Nigerian netizens who share, post, and/or tweet humorous content are thus invested in 
a performance articulated through the visual metaphors of digital media. These texts enable a 
focused and nuanced treatment of how alternative spaces of humour occasioned by Web 2.0 
decenter, supplement, and reconstruct traditional platforms, such as the stand-up comedy stage in 
Nigeria. Organizing the rhetoric of humour around social media affirms the production of humour 
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in digital media as a site of individuated resistance, with the “private spaces” of citizens becoming 
public and performative sites for engaging with and critiquing culture and power.   
Without social media, voices such as those of Correct Bro, Correct Babe, and those of the 
young Emmanuella and her uncle, both of Mark Angel Comedy would most likely struggle for 
prominence in a crowded stand-up comedy industry. The YouTube channels of these non-
professional comedians literally have millions of viewers engaging with creative reinterpretations 
of everyday life and anxieties. This large number of views support the fact that social media, more 
than the traditional comedy stage, enables outlets for mass distribution and consumption of 
humorous forms by regular citizens. In the case of Mark Angel Comedy, starring Emmanuella, the 
six-year-old comedienne, there is an instance of how an ordinary netizen who generates content 
can become a key cultural reference because of comedy skits that uncover social and cultural issues. 
In the episode I'll Beat You, Emmanuella, returning home from school is accosted by a bigger girl 
who wishes to fight with her. Emmanuella outsmarts the girl by asking her not to run away but 
follow her home if she really wants a fight. They get home and Emmanuella further asks her to 
wait outside while she goes inside to put down her school bag. She gets inside the house, puts on 
the TV to watch cartoons and settles down to some popcorn. The other girl, meanwhile, waits 
outside until she is tired and departs with her cheering group. The episode ends with Emannuella’s 
words: “my fellow Africans, stop fighting. Use your head.” These words are probably the core of 
the video as they show an awareness of the conflict situations in some parts of Africa. By calling 
on “fellow Africans” to “stop fighting,” Emmanuella is using humour as an interventionist strategy 
in Africa’s perennially social and political conflicts. The producers of the Mark Angel Comedy that 
features the young girl also understand the diverse nature of the audience of the videos, as “my 
fellow Africans” can also initiate, as the comments on the thread presents, conversation with 
audiences beyond Nigeria.  
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Fig. 4.1. “Hollywood Standard.” YouTube, Uploaded by Mark Angel Comedy, 8 July 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JVyFVFyr8Ck 
 
The ideological underbelly of the humorous narratives from these social media comedians can be 
seen in episodes that engage with topics as diverse as the operation of capital, the contentions of 
religion in a plural society, and colonial attitudes. For instance, it engages with the ambivalent 
mechanism of “colonial imitation” that normalizes colonial culture which Homi Bhabha has rightly 
called mimicry (126).  Mimicry, in Bhabha’s formulation, takes the form of a performative staging 
by the formerly colonized of the cultural codes and behaviour of colonial hegemony. The native 
learns and internalizes the codes of the colonizer and by performing them subverts the apparatus 
of dominance. Mimicry thus has an unintentional subversive component, which is a critique of the 
colonial codes that have been copied. Even if unawares of its operations in the text, the comic group 
expresses the notion of mimicry in the episode Hollywood Standard, an apt illustration of a 
subaltern engagement with power and culture. Evident in most of the examples in this dissertation 
 160 
 
is a mimetic representation of power that appears to copy its codes with the view of showing its 
gaps. As Bhabha explains, mimicry is “the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of 
reform, regulation, and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power” (126). 
Subaltern mockery that takes the form of visual images are the metaphors of a mimicry of cultural 
hegemony and political dominance intended to subvert the hierarchies themselves.  
In the video, the Mark Angel Comedy team can be seen on location, shooting a video which, 
as the director says, must impress “a Hollywood agent” waiting impatiently by a corner. The 
director and the production crew are part of the video text as they seek to produce a “Hollywood 
standard” comedy. He hurries the crew up, saying, “we don’t have time; this video is going on 
YouTube in a few minutes.” Emmanuella, however, raises an objection and calls the attention of 
the director to the palm wine, a local alcohol another actor is required to consume. The director 
tells her they “are making [a] Hollywood standard [film] and everything has to be real.” They get 
the actor to take alcohol, and not an alternative drink Emmanuella has suggested. Having agreed 
to continue, Emmanuella pretends to forget her line, to the chagrin of the production crew who 
scolds her and tells the other actor to repeat his role—drinking the wine again each time the girl 
deliberately misses her line until he gets drunk. Because the drunk actor falls asleep, therefore, the 
crew are not able to complete the skit for both YouTube and for the assessment of the Hollywood 
agent who watches in astonishment. The dramatic irony of the video is evident in the commentaries 
that follow the video on YouTube. Both Emmanuella, who has deliberately subverted the filming 
process, and the audience know what the rest of the film crew does not know. Emmanuella wishes 
to see the other actor drunk in order to prove that producing a Hollywood standard film is not 
sufficient reason to abandon reality. By depicting a film crew that aims to imitate a Western model, 
the video calls attention to mimicry as an unconscious performance of colonial desire that 
nonetheless simultaneously critiques the colonial culture being longed for. In this example, 
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therefore, the video engages with the question of reality in Hollywood, subverting the desire in 
local cultural contexts for a global and hegemonic cultural form. This episode gives an insight into 
the production work of the comedy group in the way they show a group of guys who take a video 
camera, produce a comic script and upload it to YouTube where local and global audiences meet 
and engage in important conversations.  
The young Emmanuella and Mark, the producer of the series who is also her uncle in the 
episodes, were recently awarded a prize by Google and the Australian Government for their 
humorous works on YouTube. The Wikipedia Foundation has also recently partnered with the 
group to produce an episode that promotes the use of Wikipedia among Nigerians.8 The episode 
features a young Emmanuella who claims her knowledge of university-level topics is made 
possible by her reliance on Wikipedia. In defining the term “cognitive inertia” to the astonishment 
of her uncle’s professor and classmates, Emmanuella asserts Wikipedia’s emphasis on the shift of 
knowledge production and circulation from print technology to digital media, while subtly decrying 
a print culture that is still ubiquitous in the Nigerian educational system. This humorous episode 
for Wikipedia is an important reaffirmation of the ways in which the social media environment 
amplifies the voices of everyday people, while also signalling itself as a significant location of new 
cultural meanings.  One final point about this YouTube comedy group, and this is equally true of 
the other comedians discussed in this chapter, is how they reappropriate the recognition they get 
on the platform for commercial purposes. In most cases, these users take their content to their own 
websites, hoping to attract their fans and followers to an independent space different from that 
afforded by social media. In the case of both Brohahamedia.com and markangelcomedy.com, what 
suffers most is the kind of vibrant and active communities inhabiting the multimodal and interactive 
                                                          
8 “Wikipedia-Emmanuella goes to school” Mark Angel Comedy https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2qDH4bPvfMw.  
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space of social media. Aside from the ability to comment on images on these websites, there is a 
loss of the immediacy of liking, tweeting or instant sharing of posts which is available on social 
media. This capitalist cooptation of the community of subscribers, similar to the larger 
monetization of leisure time that underlies social media, is expressed through adverts directed 
towards readers unable to network openly and offer some form of resistance.  
While the works of Mark Angel Comedy are well-received online, other groups on 
YouTube such as Naija Craziest and WoWo Boyz equally have thousands of YouTube 
subscribers. YouTube nicely illustrates the capacity of social media to shape and produce the 
identities of users in a performative manner.  In broadcasting the self on YouTube, users are in the 
process of enacting or producing specific subjectivities and identities through videos uploaded to 
a broad demographic of audiences. The “Darris God o” video discussed in chapter three has 
remained fascinating as the subject of other similar comedy skits on YouTube, with many parodies 
of the former first lady’s outburst created by young humourists. In addition to parodies of Patience 
Jonathan’s video, other viral stories that inspire comic skits include the collected speeches of 
bombast-loving parliamentarian, Patrick Obahiagbon, as well as the last viral story of “Oga at the 
Top. In chapter two, I discussed “Ogas at the top,” a series of puppetry videos by Buni TV. These 
videos were inspired by the Channels TV interview in which Shem Obafaiye kept repeating the 
expression “Oga at the Top.”  His gaffe on live TV inspired the production of “Ogas at the top”—
which is the name of the puppetry YouTube videos discussed in Chapter two. Aside from this 
Kenya production by Buni TV, there are ordinary Nigerian netizens that have produced comic 
YouTube videos from the interview, while involved in the presentation of comic selves and the 
mobilization of parody and satire to critique government. 
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 Naija Craziest’s version of the “Oga at the Top” narrative is titled Grammatical Explosion 
and starts with the formulaic storytelling signifier, “once upon a time.” The use of this element 
shows a narrative awareness expressed through parody and developed throughout the video. “Once 
upon a time…The Oga at the Top’ saga rocked Nigeria,” begins the video. The viewer is taken 
back to the Sunrise morning show at the Channels TV studio where the actual interview that 
produced “Oga at the Top” had taken place. Since the creators of the video also believe the popular 
idea that the anchors at Channels TV were unprofessional and disrespectful to Shem Obafaiye, they 
continue the narrative by noting that a man is on a revenge mission on behalf of the officer. This 
heroic subject, Patrick Obahiagbon, seeks revenge and his goal is to “finish the Sunrise presenters 
with grammatical eloquence and leave Channels TV in confusion.” The video thus presents a 
narrative in the heroic mode, as one can see a public official who has come to defend the integrity 
of another public officer. This context provides a premise for the performers to query the 
grammatical accuracy of Patrick Obahiagbon’s statements. Obahiagbon’s famous lines, such as 
“political crimkum crankum” and “higi haga,” became materials for the comedians’ cultural 
jamming.  The video is a creative blend of two parallel narratives: the original interview in which 
Patrick Obahiagbon responds in grand expressions to a crew of stupefied Channels TV presenters, 
and a second layer in which the young comedians hilariously challenge and critique Obahiagbon’s 
language. There is also an instance of a neo-oral tendency in the reproduction of Nigerian humour 
on social media, since, like stand-up productions, the social media stage facilitates a return to an 
equally collective production of humour. An important Instagram post9 that mounts a dialogue 
between itself and other works of humour featuring Patrick Obahiagbon as the central point of 
                                                          
9 @Jiggzytos’s video can be found on his Instagram page: https://www.instagram.com/p/BLoJBfMha3d/?taken-
by=jiggzytos&hl=en 
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narrative is by the comedian @Jiggzytos. The fictive video interview illustrates how social media 
locates humour as a cultural form to be shared in response to sociocultural and political events in 
Nigeria. It presents an interview in which @Jiggzytos Photoshops himself into an existing 
interview granted by Patrick Obahiagbon and reappropriates his response to his own comic text. In 
this new interview, Obahiagbon responds to allegations in the media that he deliberately uses high-
sounding words to impress and mystify his audience. Obahiagbon replies by garbing his words in 
more exaggerated rhetoric, “render[ing] an unreserved apologia” to those offended by his 
communication style. The interviewer proceeds to get Obahiagbon’s view on President Buhari’s 
comment in Germany in October 2016 that Nigeria’s first lady belonged in the kitchen. Obahiagbon 
answers that the president’s gendered rhetoric reaffirms the view that Nigeria still wallows in 
“cantankerous tribalism, ethnocentric chauvinism, syphilitic parochialism, epileptic nepotism, 
[and] catalytic parapoism.” This litany of grandiose expressions enervates the interviewer who 
storms out of the scene in annoyance. The use of sound accompaniment to punctuate the sequence 
of these words creates a funny rhythm that adds to the pleasure derived from the text. The 
pertinence of this comic video lies in how social media enables the creator of the video to create 
new narrative from an existing content from the traditional media. This skill allows him to insert 
his own agency as an up-and-coming comedian into a text that other users have remixed in similar 
other contexts for comedy. The Obahiagbon examples succeed as humorous texts satirizing 
Nigerian leaders, who are defined more by mere political talk than by an actual fulfillment of 
electoral promises. And since multiple copies of the videos migrate to other platforms where they 
are subjected to an endless process of sharing and retweeting, one can see that people are interacting 
with these texts as consumers of humour and transmitters of the resistance strategies inherent in 
the texts. Finally, the continuum being described in this section is that response to the structural 
adjustments imposed by economic hardship that inspired cultural forms such as Nollywood and 
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stand-up comedy in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Nigeria. Aside from the idea that a 
performative platform urges the will to share cultural practices, there is also an economic 
determination of the behaviour of netizens, expressed in the ways humour is being shared as a 
response to austerity.   
 
4.2 The Will to Share 
Because the discourses produced in comment threads of social media posts are fundamental 
to the overarching meaning of a post, there is the need to stress the “dialogic imagination” (Bakhtin 
1981) at play in social media conversations.  The comments on the thread of most examples in this 
dissertation are not only indications of a new order of participatory culture made possible by social 
media, but also of the dialogic framework of much of social media mode of communication. These 
comments are best located within a discursive frame in which their very production is both a 
response to a previous utterance and an anticipation of response from others in the thread.  In other 
words, utterances are essentially dialogic and are positioned within a chain of communication as 
markers of discourses. This idea is particularly true of the historically contingent threads being 
produced in the many online communities and networks in Nigerian social media. In The Dialogic 
Imagination: Four Essays, Mikhail Bakhtin claims: 
The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a 
future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures 
itself in the answer's direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the 
already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has 
not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the 
answering word. Such is the situation with any living dialogue. The 
orientation towards an answer is open, blatant and concrete. (279-80) 
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The dialogic presence sponsored by social media is why commenters on threads have an 
expectation that some other user/reader will have an answer-word in the form of a like, share or a 
direct reply to whatever they have posted in a thread of discussion. Social media provides the best 
illustration of the blatant and open orientation of communication towards an answer, such that this 
affective orientation itself shows a performative impulse that urges some form of response from 
anyone who sees what is posted. Within this context, identifiable is a certain will to share a content 
that most social media users experience when they find a post that elicits some form of response. 
Virality is the product of the will to share content on user-generated media. This “orientation 
towards an answer” (280) is even more evident in comic or satirical posts that provoke laughter. 
For instance, Figure 4.2 below is another example of a Facebook post in which the user is 
responding to a proposed Nigerian government tax policy that caused outrage online:  
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Fig. 4.2: Mitterand Okorie. Facebook, 21 November, 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/MittOkorie/posts/10155815805004815  
 
In response to a proposed increase in mobile call tariffs by an agency of the Nigerian government, 
Mitterand Okorie calls on his friend to “download the latest version of WhatsApp” as an alternative 
call platform because this joke—the proposed hike— “is too expensive.”  The use of the word 
“joke” foregrounds the hilarity contained in the post and the comments produced in its thread.  In 
addition to the many likes and shares indicating the widespread understanding of a humorous 
engagement with an unwanted tax regime, there are comments that show people’s dissatisfaction 
with the government’s “stupid policies.” A commenter, Dei Anthony also asserts that the proposed 
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tax is a way to raise revenue to buy cars for the “legislalooters, executhieves, and the supposed 
judicial arm.” In other words, government is composed of looters and thieves who, according to 
Cee Jay Ibeneme, have “done nothing to help the businesses of the people.” While these Nigerians 
resort to laughter as way of expressing outrage, network actors from other parts of the world are 
much more political in their expression of resistance.   
Manuel Castells describes the way outrage induces fearless risk-taking in the context of the 
Tunisian protest. Castells write that there “was extreme outrage against police abuse, against 
hunger rising in the country and against the desperation that led people to immolate themselves 
(82). He notes that outrage had, however, “been there for quite a long time. The key difference was 
that another potent, positive emotion was present: Hope. Tunisia epitomized the hope for change” 
(82). These words could have been written about the presence of outrage in the Nigerian context, 
except to the extent that the key difference in this case is the way the hope for change is expressed. 
In Nigerian social media culture, playful participation in network communities in which people 
express their outrage through the modality of forms such as humour is imperative. A major question 
being addressed, therefore is: why do people respond to oppressive sociocultural and political 
contexts through forms such as laughter when they could easily organize one another for more 
pragmatic forms of protest? A possible answer is that the underclass conceives of humour as an 
important cultural weapon for resisting the domination of the mighty. Even though, as Donna 
Goldstein explains, “the humor of the poor may not necessarily lead directly to rebellions and 
political revolutions, it does open up a discursive space” (10) within which they can express their 
views on subjects that have been previously naturalized as exclusive to the upper class. The 
exploration of this discursive space on social media yields insights into the form and function of 
humour in a digital age, which includes the involvement of otherwise non-dominant groups in the 
constructions of humorous online publics.  
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The reference to the last example is to emphasize the presence of other texts, aside from 
comic videos and images, although I acknowledge as Limor Shifman does, that there is a 
prominence of visual humorous forms over verbal forms (187) of humour in social media 
environments. The forms I examine also include posts that promote laughter in the critique of 
society, culture, and power. The next example is another Facebook post illustrating this capacity 
of a status update to create a laughing space in which a network of friends and followers can express 
and share perspectives on any subject.  
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Ayobami Ojebode. Facebook, 19 November, 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/ayo.ojebode/posts/904232229676661 
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The conversations produced in this post are significant sources of knowledge, aside from the comic 
treatment of a frequent Nigerian problem, the advance-fee scams distributed globally from Nigeria 
and other parts of the world. Ayobami Ojebode is a Nigerian communications professor who has 
supposedly been notified of an offer of admission to a polytechnic in Nigeria. The scammer asks 
him to click on a link or call a phone number for further details. Ojebode gets on Facebook and 
requests that his friends “rejoice with [him]” and a thread of funny comments emerges. The 
commenters playfully congratulate Ojebode and some remind him that there is “no end to 
learning.” A commenter, as if encouraging criminal behaviour, is disappointed that “the crooks are 
not even creative” while another believes the recession in the Nigerian economy is “bringing out 
the best in scammers.” The implicit critique of a culture of corruption articulated through humorous 
commentaries organized around a spurious offer of admission initially appears to be secondary. A 
closer inspection, however, reveals that the humorous commentaries foreground the playful 
treatment of a serious subject, as both the post and the thread call critical attention to a practice that 
perpetuates the notion that Nigeria is essentially a country of crime.  
Content-sharing options on both YouTube and, recently, Facebook have resulted in the 
mass creation of humour as a means of what may be called digital networks recreation. As virtual 
communities that facilitate the creation, exchange, and commentary on content among different 
people, social media inherently harbours a playful environment that envisions sociality as an 
epistemological practice. As I demonstrated in previous chapters, social media enables the creation 
of new forms of knowledge. Against the backdrop of humour and play, one can imagine how this 
production of knowledge is grounded in a non-hierarchical and decentralized space that conditions 
ways of knowing as methods of altering and resisting existing meanings. The creation and 
recreation of content is explained more broadly by Lawrence Lessing as “remix culture,” the 
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practice of merging online content material found (songs, texts, images and videos) and merging 
it in a new, original, creation (De Notaris, 111). The focus on recreation, alongside remix, is to call 
attention to the elements of play and relaxation sometimes evident in some of the virtual 
communities on the Web. Play becomes a productive modality for expressing the social component 
of social media, while users poke fun through cultural forms at hegemonic formations. The mass 
production of humour in a Nigerian social media context consolidates the understanding of remix 
culture as a performative and participatory expression of this (re)creative play. In Figure 4.4, for 
instance, the user Correct Bro creates a fictional character that allows him to play with the idea of 
anonymity as he masks his identity in the process of humorously critiquing the Nigerian social and 
political processes on Facebook: 
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Fig. 4.4. Correct Bro. Facebook, 25 September, 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/correctbro/photos/a.1050856868326588.1073741827.105085082166
0526/1162443990501208/?type=3&theater 
 
Akara is a staple Nigerian snack that is made from beans and may be considered as a local meal 
through which the working class aspires to the elite status of upper-class food culture. The non-
availability of “the akara woman,” a roadside vendor who sells akara in Nigeria, signifies the 
absence of some of the basic existential needs of the masses in Nigeria. The popularity of this post 
can also be explained by using Roland Barthes’s view that food is a form of speech, a site of 
mythology that the many people who like and share the post can identify with. Food, as Barthes 
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asserts, is "a system of communication, a body of images, a protocol of usages, situations, and 
behaviour" (29) which has particular signification in any given society. It is the way akara signifies 
the food of the poor that makes many on social media identify with the humour in the post as an 
expression of their own anxieties about the economy. The 8,273 shares of this post and the over 
five thousand likes it has attracted give credence to how social media is changing the consumption 
and distribution of humour in Nigeria. The decoders of the texts on the platform relate to them as 
objects to be shared as a necessary ritual of the reading process. The “writer” of this post is an 
ordinary citizen who, according to his Facebook timeline desires “to be the reason [his followers 
and friends] look into [their] phone and smile.” In other words, his activities on social media are 
geared towards the production of humour. The post itself is an artistic response to how people cope 
with everyday challenges in Nigeria. The implicit assumption of the post is a commentary on 
abjection and the tensions of chequered socioeconomic conditions. A commenter observes that in 
the kind of situation the text presents, people’s dependence on an absent akara woman is usually 
the only plan, another suggestion of the economic deprivations meted out to ordinary people by an 
irresponsible political class. Correct Bro’s fictional deployment of humour to critique everyday 
life in Nigeria, though anonymous, is one of the ways social media allows for individuated 
articulations of cultural resistance, as users’ private accounts become virtual spaces for critiquing 
culture, power, as well as forms of institutional injustices. The Twitter user in Figure 4.4 presents 
a narrative that sustains the notion of food as system of communication, as Barthes notes. If akara 
signifies as a sign of the underclass, the Twitter user @am_delly asks us to see another food jollof 
as “a sign of hope and way of life” which must be well represented as a particular marker of a 
broader domain of discourse Bakhtinian sense of resistance and playful subversions. 
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Fig.4.5. @am_delly. “Spelling Jollof rice with small letter J is an insult…”  Twitter. 3 April 
2014, 7:25 p.m.  
 
There is an implicit play on the word “Jollof” expressed in this text in the way a non-proper noun 
is being foregrounded to elicit a surprise effect on the reader who understands the word should in 
fact be spelt in lower case. The humour in the tweet is discernible in its unpretentious defence of 
the integrity of the spelling of jollof, a red, spiced West African rice dish that has recently captured 
the imagination of social media users in Nigeria and Ghana. Arguments about which of the two 
countries produces the best jollof rice reveal a much larger issue, namely the way food and its 
consumption can have covert cultural and political layers of meaning. The jollof example is useful 
here as a supplement to the creative merits of Correct Bro’s Facebook post, that is, the idea that 
humour can be organized around the daily rituals of food consumption in the critique of social and 
political structures.  
The fact that these two examples affirm West African dishes to a global audience is 
significant, considering that older mediums of humour such as the stand-up comedy stage exist as 
events to be experienced singularly in a particular place and time. Consumers of social media 
humour, on the other hand, can experience jokes in multiple digital platforms, whether it is real-
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time or not. Even if it is humour by an established comedian or by an ordinary user with a comic 
talent, there is, in addition, a memetic effect to social media humour. These jokes can go viral and 
become online memes, self-perpetuating cultural texts that function in social networks to transmit 
and replicate ideas and identities. In the last two years, the Buhari government, with an outdated 
sense of monetary nationalism and fiscal protectionism, had subjected the country’s currency the 
Naira to economic policies that led to recession. In line with the mobilization of food as a cultural 
form in the communication of humour, here is a Facebook video response to the economic 
recession in Nigeria. Segun Adefila and two friends film themselves having a sumptuous meal and 
then post the video online with the caption “Let’s Get Serious.” 
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Fig. 4.6. Segun Adefila. “Let’s Get Serious.” Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/segun.adefila.5/videos/vb.722629458/10154720863059459/?type=2&
theater 
 
Because of economic recession, Adefila and two other men call out in the video to “fellow 
Nigerians” advising young people particularly to go “on this hunger strike”—which refers to the 
food they are eating so the world “will know Nigeria is hungry.” With a huge morsel of meat in his 
mouth, Adefila insists the economic fortunes of the country calls for a radical change in lifestyle, 
expressed through their present investment in finishing their meal. The video is Adefila’s 
performance of humour that intersects with a damming assessment of the country’s political 
economy. The Nigerian government and its officials continue to feed off the national treasury while 
working-class people, mostly in the public sectors, confront a ruling class that asks them to change 
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their lifestyles because of economic recession. Within a context of play, Adefila’s video rightly 
calls out the hypocrisy of a government that insists people must adjust to the ugly realities of 
economic hardships without any commensurate change in its own illicit opulence. “Let’s Get 
Serious” is a regular citizen’s articulation of the general perception that the Nigerian government 
is not sufficiently motivated to arrest the chronic economic mismanagement in the country. Social 
media provides an instant mechanism for a video text that embodies the deployment of humour in 
the political conversations people are participating in. This disposition by young people to 
scrutinize and critique everyday life and the agents of state power is a mode of response to 
subjection by hegemonic forces. As most of my examples seek to demonstrate, this amplification 
and visibility of subaltern voices are expressed in different forms of overlapping cultural practices. 
The performance of the agency enabled by social media through strategies of humour is central to 
the alternative and participatory context of political conversations in Nigeria.  
The fluidity and exchange of roles between performers and audiences that one often sees 
on social media invites further comparison with indigenous performances in precolonial African 
cultures. Kole Omotoso writes of performance in these indigenous contexts as “a celebration to be 
enjoyed by both the audience and the performers in a unified encounter of participants, rather than 
by players and onlookers in isolation” (9). In network environments, the production of humour 
creates a virtual celebration in which both performers and their followers contribute to the workings 
of the performance space. Sometimes, the comments on a humorous post on YouTube or Facebook 
take on a new life of their own, as commenters extend the narratives of an initial post. Much like 
on the stand-up comedy stage where the meanings of jokes are co-produced, the social media stage 
also exhibits possibilities for a shared performance space between comedians and their audiences. 
This idea can be illustrated in another example: Correct Bro, who posts a humorous text to which 
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a reader responds by supplying a witty comment. Within hours, Correct Bro publishes another joke 
which includes the content provided by the reader. Figure 4.7 is a merged snapshot of these texts: 
 
 
 
Fig.4.7. Two Correct Bro Posts. Facebook, 7 October 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/correctbro/photos/a.1050856868326588.1073741827.105085082166052
6/1172337352845205/?type=3&theater 
 
The first joke reproduces and contests the idea among locals that a young lady who “starts to vomit” 
is “definitely pregnant,” a stereotype that is perpetuated in many Nollywood films. The post is, 
thus, an apt illustration of how social media is being deployed as a mechanism of resisting and 
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altering dominant meanings, as Facebook user pushes back at the gendered biases and 
misinformation of an older popular medium, Nollywood. “Nollywood taught me that” takes a 
swipe at unimaginative film directors who favour single modes of interpreting scripts. The 1.2k 
likes the post has attracted so far point to many fans and readers who agree with the rhetoric of the 
post and therefore share or retweet it. A significant point is the way social media is positioned as a 
corrective to Nollywood, to the extent that the narratives in the latter are reconstructed and 
rehabilitated by a network community of audience empowered by digital media. Returning to how 
the feedback of the audience constitutes part of the performance of humour on social media, I 
should add that the commenter who responds to the Nollywood joke by posting a joke of his is 
possibly aware of the decentered nature of the new stage on social media. This user, like 
interlocutors in face-to-face interactions, enters the performative space of Correct Bro and starts 
another performance that Correct Bro acknowledges. By sharing his joke with Correct Bro, who 
publishes a modified version of his audience’s joke, Taiwo Horlorlarde Yusuf also performs a 
comic self that is reproduced beyond his own limited community of friends on Facebook.  
One cannot gloss over new media’s propensity to create multiple users of a single content, 
reworked and remixed as a new text for different audiences.  Peter Kunze, drawing from two of 
Lev Manovich’s characteristics of new media — “variability” and “numerical representation”—
explains how digital content can exist in multiple versions, with the digital structuration of new 
media allowing creative users to modify existing content (102). This capacity of the user to mix 
and remix content is one area of affinity between digital content and texts composed in indigenous 
performance traditions, especially considering how an original text, say oral poetry, itself often a 
product of collaborative effort, can easily be manipulated in the process of improvisation. As in the 
view that no two performances of a single text are ever alike, users with the right technical skills 
can reproduce different versions of a single text with varying degrees of modification. Accordingly, 
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the performance of humour on social media is often both a remediation and re-contextualization of 
the content and form of older jokes, often reproduced through a communal process in which 
laughter is jointly produced, consumed and shared by networks of online communities. Within this 
context, the production of humour may be problematic since “authorship of digital comedy is a 
fundamentally fraught concept” (Kunze 102). In a Nigerian social media context, the question of 
authorship is equally problematic since people reproduce earlier jokes on different digital platforms 
and remix them for different audiences. There is also the inevitable change in the way audiences 
consume humour since readers/viewers of online texts approach them with an awareness of choice. 
An expanded body of comic texts available on and distributed through social media affects the 
attention span of consumers. This fleeting attention sometimes elides the possibility of critical 
engagement required by such texts. 
The point being stressed is that capacity of social media to rearticulate a performative 
behaviour that is a common feature of everyday life among Nigerians. As Omotosho notes, the 
performance and theatre traditions in many African societies derive from the street (6) where 
people perform social roles. Nduka Otiono similarly identifies “street narratives” (7) as integral to 
articulating the ways postcolonial subjects in Nigeria engage with disempowering social and 
economic conditions. Social media facilitates a public space for the reconstruction of these street 
narratives. The oral and aural character of street narratives and performances takes on digital 
shapes, depicting some of the ways ordinary people engage in neo-oral and dialogic exchanges 
through shares and likes and/or tweets and retweets. Beyond the co-production of cultural 
meanings, also, is the possibility of real-time and immediate feedback between the artist and the 
audience, much like in live performances. The difference, though, may be how individuals can 
utilize, for instance, the anonymity of social media to criticize the excesses of established artists. 
This change in instant audience feedback in the performance of Nigerian comedy is illustrated in 
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the viral story of Nigerian comedian, Bright Okpocha, who, to the chagrin of many of his followers, 
in January 2014 published a joke about sexual violence against women on social media. Okpocha’s 
rape joke, now removed from social media, was justifiably met with condemnations from many 
people who frowned at the inappropriateness of the joke.  The critical responses of women and 
men, who might, otherwise, have remained silent had it been a stand-up comedy event demonstrate 
the ways social media provides a safer and anonymous environment for audiences to push back at 
and resist repressive cultural values. With social media humour, the audience is a more active 
participant who critique and provide immediate counter-hegemonic perspectives to the social and 
cultural values jokes embody.   
The performative impulse of the street legitimizes the view that online interactions in 
Nigerian social media culture gesture towards a performance in which ordinary users exchange, 
play and replay roles, while also playing with roles that critique corrupt practices and dominant 
articulations of power. In the context of Nigerian social media culture in which online subjects use 
humour as a performative method of resisting hegemonic perspectives, these images contribute to 
an expanded understanding of the aesthetics and agency of popular images. This understanding is 
evident in the ways humorous images serve as a form of speech for repressed feelings and emotions. 
It is possible, though, as Andrew Keen does when he writes of user-generated content, to argue 
that “the new Internet was about self-made music, not Bob Dylan or the Brandenburg Concertos. 
Audience and author had become one, and we were transforming culture in cacophony” (104). 
However, that would be an elitist and classist reading of the ways democratized media allows 
creative individuals in oppressive postcolonial contexts such as exist in Nigeria, and elsewhere, to 
assert agency and recreate culture. Keen’s view also forecloses the possibility that culture may be 
locatable in the everyday life of people. By implicitly restating the boundary between popular 
culture and high culture, Keen shows that his anxieties about Web 2.0 applications and networks 
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are prejudiced assumptions stemming from class biases. Rather than decrying the proliferation of 
digital media-enabled popular culture as a debasing of culture, “we can embrace it as an opportunity 
to seek out new, engaging and exciting creations from unknown and underappreciated artists” 
(Kunze 104). Peter Kunze concludes by noting that it is comedy that proves “particularly fertile 
grounds, as digital technology now gives us greater access not only to up-and-coming talent but to 
hard-to-find comedic materials from the past” (104).  In the Nigerian social media context, the 
many versions of the “Darris God o” video reproduced by users of social media for comedic 
purposes speak to how digital technologies and the democratization of the media empower 
previously invisible talents to tell their own stories to both popular and elite audiences. 
 
4.3 Social Media, Resistance, and the Carnivalesque 
Writing on Renaissance popular laughter, Mikhail Bakhtin asserts that “[a] boundless world 
of humorous forms and manifestations opposed the official and serious tone of medieval 
ecclesiastical and feudal culture” (4). He explains that carnival occasions built “a second world and 
a second life outside officialdom,” noting that both must be taken into consideration for a nuanced 
understanding of both medieval cultural consciousness and the culture of the Renaissance (6). This 
position can be applied to the two levels of interactions that exist in online communities, 
particularly in Nigerian social media. There is an official culture of political discourses and civic 
engagements on social media expressed through commentaries. Also, present in most 
conversations in network communities is a second world outside this formal and official culture. 
This second-order condition is defined by the laughing spaces people create to laugh out loud 
(LOL) at abusive power and their oppressors.  By identifying forms of laughing out loud at 
oppressive power and official culture, I focus on a crucial form of the amplified speech social 
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media gives the subaltern class whose laughter functions as an ambivalent signifier of outrage and 
hope.  
To ignore or underestimate people who use digital media to denaturalize the operations of 
hegemonies through the instrumentality of laughter is to distort the true picture of social media 
engagements in Nigeria. There are many jokes in Nigeria network communities, for instance, that 
desacralize religion, and make fun of both individuals and official power, while engaging the ruling 
elite in the kinds of unsanctioned and uncensored conversations absent before the social media age. 
Within a similar context of black humour in Brazil, Donna Goldstein writes that the carnivalesque 
is mobilized by ordinary Brazilians to make fun of the wealthy, and to poke “fun at the miserable 
circumstances in which they find themselves. It mocks the world and its madness and seems to be 
an unconscious masking of deep personal feelings that are too painful to deal with directly” (34). 
The eruption of this space of laughter, undergirded by a carnivalesque order assuring the free flow 
of creativity among social media users of different classes provides creative expression for coping 
with the agonies of everyday anxieties in oppressive postcolonial contexts. Within the framework 
of a repressive Iranian state, for instance, Babak Rahimi writes of the “anatomical indeterminacy 
of Facebook” as largely marked by “the co-presence of discursive activities that can be 
characterized in terms of asymmetrical exchanges, creating a distinct communicative realm of 
composite yet irreducible experiences for the participants” (11). Rahimi, commenting on the 
carnivalesque politics of online social networking, writes of online subjects “interactively sharing 
a “wild public” or contested spaces where hierarchies are questioned through various 
performances, including grotesque language and symbolic inversions” (11). In relation to Nigeria, 
the capacity of these citizens to speak for themselves may involve a direct and formal interaction 
on Facebook or even unsanctioned interactions on Twitter with the few Nigerian politicians who 
use these new media forms, undermining, in the carnivalesque spirit, the normativity of 
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officialdom. While it is pertinent to highlight the importance of this new site of communicative 
agency, the focus of this chapter is to understand the function of popular laughter and the 
“boundless world of humorous forms” (4) in social media conversations that use political satire to 
critique and subvert hegemonic culture. In her discussion of some of Bakhtin’s ideas in Rabelais 
and His World, Paula Findlen observes:  
For Bakhtin, exploring the role of laughter in the Renaissance offered an opportunity 
to comment on the problems of totalitarianism through a historically specific 
investigation of the relationship of laughter to ‘official’ culture. Laughter represented 
an unofficial and subversive means of expression, a freedom in the midst of 
restrictions. (249) 
Similarly, social media allows for the creation of a spaces in which a festival of laughter flourishes 
in Nigerian digital culture; more importantly though, the investigation of these forms of humour in 
social media communities offer the opportunity to uncover the ways citizens relate to the official 
culture of totalitarian power. The carnival of funny images, satirical discourses, and grotesque 
descriptions presents a subversive, humorous culture, marked by a crescendo of activities 
undermining the official culture of normative behaviour (Rahimi 12). By staging state power and 
performatively mimicking officials on social media, netizens offer one an opportunity to 
understand the ways official power is reconstituted and represented in the public (virtual) arena.     
Also, because of the blurring and fusion of identities between performer and audience, as 
well as the inability to distinguish between both groups, there is something of a carnivalesque 
aesthetic at play in the performance of Nigerian humour on social media. Bakhtin’s view that 
“carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not acknowledge any distinction 
between actors and spectators (7) foregrounds this view. Also, the intersections and fluid 
interactions which social media facilitates among different classes of people, whether from the 
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upper class, or the middle or lower classes forbids the essentialization of hierarchies and dominant 
articulations of hegemonic cultures. It should be noted that most social media users in Nigeria are 
middle-class citizens who constitute fifty per cent of the population with access to the Internet. 
There is also a growing number of members of the ruling class, including those in the ruling elite 
who use the platforms as partisan locations of political engagements and solidarity with supporters. 
The idea of the carnival in this sense is not the momentary occurrence of the term as an event, but 
its trans-temporal nature in the everyday expressions of ordinary people, now extended onto digital 
spaces. There are aspects of the carnivalesque which are intrinsic to social media, including the 
familiar, dialogic and free interactive space legitimized for varied groups, marginal or dominant, 
and the uncensored and free nature of speech and its performance. The chaotic proliferation of 
humour in Nigeria social media culture is certainly one of the ways popular laughter intersects 
freely among different classes in a de-hierarchized manner. The fact that carnivals are participatory, 
alternative, and transient spaces within which performative actions questioning normalized social 
structures are possible also helps to draw parallels with the social media culture in Nigeria. As in 
other parts of the world, social media generally facilitates an alternative media ecology for 
participatory culture and different forms of unfinished narratives and discourses.  
In the same manner as "[c]arnival festivities and the comic spectacles and ritual connected 
with them had an important place in the life of medieval man (6), the articulation of resistance in 
contemporary Nigeria has significant connections with the comic spectacles and visual or text-
based forms of humour central to Nigerian social media culture. Achille Mbembe’s comment that 
the “question of knowing whether humour in the postcolony is an expression of “resistance” or not, 
whether it is, a priori, opposition or simply a manifestation of hostility towards authority” (8) is 
thus not of secondary importance as he suggests. Mbembe probably conceives of popular humour 
and the carnivalesque in terms of an event—a stand-up comedy performance, a political cartoon 
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publication, or a comedic film or novel that satirizes power. It is in these restrictive contexts that it 
would be appropriate to affirm the ways the carnivalesque reinforces the dominant social structure, 
as the inversions and desecrations that occur in such fossilized spaces are temporary and permitted 
events that can be censored by the forces of power. The view that the carnival is “a licensed affair” 
dates to critics such as Terry Eagleton who see the carnivalesque as “a permissible rupture of 
hegemony” (148) relatively ineffectual as a revolutionary work of art. While the folkloric and 
medieval contexts of Bakhtin’s work are understandably inapplicable in a digital context, social 
media re-articulations of the carnival do not affirm the view that carnival has to be a licensed affair 
that renormalizes an existing social order. On social media, people poke fun at social and political 
hierarchies without the need for any permission, nuancing their political subversions in an 
uncensored regime of populist power.  Indeed, Obadare’s caution that “the privileging of humour 
must be undertaken with one eye on its limitations as a strategy of resistance” (76) is entirely 
justifiable. Within a social media context, however, one can think of the carnivalesque as an 
everyday performance of agency by all classes of people, who interact freely, unregulated by any 
dominant hegemony, with humour daily articulated as a form of resistance. And since careful users 
can avoid digital traces that can subject their privacy and online activities to both surveillance and 
monetization, it is possible to avoid, to a large extent, forms of algorithmic interpellations and 
subjectivization. Regarding Nigerian humour, a carnivalesque imagination on social media is thus 
an everyday expression of comic selves in an uncensored and decentralized space in which the 
country’s digital citizens share laughter as a response to the medium’s performative urgings. With 
a different array of social media available at their disposal, anyone can go public to criticize 
government and participate in political conversations, as can be seen in this post by another 
fictional account on Facebook: 
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Fig. 4.8. Correct Bae. “Just as they Promised.” Facebook, 30 November, 2016 
https://www.facebook.com/correctbae/photos/a.1685358838448864.1073741828.168449517520
1897/1722030504781697/?type=3&theater 
There is the suggestion of certain gender dynamics in this example, as the user is a female version 
of the Correct Bro fictional character. It is hard to tell that both accounts are run by the same person 
because of the anonymous profiles, but they share an affinity in the ways their Facebook, Twitter, 
and Instagram pages provide a contact point for free-flowing and diverse forms of humorous 
commentaries on Nigerian political culture. As Stephanie Newell (1997) argues, contemporary 
West African cultures “overflow with local, culturally specific constructions of gender which 
circulate in literature and popular representations” (1). This post stresses how social media has 
become an important arena from which everyday women contribute to these constructions of 
gender. In this post, the user is using humour to subvert and satirize a major campaign promise of 
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the current ruling party in Nigeria. Having promised “One Meal a Day” for primary and high-
school students, President Buhari had been widely seen in some quarters as a more promising 
alternative to his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan. Instead of fulfilling their electoral promises, 
however, the Buhari government has pursued economic policies that resulted in a recession in 2016, 
just about a year after the elections. Although not mentioned in the post, the idea of economic 
recession is the subject of the post as the economic conditions of the masses have worsened, leading 
them to settle for only a single meal per day, “just as they promised.” Correct Bae is therefore 
invested in this post in some form of culture jamming, as she, as in the spirit of anti-consumerist 
social movements, disrupts the rhetoric of a political advertorial to show how the political class has 
yet again successfully deceived a segment of the electorate. She uses subversive satire to unfix the 
meaning in a dominant sign of power, and then affixes a new layer of meaning to the text. She 
renegotiates the meaning of the image because, as Rahimi points out, political activism on 
Facebook facilitates “the possibility for the emergence of alternative stylistic and narrative spaces 
marked as unofficial discourses that allow individuals of diverse backgrounds to negotiate 
positions of identity and power” (11). The post, thus, uses a version of a stereotypic assumption 
about the reading culture in some parts of Africa—to deceive an African man, write in black and 
white—to reimagine a nexus between the language of the advertorial and the actual reality of 
abjection and hunger imposed by the economic recession. The comments on the post mostly agree 
with Correct Bae, with one of the commenters claiming they are not able to get even a single meal 
in a day. The humorous post and the discursive thread of commentaries it produces are sites for 
expressing outrage through the agency of laughter. The rhetoric of the post is situated within the 
framework of politics as a way of critiquing the state and holding government to accountability, 
practices of participatory politics alien to most (young) people before the era of Web 2.0.  Although 
the image does not have engagements between politicians and the producers or commenters on the 
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image, it does offer opportunity to reflect on the ways political comedy in an uncensored medium 
is used by citizens to relate with the Nigerian state in a way that mocks and satirizes its power. 
With several politicians recently joining Facebook, there is the possibility that they encounter the 
various attempts of a dispersive and wild presentation of humour to court their attention, even if 
they feign indifference. Also, the carnivalesque nature of these funny posts can be seen in the ways 
the humorous articulations of resistance enable different classes of Nigerians to interact. Figure 4.9 
is probably a better example to show that the political class, and indeed the upper echelon of society 
engage with these social media expressions of humour. 
 
  
 
Fig. 4.9. Garba Shehu. Twitter. https://twitter.com/GarShehu/status/786972719095177216 
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In this tweet, the president’s media aide justifies President Buhari’s comment in 2016 that women 
belonged “in the kitchen … and the other room.” Comic Internet memes, some of which I will be 
discussing more fully in the next chapter, emerged as tactics through which netizens lampooned 
the president on Twitter.  @kolatubosun’s response to the tweet is an outright mockery in which 
“hahahhaha” as a language of laughter becomes an irreverent strategy of transgressing and 
disrupting presidential power. With increasing instances of bloggers arrested by some powerful 
state actors in Nigeria, the direct interaction between Garba Shehu and the many Twitter users who 
subvert the normalizing rhetoric of state excess is embedded in Shehu’s tweet. Kola Tubosun’s 
response uncovers a carnival moment in the way his tweet refuses to be subordinated to “the verbal 
and semantic dictatorship of a monologic, unified style and a unified tone” (Bakhtin 1984 204) 
inherent in the government’s tweet. In this carnivalesque space, what another commenter identifies 
as “a [classic] sense of humour” is the weapon that resists the authoritarian control suggested by 
the narrative of the presidency. Aside from this tweet, there are other examples of comedic forms 
that elicit the interest of the ruling class even as they deface power through their grotesque 
representations. In December 2016, an evangelical church in Nigeria had a YouTube comedy group 
arrested by the Nigerian police for satirizing its activities and rituals of worship. Like many similar 
powerful religious institutions in Nigeria, the church and its leadership successfully got the creators 
of the video to delete the episode from social media, marking the encounter as one of the recent 
ways power is coopting online resistance voices. While this incident can also be imagined as a way 
subversive humour has material implications on power, the now deleted YouTube video is a 
witness to how carnival is realized as a momentary performance that is an anti-hegemonic tactic of 
resisting hierarchy, the Nigerian Church, in this context. That the church, in tandem with the state, 
succeeds in getting the group to delete the video is a way a temporal and virtual transgression of 
sacred authority is followed by a return to the normative social order. With social media, however, 
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this normative return is again displaced, and carnival moment re-emerges in the next comic post 
that lampoons the state. This censoring of the group’s comic performance bears witness to an 
evolving culture among the ruling elite seeking to suppress alternative voices and underscores the 
penetrative, even if silent, gaze of institutional power in Nigerian social media.    
To return to Correct Bae, another of her post, Figure 4.10, suggests commenters’ awareness 
of this capacity of official power to act as a panoptic gaze in the raucously festive treatment of state 
policies and actors. The profile avatar of Correct Bae in this post implies a gossipy image that 
mocks the “current affair update—London is the capital of Nigeria.” Here is a carnivalesque 
deployment of language and comical image to break down an existing political and social narrative, 
namely the official account that the Nigerian president has to remain in London for medical 
treatment. After an extension of his visit to the UK for health reasons, the presidency announced 
the president had written to the senate to extend his stay.  
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Fig. 4.10. Correct Bae. “London is the Capital of Nigeria.” Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/correctbae/photos/a.1685358838448864.1073741828.168449517520
1897/1767429593575121/?type=3&theater 
 
That “London is the capital of Nigeria” recalls the country’s colonial relations with England and 
casts the president’s prolonged medical visit as symptomatic of the postcolonial and ambivalent 
fascination with empire that persists in the mind of many African leaders. There is also the 
suggestion that London still exerts much political influence in the administration of postcolonial 
Nigeria, a mockery of the supposed sovereign exercise of power by Nigerian leaders. This playful 
reference to the language of empire is used in a manner that parallels with carnival’s permission of 
informal discourse in the humorous engagement with official culture.  
The comments on the thread constitute an important alternative archive of the public 
perception of the president’s visit. While the post and the comments may historicize this political 
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episode, the dialogic exchanges reveal the point I am making that alternative and humorous voices 
recognize the possibility of surveillance by the state. The commenter Mr. Oluwakpor cautions 
Correct Bae when he writes: “if them hear it from you,” a Nigerian pidgin expression asking her 
to be careful that her statement is not heard by the powerful forces being critiqued. Although this 
statement is complemented with smile emojis gesturing towards the humorous context of the 
message, one still gets the sense of the self-regulating behaviour and interaction grounded in the 
performance of subversion. In Figure 4.8, the avatar is symbolic of the average Nigerian young 
woman, probably from a rural community, with limited access to economic opportunities, while 
Figure 4.10 presents a sophisticated urban personality commenting on the political. Although the 
avatar in figure 4.10 presents a beautiful character committed to a prattling contestation of 
authority, Figure 4.8, with an avatar that slightly suggests a grotesque depiction of beauty, 
consolidates Correct Bae’s de-essentialization of beauty as a necessity of online performative self-
presentations. As a carnival signifier of inversion, Figure 4.8 refashions the grotesque 
“affirmatively to destabilize the idealizations of female beauty or to realign the mechanisms of 
desire” (Russo 221). Both images can lead to the conclusion that Correct Bae deliberately presents 
images representing different layers of identities that seek to deface power and subvert the 
dominant narratives of authoritarian power.  
Another post that shows this transgressive inversion of dominant and official discourse and 
that refers to the working of symbolic language in the tradition of the carnival is Figure 4.11, in 
which Correct Bae uses a news headline from the traditional press to alter an existing narrative on 
the president’s health status. 
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Fig. 4.11. Correct Bae. “Buhari Undergoes Penis Surgery.” Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/correctbae/photos/a.1685358838448864.1073741828.168449517520
1897/1767591996892214/?type=3&theater 
 
The apparent sensationalism of this headline in the mainstream media is what creative users on 
social media have appropriated to achieve a viral status for this story of a child, having the same 
name as the president, who required corrective surgery after molestation by his step-mother. By 
posting an image in which the fictional character is surprised to hear that “Buhari undergoes Penis 
Surgery,” Correct Bae is performing a subversion of another narrative—the idea disseminated by 
state officials that President Buhari’s trip to London was for a routine medical check-up. There are 
people, especially in the opposition party, who would have the seventy-five-year-old president 
resign from office because of perceived health problems that undermine his ability to lead the 
nation. On the one hand, the intervention of Correct Bae and the commenters on the thread is a 
mode of engaging with this discussion that might provoke disgust for people who believe a child’s 
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health problems should not be the subject of both sensationalism and humorous representations. 
On the other hand, that the post enables space for people to discuss the metaphoric portrayal of the 
president’s ability to perform his duties as president foregrounds the transgression of power 
relations embedded in the post. This mockery of President Buhari’s sexuality intersects with a 
questioning of the operations of juridical power, although, as Achille Mbembe asserts, bodily forms 
such as the mouth, belly, and the phallus, “when used in popular speech and jokes, have above all 
to be located in the real world, located in real time, as play, as fun” (7). Correct Bae’s post is, thus, 
a playful moment of carnival on social media that allows citizens to transgress the space of official 
power. In all three posts by Correct Bae, the utilization of facial expressions and the representation 
of the president’s phallus by a female are indications that “the body itself is the principal locale of 
the idioms and fantasies used in depicting power” (Mbembe 7). The critique of a phallocentric 
political landscape is best echoed in the hashtag #TheOtherRoom which trended on Twitter in 
response to the president’s misguided views in Germany. The hashtag, discussed in the next 
chapter, and posts such as Figure 4.11 are avenues through which netizens use the intertwining of 
sexuality and political power to mock the president’s competence.  
Similarly, there is value in the ways Twitter user Hakeem Alaiya uses his account as a 
platform for staging power relations. The images on his Twitter feeds offer examples of 
postmodern iterations of the carnivalesque, both in relation to Nigerian postcolonial condition and 
the representation of transnational engagement with politics. For instance, in Figure 4.12, Alaiya 
intensifies the discourse on the sexualization of the President’s identity through an inversion of 
gender identities that gesture towards the unduly male-dominated nature of Nigerian politics.  
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Fig. 4.12. @queemus1. Twitter. https://twitter.com/qeemus1/status/724974142265671680 
At first, a feminist reading of the image would imply a troubling representation, since it is a male 
Twitter user deploying the symbol of the drag-queen as a performative tactic of subversion. In other 
words, a male online subject cross-dresses another male to project a masculinist space in which 
feminine identity is being ridiculed as source of amusement and laughter. However, in a country 
that has recently criminalized homosexual relations and gay culture, the representation of the 
president’s gender identity within the context of drag is extremely important, even if as an 
unintended critique of heterosexual normativity in the Nigerian political landscape. This example 
harbours a parodic performance in which an exaggerated femininity is attributed to President 
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Buhari as a reimagination of the president’s identity. From the tweet, Hakeem Alaiya intends for 
this image to be a performative strategy of humour in which presidential power is reconfigured to 
get his audience to “laff and easy (sic) the stress,” affirming the user’s deliberate adoption of 
humour as a coping mechanism in disempowering postcolonial conditions. The carnivalesque 
imagination in the image is the appropriation of embellished femininity to unsettle a political 
hierarchy and subvert a cultural space hostile to the articulation of female agency. Aside from the 
fact that the reversal of the president’s gender identity stages the performance of female power in 
virtual public sphere, a common citizen is also poking fun at the patriarchal culture President 
Buhari embodies. These are carnivalesque strategies that mount political critiques through a 
parodic performance of gender identities. In The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, Peter 
Stallybrass and Allon White highlight how in “Bakhtin the ‘classical body’ denotes the inherent 
form of the high official culture,” (21) an analogous interpretation of the body, by Mbembe, as the 
principal locale for depicting and mocking the mechanisms of oppressive power. This view, when 
applied to both Correct Bae’s and Alaiya’s vulgar humour on President Buhari, can suggest the 
ways the president’s body as a discursive site of high official culture and power is subjected to 
transgressive alterations to stage a critique of state hegemony and the power symbolized by the 
president. 
The critique of cultural barriers and political hierarchies is not limited to the Nigerian 
sociopolitical environment, as it can also be seen when Nigerian social media humourists 
participate in global discourses around power. Alaiya’s Twitter feeds offer some insights into the 
ways some users, in the carnivalesque spirit, deploy popular laughter as a way of participating in 
official sites of power such as the discourse of global politics. During the American elections, 
Alaiya used Photoshop to present alternative images of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton as an 
intimate couple. 
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Fig.4.13. @Qeemus1. Twitter, 29 October, 2016 
https://twitter.com/qeemus1/status/788652818571915264 
 
The cultural politics of this image is constituted in the local idiom it gives to a global subject, as 
the two American contestants are presented as Yoruba couple dressed for a wedding event. The 
image implies that both Trump and Clinton hold similar ideological persuasions, and present 
limited options to the American electorate. Although this view was a common one among pundits 
in the days leading to the election, it is graphically summarized in an image that represents the 
politicians as a rich Nigerian couple. The appropriation of Yoruba party dressing for humour gives 
the image its comic effect, suggesting the showbiz influence Trump, and perhaps Clinton, brings 
to the elections. The text also mounts a subtle critique of the Nigerian social space and its 
compulsive party culture. Alaiya is using this tweet to satirize the Nigerian ruling elite and the 
hypocritical alliances they forge whenever there is a party. The tweet is fascinating for its staging 
of intersecting local and global identities, and is a signifier of the many ways Nigerian netizens 
“participated” in discourses on the US elections. This overlapping of local voices and global 
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identities online is reflective of what Daniel Miller refers to as “the death of distance” (193), the 
transnational erasure of communicative distance enabled by online social networking sites and 
founded on the dissolution of social spaces and hierarchies between people. This decentering of 
the communication space is one of the ways a carnival moment occurs in the tweet, aside from the 
fact that the image has migrated to other platforms where it is subjected to other forms of 
performances, remixing, discussions, and disseminations, all of which assure the heteroglossic 
nature of social media forms of speech. Those participating in these conversations are performing 
a transnational identity enabled by global media. After Trump’s electoral victory, Hakeem Alaiya, 
@Qeemus1, presents another Photoshopped image of Trump, this time alone: 
 
Figure 4.14. @Qeemus1. “The real Jagaban.” Twitter, 9 November, 2016. 
https://twitter.com/qeemus1/status/796323871431467009 
Although Alaiya attempts an unsanctioned conversation in this tweet with @realDonaldTrump, it 
is the larger conversation he is having through the humorous rhetoric of a political image that is 
more important. In this example, he Photoshops Donald Trump’s Twitter avatar, using it to show 
him as a powerful ruler in the Arab-Islamic tradition. The symbol of authority in the image is 
expressed through the traditional power-portrait pose as well as through the turban and royal staff 
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placed in front of the subject, whom the audience must approach with reverence. Very important 
is also the face of the eagle that suggests Trump’s sense of vision, strength, and foresight, as well 
as the words “Jagaban Trump”—which is where the subversion and displacement of the hitherto 
flattering qualities in the image commence. Within a Nigerian political context, despite that the 
term “Jagaban” refers to “a leader of warriors,” its popular connotation among street urchins in 
urban centres such as Lagos conjures the idea of fear, anti-sociality and criminality. That a 
notorious Nigerian politician, Bola Tinubu of the APC, is referred to as “Jagaban” emphasizes the 
corrupt context in which a Trump presidency is being placed and imagined. On the other hand, 
Donald Trump’s notoriety as, in the estimation of Paul Waldman, “the most disliked, least trusted 
president in modern history” (The Washington Post) casts back a negative light on Bola Tinubu. 
The fact that Donald Trump is “the real Jagaban” is not only an obvious reworking of the Twitter 
profile of the then president-elect, but also a pointer to the doubled articulations of the post: 
Trump’s corrupt and narcissistic personality resembles the corrupt outlook of a Nigeria politician, 
much like Trump’s disapproval ratings among a large section of Americans might intensify the 
negative perception of Bola Tinubu among some Nigerians. An ironic quality in the image is its 
appropriation of Islamic royal paraphernalia to portray an American politician whose regressive 
rhetoric during electoral campaigns promoted Islamophobia and divisive politics. The fact that in 
both tweets, Alaiya mentions Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, and mainstream media such as the 
CNN describes how the carnivalesque disregard for conventions and hierarchies is at work in social 
media conversations in which a common Nigerian citizen is using political images to satirize 
powerful political figures. The critique of Donald Trump by some liberal voices around the world 
is localized in an example in which a Nigerian citizen perform an unlicensed and humorous parody 
of oppressive power. The last two images depict transnational negotiation of power, offering 
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alternative perspectives on ways social media makes the politics of representations a borderless 
process.  
Also, the works of Wowo Boyz, a Nigerian comedy group in the US, offer a diasporic 
perspective to this idea that Nigerian humour is entrenched in a global and transnational discourse. 
That they work from a foreign country not only shows that Nigerian popular culture is also being 
determined by netizens from locations outside the country, but also that Nigerian youths who 
migrate to the West have found an inventive mechanism in a placeless medium for narrowing the 
gap between home and exile. While performing comic selves via YouTube channels and Instagram 
updates, these humour merchants produce narratives that project an image of Nigeria shaped from 
the diaspora. With their humorous interventions from exilic locations of the West, Wowo Boyz is 
invested in the performance of humour as a transnational practice through which it examines issues 
of alienation and identity that immigrants face abroad. Members of the group reconnect themselves 
to the homeland by posting comic videos that are oriented towards their over three million 
YouTube subscribers in Nigeria and around the world.  Through their comic skits, the artists 
articulate the values, anxieties, social tensions of the Nigerian society to a global audience. In one 
of their skits on YouTube, they engage with the subject of Black Lives Matter, offering the 
narrative of a hysteric African pregnant mother who, responding to a journalist, expresses concern 
that her unborn child might be the next victim of police brutality. This hyperbolic perspective to 
racial politics in the American justice system is articulated in terms of an immigrant anxiety over 
public safety.  
Commenting on the works of Naija Boyz another diaspora-based group of Nigerian youths 
that blend hip hop and comedy, Krystal Strong and Shaun Ossei-Owusu (2014) point to “the 
intersection of entertainment and technology as a strategic site of cosmopolitan practices, which 
exemplify the ways African youth reimagine themselves” (190) as cultural and global citizens. This 
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cosmopolitan impulse, recently reimagined as an “Afropolitan consciousness” (Gehrmann 63), in 
the discourse of African identity is central to the ways young Nigerians in the diaspora use social 
media to negotiate for themselves a productive identity from the liminal and alienating space in the 
home-exile binary. Most of their videos are social critiques of cultural issues as diverse as sexuality 
and gender, Nigerian parenting styles, and religion. Rather than conceive of the works and those 
of other humourists as a threat to “the business of stand-up comedians” (6), as Barclays Foubiri 
Ayakoroma claims, these new cultural economies can be understood as spaces that facilitate a 
better understanding of the transformation of the production, form, and reception of Nigerian 
humour. While humour continues to signify as a cultural form that helps people cope with everyday 
challenges, the ways social media reframe this function remains fascinating in the scholarship of 
Nigeria’s digital culture. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The carnivalesque culture of political subversion is an unsanctioned form of humour 
examined in this chapter within the context of social media. I have argued that a carnival impulse 
undergirds the anti-hegemonic repertoire organized by Nigerian netizens to alter and resist 
oppressive social and political hierarchies. That digital media enables the visibility of this 
expression of discourse is best articulated by the process of sharing, itself a subversive political 
practice that reconfigures humour as a form to be disseminated in response to disempowering 
political and economic conditions. Rotimi Taiwo (2016) has recently noted of Nigerian forms of 
humour on the Internet that “the online jokes posted by Nigerians are closely linked with socio-
economic and political issues in the country” and besides making people laugh, function “to 
express people’s concerns about the state of the nation” (182). Therefore, I have argued that 
humour is one of the most productive modes of cultural engagement and critique in Nigerian digital 
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culture. Aside from the fact that social media inspires the sharing of content, an avalanche of 
information in digital network applications naturalizes conditions in which humorous narratives 
can become one of the paradigmatic ways of interpreting contemporary social issues. This point is 
close to the functioning of humour as a coping mechanism, only that in this case, humour operates 
as a virtual system through which everyday citizens make sense of and participate in contentious 
debates in the polity. The more controversial a social or political subject is, the more likely it will 
be represented in humour by creative citizens asserting their presence in the public arena. Digital 
platforms that allow real-time sharing as well as social media sharing options, such as Facebook 
Live give users the capacity to broadcast live comedy performances to audiences in more dispersed 
places in Africa and elsewhere. The space of humour production and consumption is therefore a 
decentered stage on which ordinary people present comic selves to represent a subaltern version of 
the African experience. If most Nigerians have an innate inclination for humour, social media 
simply intensifies that tendency. Sharing humour on social media is therefore fundamentally a 
performative act because its appropriation in digital media is primarily rooted in the online rituals 
of self-presentation: people perform and share comic selves as a cultural practice of narrating the 
nation, asserting agency in disempowering circumstances, and participating in global politics. In 
the next chapter, I will focus on the intersection of memes as a visual language of online humour, 
showing how social media users employed viral memes in the 2015 elections as a form of electoral 
participation and their involvement in the democratic process in Nigeria.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HASHTAG AS ARCHIVE: INTERNET MEMES IN NIGERIA’S SOCIAL MEDIA 
ELECTION 
In this final chapter, I track the trajectories of citizens’ engagement with Nigerian domestic 
politics by discussing Internet memes and identifying the most viral social media hashtags since 
the #BringBackOurGirls movement. In my introductory chapter, I argued that the Nigerian state 
accurately represents David Buckingham’s reasoning at the turn of the millennium that, in relation 
to politics, “young people are not defined by society as political subjects” (219). I will be examining 
viral hashtags to highlight some of the most visible Internet memes in the last five years, 
demonstrating that individuals excluded from political conversations now have ways of appearing 
in the arena of public dialogues. One of the impacts of the 2014 #BringBackOurGirls hashtag, for 
instance, is its implications for the surveillance of juridical power in Nigeria by creative and 
dissident citizens in digital environments. These netizens have continued to utilize funny hashtags 
and viral memes as tactics for participating in public debates and for subverting normative cultural 
and political perspectives. The discussion of these hashtags and the political conversations 
organized around them also enable me to archive some of the most dominant Internet memes in 
Nigerian social media since #OccupyNigeria in 2012.  
As may be evident from the preceding chapters, central to this dissertation are the various 
ways social media facilitates a discursive interplay of the performance of politics and the politics 
of performance—the latter having a theoretically inflected character that I shall attempt to unpack 
shortly. A major objective of the work is the documentation and analysis of the entry of a previously 
excluded and marginal audience of Nigerian culture and politics into the realm of socio-political 
and cultural discourses. Because of user-generated technologies, this group has become more 
visible and involved in the expression of political voice and performative agency. Also, I have 
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demonstrated that the presentation of self on social media, to illustrate, can be expressed 
performatively through virtual images, as in the case of protest bodies deploying selfies and self-
portraits as forms of performances in the #BringBackOurGirls social media campaigns. Cultural 
practices such as the selfie serve as an embodied presence of its subject’s intervention in resistance, 
and demonstrate the ways in which the intersection of visual culture and digital activism is 
productive for thinking about social media articulations of subaltern politics.  
By focusing on the popular images transmitted on social media, I have highlighted the 
radical critique of both governmental power and the larger hegemonic culture mounted by Nigerian 
netizens seeking to initiate a potential shift in the actions and directions of cultural and political 
institutions in the country. It is within this matrix that I have, on the one hand, framed the discussion 
on the performance of politics on social media as the means through which online presentations of 
selves through visual signifiers such as the selfie and fictive images overlap with the production of 
political identities and subjectivities. On the other hand, and following from this view of 
performance, there is also locatable a politics of performance in the ideological range and political 
spectrum, signified in the cultural posts of users on social media such as YouTube and Facebook. 
This latter approach to performance imagines culture to be “saturated with discourses of power,” 
and conveys a functional perspective of performance that serves to “change the audiences’ 
community and culture (Kershaw 6). In other words, as Baz Kershaw explains, a politics of 
performance is performance as an ideological transaction, articulating the various ways in which 
spectators are actively engaged in the construction of meaning as a performance proceeds (256). 
Although Kershaw’s theory, unmindful of a social media field in which the spectator can also 
function as performer, relates mostly to the deeply political character of rural theatre and 
community performances, his conception of performance as ideological transactions is conducive 
to the ways in which I frame performance through digital images as a political practice. This 
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conception of performance is articulated within the discursive sites of social media dialogues and 
networks that develop around politics and culture. While previous chapters have been focused on 
how social media users do politics with images (cartoons, selfies, etc.) as symbolic expressions of 
their performative agency, I now proceed to discuss how photo-based Internet memes are used as 
signifiers of the politics of performance, one that conveys social media performance as an 
efficacious media practice that can materialize social and political change. Within the context of 
electoral politics in Nigeria, the chapter identifies internet memes as viral monuments of a specific 
political moment in Nigeria, namely the 2015 presidential elections, showing how the production 
of photo-based memes was an online political practice that threatens real-world change. In a 
country in which 50 percent of the 180-million population have access to the Internet, it is 
understandable to see why, according to the How Africa Tweets Report, #Nigeriadecides was the 
post popular hashtag in Africa in 2015 (Dobbs 2016). While this report underscores the 
increasingly dominant role of digital technologies and social media in the political landscape in 
Africa, it also points to the expanded prominence of hitherto excluded groups such as young people 
in the Nigerian public imagination.  
These youths, like their counterparts in other parts of the world, resort to the creation and 
distribution of Internet memes for the expression of a new regime of citizenship orchestrated by 
digital media. In April 2015, for instance, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) published 
a story on how social media users in Nigeria relied on Internet memes to visualize the narrative 
contours of the 2015 elections. Titled “Nigerian election in memes,” the writer of the article 
concludes that “one thing [was] left to say from the social media world - goodbye to an old meme.” 
This “old meme” in the BBC story is a reference to a photo of the former Nigerian president, 
reproduced here as Figure 5.1. The meme, both as a reproducible idea and a viral Internet image, 
has been used and reused by many social media users in Nigeria to parody and mock the former 
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Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, whose hand was “seemingly permanently stuck to his chin” 
(BBC online). The rhetoric of the pose bears the image of a political leader who appears resigned 
to fate and unable to perform the functions of governance. Metaphorically, the photo is the face of 
political privilege in Nigeria and indicates the ruling elite’s indifference to those in the lower rungs 
of the socioeconomic ladder. Reproduced and remixed as Internet memes by netizens on different 
digital media platforms, including on Facebook and WhatsApp, the image is symbolic of the 
lingering perception among citizens that political passivity was the hallmark of the Goodluck 
Jonathan administration.  
 The intent of the focus on Internet memes is, thus, to explore the usage of these popular 
signifiers of visual culture by Nigerian netizens in the expression of civic and democratic agency 
with respect to the 2015 elections. I hope to show that the political memes from Nigerian new 
media spaces constitute an insightful visual language through which subaltern Nigerians with 
access to digital media participated in electoral processes.  There is value in the ways in which 
memes facilitate a visual field for cultural and political analysis in Nigeria, considering the 
evolving digital culture in the country. In addition to examining this productive arena of online 
communication, I also explore memes that served to express the major concerns of social media 
users during the election, as well as some of the ways memes continue to function as an expressive 
and playful mode of checking the excesses of power. This chapter, thus, mounts its arguments as a 
way of furthering emergent scholarly conversations, such as Adeyemi Adegoju and Oluwabunmi 
Oyebode’s, whose article locates humour and memes as discursive practices in the 2015 elections. 
Their essay, which, despite an extensive Internet culture in Nigeria, is one of few studies on the 
topic, is an analysis of “the appropriation of Internet memes in representing the two main aspirants 
in Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election online campaign discourse” (659). To be clear, the idea of 
“presidential election online campaign” suggests that there were some members of the ruling elite 
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who believed the Internet could be used as campaign space to further their political interests. 
However, it also suggests that Internet users were actively invested in the electoral process and the 
discursive layers of their participation are what Adegoju and Oyebode analyze in their work. My 
intervention here extends their argument by tracking these political discourses by Internet users 
before, during, and after the election itself. This perspective enables me to stress the ways the 
production and distribution of Internet memes encourage practices, which serve to construct new 
types of online subjects, including networked netizens invested in a playful participation in public 
conversations. From this viewpoint, the production and distribution of Internet memes in Nigeria’s 
contemporary communicative landscape is fundamental to understanding sociocultural and 
political processes. By critically analyzing Nigerian Internet memes of the political genre, I focus 
on how these digital media forms are mobilized by citizens to offer a critique of the state, and to 
express political dispositions informed by the social media modalities of interactivity and 
networking.  
 
 
Fig. 5.1. Meme. The viral GEJ pose. Source: The BBC online.  
This example offers an instance of some of the ways through which the traditional media furnishes 
creative new media users with visual resources through which they recreate memes for their own 
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alternative and playful performances of politics. The idea of play can be understood through the 
prism of what has been described as the performance of ludic selves on social media. Ann Deumert 
identifies digital communication as enablers of spaces in which people relate to themselves and 
others in a playful manner. In her estimation, “the primacy of play” (1) in social networking sites 
explains performative strategies of online-presentations that make participations in cultural and 
political conversations a fluid and pleasurable activity. These memes serve to complement the 
practice of voting and other concrete electoral activities with the production and sharing of memes 
as digital cultural practices of uncovering and resisting electoral fraud in Nigeria. Figure 5.2 
presents an analogy to the meme mentioned in the BBC article and illustrates another way the 
aesthetics and content of political images from the mainstream media are reorganized for critiquing 
the state. 
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Fig, 5.2. Meme. “4 More Years.” Tech cabal.  http://techcabal.com/2015/04/01/top-memes-from-
the-nigerian-2015-presidential-election/ 
The creator of this meme has merely used “4 MORE YEARS” to describe what the country could 
expect from another Jonathan presidency. The creator uses four different camera angles of similar 
photos to express the view of political incompetency that marked the administration of the erstwhile 
president. The rhetoric of these images can be located in the different facial expressions of 
Goodluck Jonathan as it seeks to persuade the reader not to endorse the passivity of his government. 
 
5.1 Internet Memes as Popular Culture Genre 
 Richard Dawkins proposed the concept of the meme as a “unit of cultural transmission” 
(192), functioning within the regulatory frameworks of imitation as a self-perpetuating cultural 
phenomenon similar to the gene as a replica and replicator of biological data. Positioned within 
this model, memes function to spread, replicate and modify ideas and culture. The word meme, 
according to Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear (2007), is employed by netizens mainly to 
describe the rapid uptake and spread of a “particular idea presented as a written text, image, 
language 'move,' or some other unit of cultural ‘stuff’” (202). This description, like that of Dawkins, 
relates to the formal academic study of mimetics that is different from the popular conception of 
Internet memes motivated by a digital culture that is non-hierarchical, user-based, and interactive. 
The field of this cultural production is constituted by online subjects fascinated with the 
deployment of social media as space for expressing a humorous and satirical critique of power and 
political institutions. Internet memes are the playful texts of this transmission, as they enable 
netizens to convey and replicate ideas, contest dominant ideologies, while affirming online visual 
culture as a domain of individual mythologies that are easily reproducible. Limor Shifman’s 
definition of Internet memes as products of a shared and interactive network culture has some 
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value: 
Internet memes are defined here as units of popular culture that are circulated, 
imitated, and transformed by individual Internet users, creating a shared cultural 
experience in the process. I suggest looking at Internet memes not as single ideas 
or formulas that propagated well, but as groups of content items that were created 
with awareness of each other and share common characteristics. (367) 
There is the evident shift in this conception from Internet memes as unitary cultural forms to an 
expanded view in which they can be understood as a genre of popular culture. Shifman, who argues 
for a “cultural logic” (340) of photo-based memes, suggests in another study that Internet memes 
be regarded as “a group of digital items that: (a) share common characteristics of content, form, 
and/or stance; (b) are created with awareness of each other; and (c) are circulated, imitated, and 
transformed via the internet by multiple users” (341). Shimor’s perspective is unlike Dawkins’s 
singularized notions of memes (pre-digital memes, for instance a stand-up comedy, can mostly be 
experienced singularly at a given time and place). By cultural logic, Shifman rightly argues that a 
meme should be understood as cultural texts that combine linguistic and visual metaphors to 
articulate reproducible versions of mini-narratives. Shifman’s approach suggests that memes are 
best understood as iterative models of communication that constitute a genre deployed by ordinary 
users of media as creative interventions in cultural discourses. Seen as genre, therefore, Internet 
memes could be interpreted as a system of signs that function from person to person to represent 
and disseminate cultural and power relations. This cultural logic is certainly true of the Third World 
Kid meme which makes an excellent argument about the possible rhetoric and ideologies embedded 
in Internet memes. Of all the possible images a Google search for “African memes” might produce, 
the Third World Kid meme is almost guaranteed to be present. 
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Fig. 5.3. Third World Kid meme and some of its many variants. 
Most of the narratives of the memes in this example demonstrate some of the ways the Internet 
meme genre can be used to disseminate and normalize racist epistemologies, affirming digital 
culture as a maelstrom of encoded textual moments that bring some netizens in arenas of 
ideological contestations. Since these memes reproduce dominant ideologies, and essentialize 
third-world conditions, it is important to engage critically with them and other similar memes 
because of their capacity to exist as viral media embodying negative and sweeping representations 
of the African child. In this case, memes become ideological texts of hidden power relations and 
reveal how the digital artifacts of global social media can also extend cultural polarities. Although 
it is easy to see how these memes and the ideas they stage demonstrate that there are persistent 
topographies of power and inequality in online communities, it is how they are organized as cultural 
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texts around economic and political agonies in postcolonial countries such as Nigeria that is critical 
for me. In either case, it is fascinating to see how pessimistic memetic representations occasion 
ripostes, generated as counter-hegemonic derivatives to the grand narratives of memes created 
within a dominant culture.   
While Figure 5.3 does not relate directly to Nigerian social media landscape and electoral 
politics, it provides a premise for my idea that Internet memes are cultural texts that embed 
ideological assumptions, aside from their functioning as humorous popular ‘texts’ that can be used 
as signifiers of participatory politics. As examples from online political conversations from Nigeria 
indicate, social media as new spaces for performing agency have been effective in the 
dissemination of the subjectivities and agency of ordinary citizens extending the frontiers of the 
country’s democratic imagination. By sharing humorous and satirical memes and other forms of 
online popular culture, Nigerian digital actors supplement social media’s positioning as a space for 
coordinating social activism with a practice, expressed through comical images that perform and 
narrate the voice of marginal and excluded groups such as youths. This practice identifies online 
subjects who circulate the images on social media as repoliticized subjects seeking political change 
through digital networks and communities. Examples from Nigerian digital culture demonstrate 
that these regular citizens can engage more with the political culture than they do through earlier 
forms of media, which, in most cases, is partially regulated by the Nigerian state. Unlike the 
mainstream media, the more participatory and complex communication landscape enabled by Web 
2.0 result in, as Clay Shirky has argued, “gaining greater access to information, more opportunities 
to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action’ (2011). The 
performance of this public speech through the apparatus of online visual culture, such as memes 
make digital media in Nigeria a new kind of cultural landscape within which democratic 
subjectivities indeed emerge and proliferate.  
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Aside from actual performative forms such as the selfie, and fictional images, Internet 
memes are other forms of political communication that indicate how the Nigerian public sphere is 
being transformed by the digital symbolic representations of Nigerian netizens. Memes in this view 
bring an evidence of “pop polyvocality” in the way they are a popular cultural common tongue that 
facilitates the diverse engagement and proliferation of many voices (Milner, 65). Used together 
with popular hashtags, these memes shape and reshape the public consciousness of network 
subjects, enabling cultural and alternative spaces for resisting official sites of hegemonies. These 
young Nigerian netizens rely on a digital culture that enables an unmediated representational space 
for individuals, and a self-broadcasting agency that oftentimes brings individual users of new media 
technologies in direct confrontation with oppressive power and disempowering conditions. Brian 
Loader, Ariadne Vromen, and Michael Xenos have described the youths who participate in this 
‘digital social mediation’ of political power as the networking young citizen. As they put it: 
Networking young citizens are far less likely to become members of political or civic 
organizations such as parties or trades unions; they are more likely to participate in 
horizontal or non-hierarchical networks; they are more project orientated; they 
reflexively engage in lifestyle politics; they are not dutiful but self-actualizing; their 
historical reference points are less likely to be those of modern welfare capitalism but 
rather global information networked capitalism and their social relations are 
increasingly enacted through a social media networked environment. (145) 
Since there exists a vast army of networking young citizens around the world that invest political 
agency in online forms such as memes, the ideas in this excerpt can be extended to accommodate 
the operations of online popular culture in pushing back oppressive political hierarchies. Also, a 
social media culture that promotes different expressions of networking and interactivity, makes 
possible a political order ensuring the destabilization of the traditional function and capacity of the 
 215 
 
state as the sole and legitimate organizer of people and resources (Owen 18). The creation and 
distribution of memes should be conceptualized as an important aspect of Nigerian digital culture 
that undergirds and intensifies resistance against totalities.  
 
5.2 Internet Memes and Electoral Politics in Nigeria 
 In a country in which elections are still fraught with fraud, with most agencies of government 
out to serve and legitimize the ruling party’s partisanship, netizens mobilize Internet memes as 
cultural tools of resistance. The participation of some of these Nigerian Internet users in a public 
sphere motivated by new media in Nigeria has resonance, therefore, both in cultural discourses and 
in the political landscape itself. Aside from the fact that Goodluck Jonathan became the first 
president to use social media to engage with these millions of young people, the president also 
planted apologists in these online network communities defending his government’s policies and 
activities. As one of the practices of countering this online propaganda group, Internet memes 
became a political communicational strategy of engagement in the public arena.  The proliferation 
of digitally enabled mobile cellphones in many Africa countries at the turn of the millennium 
encouraged creative Nigerian youths to appropriate digital media communities to articulate their 
political perspectives more intensely and visibly. Besides the publication of political commentaries 
on social media and the use of the various network environments for holding government 
accountable, they also, through popular entertainment forms, such as Internet memes, challenge 
social conventions and confront normative modes of corrupt and institutional power. The creation 
and dissemination of memes is one of the avenues through which young people articulate a 
resistance and cope with hostile living conditions.  
 With digital media, however, the possibility of a direct engagement by individual citizens 
with politics and political actors suggests how a multitude of internet users, using humorous memes 
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online, and the power of the thumb offline, can “authorize” possible change in governments. For 
instance, the examples below are some of the texts distributed online in the days before the 2015 
national election in Nigeria. Particularly, they describe the electoral campaign process of the two 
major political parties and how their various supporters struggled for dominance in virtual space.  
Adegoju and Oyebode describe the dominant issues distributed on social media around before the 
2015 elections, including (a) the perceived misrule of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for 16 
years (1999–2015) and the poise of the emergent coalition opposition party the All Progressive 
Congress (APC) to contest it; (b) the alleged ineptitude of the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan to fix 
some of Nigeria’s nagging problems such as corruption, insecurity, energy and unemployment 
during his first term in office (648). In addition to these, much of the campaign discourses refracted 
through online memes include the oppositional counter-discourses of supporters of the incumbent 
president. They labelled General Muhammadu Buhari the standard bearer of the opposition party 
as a religious bigot, dwelling on/emphasizing an alleged high-school certificate scandal to 
disparage his candidacy. Other electoral topics include the ‘change’ mantra that dominated the 
campaign of the opposition party and which received enormous memetic attention among netizens. 
 
5.3 Pre-Election Memes 
 Most of the memes circulated before the election were satirical critiques targeted at the 
Jonathan administration by netizens who desired a change in the country’s political leadership. 
Together with the Boko Haram terror activities in Northern Nigeria, the abduction narratives of the 
Chibok girls, which had become politicized as an election subject, provided the most apparent 
contexts for most of the memes produced before the 2015 polls. Meme creators were responding 
to the Nigerian government’s handling of the abduction of an estimated 234 schoolgirls by Boko 
Haram. These memes served to spread the political narratives and social criticism of regular 
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citizens, critiquing Nigeria’s exploitative and corrupt power regime. The subversive and satiric 
images posted in new media environments were focused on resisting the political negligence of the 
ruling class and narrating alternative citizen perspectives. As I have discussed some examples on 
the Chibok girls in previous chapters, I now consider some other images that were distributed by 
Internet users as memes before the election. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4. Meme. A tearful mage of former President Jonathan crying. Online.  
This meme uses irony and ridicule to represent the response of the Nigerian state to a recent 
misappropriation of taxpayers’ money. The ironic depiction of a president crying to remain in 
power but not willing to be empathetic enough to alleviate the people’s suffering is particularly 
telling. While the meme both disseminates, and records this actual event, it also caricatures the way 
Nigerian politicians, notable for their thievery and corruption, seek elective positions without any 
concrete developmental agenda for the country. The meme deploys satire as a strategy to 
interrogate political corruption in Nigeria, while lampooning a culture of graft that relates to shame 
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as a non-existent emotion. This example projects a netizen’s attempt to subvert and resist a 
normative political condition within what Ryan Milner identifies as a “logic of lulz” (1) that serves 
as the dominant character of internet memes. Internet memes exhibit the functioning of humour as 
important discursive practice in Nigerian social media. The idea that Nigerian politicians would 
contest leadership positions despite their questionable ethics is further demonstrated in one of the 
memes below, with the caption: “I don’t know what I am doing. Just vote for me.” 
 
 
Fig. 5.5. A screen caption of two different memes satirizing President Jonathan 
The narrative of this first meme provides an engaging commentary on the perception that President 
Jonathan was clueless and unfit to lead Nigeria. The meme is an articulation of the views of many 
Nigerian Internet users who were supporters of Jonathan’s opponent, General Buhari. Functioning 
as a visual reinforcement of the “clueless” rhetoric the official opposition party resorted to when 
describing the former Nigerian leader, it legitimizes and replicates a common political narrative in 
the country. The verbal meme—in this case the idea of meme is understood as any infectious and 
reproducible idea that propagates easily from person to person—in the Nigerian political 
environment rematerializes in this example as an Internet meme. There is also a reinforcement of 
the belief that many African leaders choose to cling to power even if without any measurable 
political achievement, or specific plans for sustainable development. Both the creator of the meme 
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and those who share and it on social media platforms suggest that the Nigerian president lacks 
political competence and is not fit to lead the nation.  
 The second meme in the example envisions the censorship of the Internet in Nigeria, a topic 
that the state enlisted for juridical approval after the elections. The meme is a representation of 
government’s response to citizen engagement with institutional practices. This meme is used to 
imagine the Nigerian president’s criticism of social media interventions by Nigerian netizens. The 
“nonsense” here refers to the various creative sites of critiques contrary to the government’s 
oppressive policies and actions. It may also signify the government’s mode of delegitimizing the 
interventions of young people in Nigeria’s political discourses, or their procurement of public 
speech through social media. The meme functions as a visual text calling attention to free speech 
and its constraints in Nigeria. In addition, we can still locate a second-order signification in the 
text, with the meme showing how online visual culture embodies mythologies, ideological 
persuasions that are culturally understood by the interpretive community of the text. The mythic 
significance of the meme is its representation of the Nigerian government’s disdain of social media, 
since Nigerian political discourse is now being shaped and influenced on Facebook and Twitter. 
Nigerian users of these social media affirm them as network communities for claiming and 
reclaiming social and political agency.  The president’s identity is reproduced in dictatorial terms 
that imagine him as a leader the country does not deserve. Free media and censorship are other 
vital concerns of the meme. In a country with much state presence in the traditional media, social 
media and new media technologies in general give young Nigerians an opportunity to speak truth 
to power. These satirical forms of ‘speech’ threaten the normative order and operation of the state 
and its repressive ideological apparatuses.  
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Fig. 5.6. A Photoshopped image of Muhammed Buhari (newly elected president in Nigeria), in 
one of his address to supporters, shows a self-indicting message about his past legacy as military 
dictator. 
 
This meme aptly reconstructs the historical legacies of General Buhari, a former military ruler of 
Nigeria. Having led a junta in Nigeria, Buhari was perceived as a high-handed leader known for 
human rights abuses.  This meme is one of several images distributed by online supporters of 
Jonathan to critique and lampoon the president’s political opponent. It is important to note that the 
creation and sharing of this meme, and other political memes indeed, can be understood as a 
practice of political identity and identification. By sharing a meme that criticizes Jonathan, a user 
can be perceived to be a Buhari supporter. Conversely, if a user shares a meme, like the one above 
recirculating Buhari’s past human rights abuses, they not only perform a political affiliation, but 
also affirm themselves as supporters of the Jonathan administration.  
The production and distribution of Internet memes during the 2015 elections was, thus, an 
expression of partisan ideologies, in most cases. In other words, Internet users who support either 
parties found in memes cultural mechanisms for performing political selves and expressing their 
political perspective. One can conclude that social media facilitates a shift in the political 
participation of many netizens, who swap their passive followership of politicians for an active 
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engagement in the political process. This paradigm shift is made possible by new media, and by 
the way the agency user-based media enables is used is this creation of forms of popular culture 
and entertainment. Aside from these examples, there were memes that were circulated within the 
contexts of viral hashtags on Facebook and Twitter. One of such hashtags, 
#BabaWhileYouWereGone, trended on Twitter as a form of bantering, which panders to satire. 
 
5.4 The #IstandwithJega Meme 
 The next three examples highlight this likelihood of a relationship between social media posts 
and the electoral process, underlining the ways young people in Nigeria used internet meme within 
the framework of hashtag activism to participate in democratic politics and push back against 
electoral fraud and corruption. The #IstandwithJega hashtag and meme was birthed within the 
social media context of support for the head of the electoral commission, Attahiru Jega. I am also 
using this section to highlight the close relationship between Internet memes and what Nathan 
Rambukanna identifies as “hashtag publics” (174).  Unlike in spaces such as Facebook, hashtag 
publics on Nigerian Twitter enable citizens to assemble and cluster more effectively around a 
trending topic. While Facebook encourages more interactivity and dialogues, hashtags serve public 
points of convergence for netizens to deconstruct and engage with power and its agents. As Axel 
Bruns et al. assert: 
hashtags now serve a wide range of purposes: amongst them, the well-understood function 
of assembling an ad hoc public around a key issue; gathering of a community of practice 
engaging in shared, possibly concurrent activities (such as attending a live entertainment or 
sporting event, or using Twitter as a backchannel to radio and TV broadcasts); attempting to 
create and promote a (playful or serious) meme that is virally distributed across local, 
national, and global Twitter networks; or introducing a point of emphasis that – similar to an 
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emoticon or emoji – carries a stronger semiotic charge than a word alone would be able to 
do. (2) 
Of all these varied descriptions of the hashtag and its publics and uses, the most dominant in 
Nigerian online communication is the way hashtags can indeed be used to provoke and promote 
“a (playful or serious) meme that is virally distributed” across local and global Twitter networks. 
This transnational staging of political identities and the performance of citizenship through the 
hashtag makes the creation and distribution of memes a practice affirming online visual culture as 
an important form of activist speech that resonates beyond specific locations. Many Twitter users 
deployed the meme as a means of expressing confidence in Jega. Attahiru Jega was perceived by 
many in the country as s social justice crusader who would not be compromised in the electoral 
process like his predecessors. The meme was thus an online response to rumours that the Jonathan 
administration was contemplating replacing Jega with somebody who would aid the incumbent 
government and disenfranchise the people.  In a country that is not generally known for free and 
fair elections, the meme was one of the significant ways netizens declared their desire for an 
electoral process not riddled with corruption. This citizen engagement with the political process 
was not merely a social media fantasy or engagement with mediatized representations and empty 
signs online. It was, as @dupekilla affirms in the tweet below, a process that can result in concrete 
political changes in the body politic. 
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Fig. 5.7. An #IstandwithJega meme. https://twitter.com/dupekilla/status/583331446124843011 
The immediacy of the social media platform results in the personalization of a hitherto distant 
political process, as regular citizens now participate more visibly through social media memes in 
the political process. Their consumption of media is simultaneously bound up with a disembodied 
distribution of resistance organized around the sharing of visual memes serving as vectors of online 
agency. @dupekilla’s tweet celebrates the recognition of the #IstandwithJega meme by the 
mainstream media, with the user adding boastfully that: “And they say it is just #Twitter.”  This 
statement justifies the use of social media in the electoral process. It also serves to show that 
arguments such as those of Russell Neuman et al. in The Internet and Four Dimensions of 
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Citizenship that, “with the notable exception of political scandals, it is hard to find traceable 
instances where issues nourished online have driven broader public debates” (28) are indeed 
outdated. The user judges the success of the meme by the fact that the BBC TV program on Africa 
dedicates airtime to discussing the issue.  “And they say it is just #Twitter” could also have been 
a response to detractors, mostly from the ruling government, who insisted the Twitter space was 
an illusory place incapable of enhancing productive political participation or the expression of 
contention politics in Nigeria. This example emphasizes the need to examine the relationship 
between power, discourses, and institutional practices in the frame of representation forms 
(Internet memes) utilized by regular citizens as playful markers of everyday online life. Although 
@dupekilla’s excessive techno-optimism may not be justifiable, one fact is clear, as Paul Mason 
asserts: “people know more than they used to ... they have greater and more instant access to 
knowledge, and reliable ways of counteracting disinformation” (Mason 147). Most importantly, 
they have, besides other tactics of performing political selves, visual images as important 
economies of subaltern meanings, speech, and agency.  
 There are other variations of the #IstandwithJega meme that show the ways Internet memes as 
forms of popular culture intersect with power and sociopolitical discourses. Unlike what obtains 
through the exclusive reliance on modern technologies in advanced democracies, the Nigerian 
voting system largely depends on manual labour, with digital technologies having just been 
introduced in recent years. Because of this dependence on human labour, voter fraud is a recurrent 
issue in the country’s elections. During the announcement of electoral results in 2015, a 
representative of the governing PDP and cabinet minister in the Jonathan administration, Godsday 
Orubebe decided to halt the announcement of results, sensing that the country was voting against 
his principal. While  Godsday Orubebe’s hysteric disruption of the announcement results was 
being shown live on national TV,  a number of memes were being circulated by social media users 
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participating in the process from home. The #IstandwithJega meme resurfaced in other forms on 
Twitter and Facebook as Attahiru Jega watched Orubebe’s actions with a calmness that further 
endeared him to millions of Nigerians. The example below is an example of the #IstandwithJega 
meme refashioned and distributed to show the bravery of the INEC chairman in fighting against 
corruption.  
 
 
Fig 5.8. The Head of Nigeria’s Electoral Commission INEC is Cast as a Jedi to Show his Fight 
Against Electoral Fraud. https://twitter.com/famuyideolawale/status/583260624207155200 
 
This image appeared in most online spaces when Godsday Orubebe interrupted the announcement 
of results, accusing the electoral body of bias. Social media users reacted to Orubebe’s protest by 
using this image along with the #IstandwithJega hashtag to live-tweet support for Attahiru Jega’s 
commitment to a fair electoral process. This deployment of social media to convey the real-time 
performance of civic speech through a meme documents an important political history of Nigeria, 
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demonstrating how participatory politics on Nigerian social media can be productive outside of the 
medium. The meme creator, Famuyide Olawale has reproduced Jega’s identity in a way that fits 
and parallels the identity of the Jedi in the Star Wars movie narratives. By invoking an important 
figure in a major Hollywood text, the meme is made to signify how Jega’s wisdom and skill helped 
to master the forces of corruption that threatened the Nigerian republic at a crucial point of history. 
The rhetoric of the photo is of particular relevance within the domain of popular culture and its 
constitution by cultural forms from different media fields. The message of the meme—these are 
not the votes you are looking for—is both an intertext and a revision of a now popular meme “These 
Are Not the Droids You Are Looking For,” a statement by Obi-Wan Kenobi referencing the 
Stormtroopers in Star Wars Episode IV. The statement is now popularly used in urban cultures as 
a reference to the pursuit of a wrong course of action. In relation to the Nigerian election, the meme 
gestures towards Orubebe’s lack of awareness of Jega’s determination to safeguard the people’s 
electoral mandate. Like the Jedi figure, who values individual freedom and self-determination, Jega 
appears to be interested in the realization of the people’s right to dictate the outcome of the Nigerian 
elections. The creative translation of Jega to a Jedi in the meme is, therefore, a linguistic means of 
emphasizing his defence of justice and resistance to corruptive electioneering practices. That 
characterized the tenure of his predecessors  
The meme exhibits a doubling of roles evident in how its creators and disseminators 
participate in a transnational discourse of popular culture, while they also engage humorously with 
Nigerian politics. Images such as these, point to one of the ways social media is construed in this 
dissertation as cultural facilities for the expression of political identities, organized by everyday 
people around performative agency and resistance. Seeing that Goodluck Jonathan would lose the 
elections, some Twitter users began to distribute sarcastic memes that ridiculed the erstwhile 
president. Setting the narrative as a subversion of the #BringBackOurGirls social media hashtag, 
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many of these users sought to mock the president and his inability to rescue the Chibok girls 
abducted by Boko Haram. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.9. “Jega, Wait… What If I Bring Back Our Girls Before 8:00 PM?” Twitter. 31 March, 
2015 https://twitter.com/iam_Rawlings/status/582918466732044289 
The text in the meme is framed as a question from a losing candidate who appears to be desperate 
to save his presidency. This meme presents a satirical narrative authored by an ordinary social 
media user lampooning how matters as grave as security are tied to political considerations such 
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as re-election. The meme satirizes African leaders whose motivation to do what is right is 
conditional upon re-election. While this is a fictional portrayal of the president, it enables an 
understanding of how regular citizens through Internet memes reimagined and narrated the 
electoral process.  Although there is the invocation of a traumatic event in the meme, it gained 
traction nonetheless because humour, as noted in the previous chapter, is one of the major cultural 
modes of engaging with adversity in oppressive circumstances. This example, together with the 
two before it, play into the narrative that memes and tweets constituted real-time options through 
which netizens participated in the electoral process.  
 
5.5 Post-Election Memes and Hashtags 
President’s Buhari’s electoral victory in the 2015 election was epochal not only because he 
was a Muslim from the North who won overwhelmingly in the majority Christian southwest, but 
also because it was the first time the country witnessed an incumbent president lose an election. 
This relinquishing of power is significant, considering that some African leaders are notorious for 
clinging to political offices. Most of the political images at the center of the conversations before 
and after the election focused on the inability of the Jonathan government to response adequately 
to domestic challenges such as political corruption and poverty. Based on Buhari’s victory at the 
2015 polls and Goodluck Jonathan’s peaceful transfer of political power, the throng of social media 
netizens who keep faith in the efficacy of the platforms to induce material change intensified their 
online advocacy, using hashtags as an important media archive of their resistance. #MinisterialList 
and #MissingBudget have been some of the most popular Twitter hashtags they employed to 
disseminate commentaries on the new policies and activities of the Buhari government. One of the 
lingering consequences of the 2014 social media hashtag #BringBackOurGirls, for instance, is its 
reconfiguration of contentious politics in Nigeria. Since then, netizens have produced many other 
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hashtags that have been used to organize and shape online discussions on electoral politics and 
political governance.  
In the first two years of the Buhari government in Nigeria, several Twitter hashtags that 
narrate and reflect the Nigerian political condition trended on Twitter. Some of the most viral 
hashtags during this period include: #NigeriaDecides, #NigeriaHasDecided, #Dasukigate, 
#MissingBudget, #BudgetofYams, #OpenNass, #RedefineNigeria, #NotoSocialMediaBill, 
#MarchonNass, #NeverToBeForgotten, #TheOtherRoom, #PMBwasted365days, #TheList, 
#FreeAudu, #IstandwithNigeria, #OccupyCBN, and #Takebackyourcountry. Anyone familiar with 
the Nigerian society can see how these hashtags also historicize and document contemporary 
politics in Nigeria. While hashtags are important symbols of the online public sphere, therefore, 
the Nigerian context shows that hashtags can also be regarded as archives of political narratives 
and resistance. As these examples affirm, most of these hashtags produced network publics whose 
interactions in the new public spheres facilitated by digital media are mostly politically oriented. 
Although these hashtags originate from the Twitter community, they migrate to other spaces such 
as Facebook and to offline environments of actual protest. One other thing these hashtags reveal is 
the way online debates in Nigeria are grounded in a contested space in which the political 
perspectives of regular citizens can be censured by disruptive online voices working in the interest 
of government. Other ways this censuring of expression of alternative meanings manifest in 
contexts, such as #Ferguson, for instance, is through “algorithmic filtering” (Tufekci 2014) of the 
hashtags themselves. Zeynep Tufekci wonders if “Ferguson [would] be buried in algorithmic 
censorship” (online) had there not been Twitter. In the Nigerian framework, the politics of net 
neutrality and algorithmic filtering which is the focus of Tufekci’s article is not as pronounced as 
the careful ways government plants trolls in network communities to misinform progressive 
netizens who converge to have disinterested democratic conversations. 
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To return to one of the hashtags above, the #MissingBudget hashtag, was a response in 
2016 to news in the mainstream media that the country’s budget of the same year submitted to the 
Nigerian Senate by the President could not be found. The creative Twitter users who began to tweet 
on the topic by using different memes were motivated by the conviction that the missing document 
was symptomatic of political corruption; although there is the possibility that they were also 
responding to the hilarity of the situation. The incident provided another classic illustration of what 
it means in Nigeria to “Laugh out Loud” (LOL) at institutional power and its abuses in Nigeria’s 
online mediasphere. Images such as Figure 5.10 is one of the many playful treatments of the subject 
on Twitter. 
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Fig. 5.10. “Searching for the #MissingBudget is a National Task.”  Twitter. 14 Jan 2016 
https://twitter.com/Justinattor/status/687717589594849281 
The example reveals one of the many modes of political conversations, in the days after the 
inauguration of the Buhari government, namely the deployment of random images as cultural 
resources for resisting systemic abuses of power. As “searching for the #MissingBudget is a 
national task,” @Justinattor and the other commenters are invested in a patriotic duty to the nation-
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state. The idea of invoking the nation suggests the ways netizens imagine the constitution of the 
“national.” From the standpoint of government, the national is an uncontested and neutral space 
for all citizens. However, the usage of the word in this tweet uncovers a reading of the national as 
politically charged space in which re-enfranchised citizens recover political voice and agency. 
Those who conceive of the search for the missing budget as “a national task” see themselves as 
citizens who now have some level of involvement in the nation’s political project, even if this 
participation is mediatized.  
There is something of a playful and performative reconstitution of citizenship at play both 
in the tireless effort to retrieve the document in virtual space and in the commitment to using meme 
to facilitate the search. The image in the tweets was shared by many Twitter users who engaged its 
visual rhetoric to demonstrate the gravity of the search effort, hence they bend over sewage drains 
to find an important political document. That they resort to the sewage is a ridicule of governmental 
apparatuses in Nigeria. The larger critique of this meme is the way the #MissingBudget hashtag is 
being used by these Twitter users to offer alternative meanings and narratives to a systemic 
manifestation of corruption in the country. Aside from the humorous meme in this illustration, the 
words of the tweets are satirical commentaries on the appalling conditions in which governmental 
power thrives in Nigeria. While I examine the political discourses and critical exchanges embedded 
in and enabled by these social media environments, my more nuanced engagement in this 
dissertation has been the ways the deliberate production of popular and comical images by creative 
Internet users furnishes critics with a parallel discursive space for the analyses of power relations 
and subaltern agency. 
One of the hashtags that best represent this commitment to the production of subversive 
images mocking and satirizing operations of hegemonic power in the Nigerian state is 
#TheOtherRoom, used with the image in Figure 5.11. Responding to his wife’s criticism of his 
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government on a state visit to Germany in 2016, Buhari told reporters, while taking questions 
alongside Chancellor Angela Merkel: “I don't know which party my wife belongs to, but she 
belongs to my kitchen, and my living room and the other room.” The idea that the country’s first 
lady belonged in the kitchen went viral on social media, as netizens used the hashtag 
#TheOtherRoom to engage in discussions on gender oppression and the female identity and 
presence in Nigerian politics and culture. I have already discussed a humorous recreation of this 
topic in chapter four, in which I examined how different users on Facebook and Twitter organized 
satirical commentaries around it. What I might add to it is that the president’s slippage received a 
more vehement attack on Twitter because of the way the hashtag functioned as an apparatus of 
collecting and organizing recalcitrant voices. The hashtag was used alongside multiple viral memes 
to reflect the criticality of visual and popular culture to the emergent hashtag publics in Nigerian 
social media. 
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Fig. 5.11: “#TheOtherRoom” Twitter. https://twitter.com/234stars_/status/788122256316719104 
This meme, published on Twitter by a blogger, has been redistributed 29 times by different users 
who have much larger number of followers on Twitter. The image is a useful illustration of the 
mobilization of popular culture in the expression of participatory politics in the Nigerian 
Twitterverse. The idea being invoked through a Photoshop design of a movie poster is the ubiquity 
of Nollywood as a foremost medium of African popular culture which is central to the playful 
presentation of political agency in much of Nigerian social media culture. Although I argued in 
chapter two that social media has overtaken Nollywood as the first communicative medium of 
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subaltern speech and agency, it is clear from this example that everyday users of social media still 
make sense of the political terrain by exploring images from Nollywood as creative memes of their 
counter-hegemony. By placing the first lady at the background of the poster, and foregrounding 
the image of the president, the creator of the meme uses a visual language to re-narrate the gendered 
nature of the president’s statement, a point discussed in the preceding chapter.  
Performative expressions of citizenship by Nigerian netizens have intensified in recent days 
because of some of the fiscal policies of the present government that have left the country in 
economic recession. The articulation of political perspectives and civic agency through a memetic 
scrutiny of the Buhari administration can be illustrated through a final example from Babasola 
Kuti’s Twitter post on the hashtag #BuhariMustGo: 
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Figure 5.12: “Game over? #BuhariMustGo.” Twitter.  
https://twitter.com/SKSolaKuti/status/860143300975751168/photo/1 
 
The #BuhariMustGo hashtag which has trended in the last few months has been used to organize 
protests across the country, aside from the fact that it is the narrative locus of critiquing the current 
government. This cartoon by Mike Asukwo is also being shared by many netizens to query the 
President’s ability to continue in office because of his failing health. Unlike Aisha Yesufu’s actual 
embodied performance of politics, this is a fictional image that accompanies a hashtag as a 
signifying practice mounted to express political subjectivity. In the image, three former Nigerian 
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heads of state are depicted as medical personnel who carry out the injured president on a stretcher. 
The language of the narrative is vital to uncovering the message of the cartoon, as there are semiotic 
and aesthetic elements of a football match that are a strategic portrayal of the ways in which politics 
is merely a game that is played by Nigerian leaders. Despite an injury that requires medical 
attention, the president is opposed to being dismissed from the field, insisting that he “can finish 
this game.” The president’s refusal to hand over the soccer ball is itself indicative of the attitude of 
some African leaders who hold tenaciously to power, even if found to be incompetent by the 
people. The cartoon, thus, satirizes the breakdown of the apparatus of governance witnessed by 
Nigeria when the President spent three months receiving medical treatment in London. A concealed 
meaning in the cartoon is also the presence of former corrupt leaders who have saddled themselves 
with the task of getting the President out of the political arena. Their role is an assertion of the 
disenfranchisement of the people in the determination of the country’s political destiny. The three 
medical officials symbolize a political culture in which an oligarchy, rather than the electorate, 
exercises power over political governance. The #BuhariMustGo hashtag is one of the ways a 
section of the electorate can repossess some level of agency on Twitter, even as this repossession 
is supplemented with a text which represents the actual conditions of political dispossession the 
people are confronted with. While hashtag activism in the Nigerian increasingly generates more 
hashtags, it is important to conclude that hashtags have afterlives and indeed serve as storehouses 
of public memory—in the way they function to archive and circulate the recent history of 
alternative and subaltern political perspectives in Nigeria. 
To conclude this chapter, I first restate some of ideas on Internet memes, hashtags and 
democratic participation in Nigeria, before some final reflections on the overarching thesis and 
arguments in the dissertation. Internet memes constitute a productive virtual genre of the 
participatory politics of Nigerian netizens. Many social media users resorted to photo-based memes 
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as forms of participating in an emergent hashtag public in the country. Specifically, as I have shown 
in this chapter, the 2015 elections in Nigeria provided a public platform for the mobilization of 
Internet memes by netizens for electoral participation. Aside from actual voting and other 
expressions of electoral agency, many of these users relied on social media as the organizing space 
for the monitoring and critiquing of the electoral process. These acts are new expressions of 
democratic behaviour grounded in and enabled by the increasingly ubiquitous digital culture in 
Nigeria. Tracking and exploring the nature of this involvement in the political landscape through a 
sustained examination of memes and their rhetorical strategies have been the focus of this final 
chapter. These Internet memes, like the selfie and the other subversive images discussed in earlier 
chapters, reaffirm the point that political images posted on social media are discursive locations 
through which satirical speech functions as resistance to abusive power.  
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CONCLUSION 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE FUTURE OF SUBALTERN AGENCY IN NIGERIA 
My dissertation began with the question: what are the ways in which Nigerian netizens 
imagine the nation and perform political selves and identities through viral images on social media? 
A study of popular images circulated by netizens in Nigerian social media reveals economies of 
subversive representations that are used by everyday citizens to undermine political oppression and 
perform politicized speech. In concluding his own dissertation on the intersection of popular culture 
and the discursive values of subaltern narratives in Nigeria, Nduka Otiono reaffirms the import of 
the street and its ontological character as an “epistemic site for a broader and deeper range of 
interdisciplinary scholarship on everyday lived experiences in postcolonial Nigeria” (412). 
Otiono’s study was completed at a point when social media was only just emerging as a space 
capable of facilitating the coordination and dissemination of local narratives and identities to a 
more dispersed and global audience. With the role of social media in the Arab Spring, which Otiono 
and other scholars writing around that period elaborated upon, and indeed, Occupy Nigeria in 2012, 
it became obvious that social media would become a pertinent digital space for collecting and 
circulating alternative meanings and subaltern subjectivities from everyday Nigerians. Social 
media thus postures as virtual platform for the reconstitution of street stories that have more visual 
inflections than imagined by Otiono. Aside from staging citizen narratives in the rhizomatic 
pathways of the Internet, social media also assures an evolution of the form of these narratives. 
Because of social media, there is a transformation in the nature of stories shared in the Nigerian 
public sphere, as well as the ways in which audience appreciate and relate with the cultural practices 
in these network spaces. 
The ways I have explored the reappearance of subaltern speech in the Nigeria public sphere 
can be summarized using the rhetoric of two final examples that illuminate how women and young 
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people now participle more visibly and vigorously in political and cultural conversations. The first 
example is Adeola Fayehun’s Keeping It Real with Adeola on Sahara TV—an online news platform 
in Nigeria. Adeola Fayehun worked as a journalist before turning to Sahara Reporters’ social media 
to start her satirical and comic presentations of political news and events from Nigeria and other 
parts of Africa.  Since her performance of news commentary and analysis uses hilarity and the 
theatrical, one may argue that these factors inform her huge following online. However, there is 
the more pertinent fact that she has a space on YouTube and Facebook that further disseminates 
her voice to many Africans around the globe who follow her 30-minute show and can have political 
conversations with her and with one another. While there are many powerful female voices in the 
contemporary media landscape in Nigeria, Adeola’s incisive, yet playful, voice is probably the 
most visible and boldest in the critique of political hegemony in the recent history of the country, 
and social media has played a huge role in the cultivation of that reality. While Adeola’s example 
gestures towards the dissemination of current affairs, users such as Correct Bae and other similar 
accounts by women use fictional and anonymous accounts to criticize government. These are all 
bold interventions by women in a culture that is still conditioned by patriarchal politics.  
If the example of a woman subverting and undermining the highly patriarchal space of 
Nigerian politics through satire on social media is not intriguing, then the second example of an 
everyday social media user from Northern Nigeria, a region mostly represented as a place of terror 
and economic precarity, may articulate the point a little more. One of the manifestations of political 
abuses in Nigeria is the recent gross neglect of the study and preservation of History, a subject 
whose academic transmission the juridical establishment in the country expunged from the public-
school system. Although this disarticulation of the subject from the curriculum was eventually 
overturned after some resistance on social media and in other media contexts, the policy 
underscores the state’s attitude to national memory and collective identity. As history continues to 
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be relegated to the margins of a decrepit educational system in a country that fails to fund and 
maintain sites of memory, social media, again, comes to the fore as an expressive mechanism 
through which ordinary Nigerians resist the government’s tragic ahistorical approach to the 
Nigerian past. Taken from Williams Chechet’s We are The North project on social media, my final 
example thus presents a work of popular image showing how digital media enables the 
reinterpretation and transmission of Nigerian history by regular citizens. Using Instagram and other 
similar platforms, the user @Williamschechet, recently featured on CNN’s Africa’s portal, 
highlights how performative and politicized speech on social media is articulated as a mode of 
resisting official dehistoricization. Chechet deploys signifiers of popular art culture to reconfigure 
historic images from Northern Nigeria, a region of the country negatively portrayed in the media 
because of Boko Haram and widespread poverty. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.13. From Williams Chechet. “We are The North.” Instagram 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BPX4rWxDTbp/?taken-by=williamschechet 
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This example presents a popular representation of a former Nigerian leader Tafawa Balewa (from 
the North) and uses digital art to portray Balewa’s identity in a way that invites a “cool” generation 
of young Nigerians to prominent figures in their history. In re-presenting an image from Nigerian 
history on social media, Williams Chechet relies on a network of audience commentary and 
participation to document the past and present alternative perspectives on Northern Nigeria. His 
works are important because they use social media as personalized representations of Nigerian 
historical narratives, promoting an awareness of historical knowledge online. While the 
deployment of popular art in presenting a historical perspective is significant, what makes Williams 
Chechet’s project We Are the North truly effective is how it exemplifies the artistic recreation of 
the Nigerian past through digital media, presenting it before a network audience that productively 
interacts with it. His work not only recalls the past but also gives his many audiences, home and 
abroad, an opportunity to appreciate the history and culture of Northern Nigeria.  
As netizens engage with the Nigerian past online through digital images, they are invested 
in a shared and digital reconstruction of historical memory that potentially refashions nostalgia as 
a generative sentiment that harbors possibilities for recovering alternative representations of non-
dominant groups and identities. This productive approach to nostalgia is necessary, because in 
Mike Pickering and Emily Keightley’s estimation, as “the negative sense of nostalgia prevails, 
there is a tendency to neglect the reciprocal relationship between audience and media in generating 
the conditions for making sense and meaning” (930) both of past and present realities. While 
nostalgia might, therefore, be regarded as an ambivalent desire for the past, works such as Williams 
Chechet’s invite the reconceptualization of nostalgia as a healthy emotion for constituting and 
producing historical imagination. An antidote for the so-called “dictatorship of nostalgia” (Boym 
2007, 17) and the cooptation of history and politics by nostalgic emotions, might be a framework 
that develops an understanding of nostalgia as “a poetic creation, an individual mechanism of 
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survival, a countercultural practice” (17) which Kerwin Klein (2011) locates as a therapeutic 
response to the crises of historiography, a fact also applicable in the Nigerian context. Williams 
Chechet’s Instagram experimentations offer an individual articulation of some of the ways images 
of popular culture are being made by Nigerian netizens to function in various contexts to challenge 
cultural orthodoxies and present alternative representations of subaltern speech in public 
discourses.  
With the recent post-factual age of Trump and its distribution of “alternative facts” and 
“fake news,” however, there is the need also to problematize and recover the idea of the 
alternative—which I have used extensively in this dissertation to signify the other locations of 
meanings and culture outside the normative matrix of dominant narratives and official power. The 
alternative meanings and perspectives I have used in my analyses are sourced from viral popular 
images of self-presentations and performances in Nigerian social media culture. These images, 
intrinsic as signifiers of visual culture to social media culture, incorporate in their rhetorical 
strategies, politically subversive insights that speak to a culture of resistance and expressive 
agency. This alternative, which also spreads online, is, thus, not grounded in the untrue, despite the 
mediatized space of its dissemination. Rather, I conceive of it as an anti-hegemonic fact or what 
Leah Lievrouw calls “an oppositional perspective” (3) occasioned by user-generated media and 
deployed as a mechanism of “participation and intervention in the creation of and sharing of 
meaning” (4). In addition to Lievrouw’s, other studies have engaged with this idea that social media 
platforms serve as an organizing space for agonizing and/or dissenting voices to mount various 
forms of resistance, and present marginal voices, and in the case of Nigeria, express outrage against 
a hegemonic culture that fosters the exclusion and marginalization of certain citizens. My emphasis 
is this possibility of de-marginalization and repoliticization facilitated by Web 2.0’s empowerment 
of the traditional consumers of media.  
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While social media continues to be used as discursive spaces of power relations by global 
citizens, my interest has consisted in identifying the various ways in which Nigerian netizens 
express performative agency through forms of popular culture, such as political cartoons, the selfie, 
Internet memes, and humorous images. Extrapolating the economy of meanings inherent in these 
images begin, for me, by unsettling the postmodern assumption that mediatized culture is futile for 
resistance. The refutation of such arguments is necessary to underscore the fact that the ability to 
represent the self, which social media affords excluded or oppressed populations is something that 
is worthy of note itself. It is possible to argue, like other scholars mentioned earlier have done, that 
a universe of algorithmic protocols undergirds and determines the behaviour of people on social 
media. However, the appropriation of the medium by users for presenting performative and 
dissident versions of selves and identities make such claims of technological determinism 
impervious to the actual social and political disruptions new media can potentially enable. While 
affirming the various ways in which processes of planting trolls online and coopting resistance 
voices by the Nigerian government suggest that the country’s social media culture has altered the 
operations of abusive power, I have focused on how economies of cultural representations can be 
productive for appreciating the organization of dissent online. My ideas in this work are thus 
grounded in the assumption that Nigerian social media culture stages an appreciation of the ways 
formerly silenced young voices use new media to engage with society and the operations of power. 
Like I mentioned in chapter two, because of social media, the exclusion of young people in actual 
governmental administration in Nigeria is a topic that is gradually being revisited through concrete 
parliamentary efforts. While these social rematerializations of social media forms of political 
engagement are important, my dissertation has foregrounded UNESCO’s 1980 prediction 
concerning young people: 
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In the more desperate structural crisis of the coming decade, the young may turn 
to the camera and the microphone in order to protest against the economic and 
social limitations impinging on their lives. They may be appealing to each other 
or their elders, worldwide, through demonstrations and cultural manifestations 
for an ethical judgment from what one expert calls an ‘all-seeing, all knowing 
eye of global communication’. (UNESCO 1981:41)  
Although this statement might not have imagined what an incipient Internet at that time would 
morph into, its emphasis on “demonstrations and cultural manifestations” expressed through the 
“all-seeing, all knowing eye of global communication’ is a prescient presentation of what 
cyberspace has become. Being more interested in the discursive implications of these cultural 
manifestations than in their teleology, I suggest that new cultural forms such as the selfie and 
Internet memes are important locations of identity and politics that make social media a cultural 
intervention. Aside from the frightening panoptic possibilities of the metaphoric ‘all-seeing, all 
knowing eye,” social media, in different ways, fully evinces this turn to the camera and the 
microphone, two significant apparatuses for performing the politics of visibility and speech, 
demonstrating the personalization of global communication by Web 2.0 technologies.  These two 
technologies have not only converged on social media as tools of popular culture, they are also 
being used by netizens as performative facilities to denaturalize and disrupt the mechanisms of 
totalities around the world. Social media thus presents itself in the Nigerian context as the most 
important enabler of subaltern speech and, perhaps for some time to come, will remain a strategic 
space from which disenfranchised individuals such as Nigeria’s youths and women seek redress 
and personal representation in the political terrain.  
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